topic

Security

1384 items · started 2023-04-11 · ongoing (last activity 2026-11-15)

  1. Published July 14, 2026 | Version v1 Publication Open Prompt Injection Attacks in Large Language Model Systems: Threats, Mechanisms, and Defense Strategies Authors/Creators Description AI systems based on Large Language Models are now ever…

  2. Got approved for Mythos 5.2 yesterday. Whole application took about ten minutes.

  3. We find that weight reprogramming fewer than 10 dormant neurons in an LLM is enough to backdoor any agent built on it, with no training required. The model passes evals and behaves normally until a trigger appears.

  4. I just noticed pretty much anyone can get access now through KYC. Enrolling used to require CVE or business verification but now individual researchers can apply with just their ID.

  5. This is a prompt-injection detector I built using NLP and SMT2.

  6. It’s been over six months since I wrote “The Boy That Cried Mythos“, and Anthropic’s vulnerability dashboard has been growing. Let’s take a look at the 8,527 findings added in its latest month.

  7. We expose a safety vulnerability on nascent agentic reinforcement-learning-as-a-service. Specifically, with a cost as low as \$20, we show that safety alignment of a large language model (e.g., Inkling) can be completely subverted through…

  8. Recent work in the privacy literature shows that sample-targeted membership inference attacks (MIAs) significantly outperform untargeted approaches by a wide margin. Motivated by this observation, we address the following question: can the…

  9. We propose Synthesis Smuggling, a novel threat model in which an adversarial LLM infers sensitive information about a user from routine assistance-seeking interactions and steganographically encodes that into innocuous-looking model-genera…

  10. Imagine an AI agent that aces every relevant evaluation, but when it sees 2027-01-01 in the terminal, it runs curl this http URL|sh, handing an attacker your credentials and your machine. Agents now run unattended for hours with privileged…

  11. Enforcement defenses against prompt injection, such as CaMeL, Progent, IPIGuard and DRIFT, ask the agent's own model to write a security artifact (a program, a privilege policy, a dependency graph or a constraint list) that code then enfor…

  12. Visual content in multimedia systems may be resized, compressed, or re-rendered before it is interpreted by a vision-language model. We study a security failure mode in which these transformations change the machine-readable semantics of a…

  13. I've been using Claude Code for small freelance jobs and wanted to share what keeps it from going wrong: Start every job with a read only tour. Ask it to explain the repo before it edits anything.

  14. Hackers are using fake OpenAI, SpaceX, and Anthropic event invitations to lure employees into phishing attacks, using two different phishing-as-a-service platforms to steal Microsoft and Google account credentials and authentication sessio…

  15. could not extract summary

  16. could not extract summary

  17. While trying to have a quick explication on one of my lessons in uni, Claude told me that in his skills, someone tried to execute a program called curl, supposed to analyze the proxy for security ig, im not very familiar to any of this so…

  18. I’m in Anthropic’s Cyber Verification Program with individual Defense Access. By December 15, 2026, the requirements say I need to sign in through Google or an equivalent identity provider with phishing-resistant MFA, and stop using API ke…

  19. My personal PC was infected with malware on Nov 6. I changed my Microsoft 365 password immediately, but between Nov 10–12, my Cursor Pro account accumulated $5,553.55 in unauthorized On-Demand Usage, mostly in ~$100 charges to my credit ca…

  20. Taster checks every tool call against your plain-English rules, and every tool result for prompt injection, so the rules live outside the agent where it can’t forget or ignore them.

  21. ⚖️ Prompt Injection, Esq.: pwning AI agent guardrails with lawyerspeak So, we raised $21M, which means we’re hiring, which means a hiring pipeline, which means someone has to keep the hiring pipeline tidy. Nobody wants that job.

  22. Introduction Hello world! Could a vulnerability in the #2 AI coding agent in the world open the door to a full-scale software supply chain compromise?

  23. Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong capabilities across diverse applications, making both safety and utility essential for reliable deployment. Jailbreak attacks use diverse forms of adversarial prompting to bypass alignment saf…

  24. Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong capabilities across diverse applications, making both safety and utility essential for reliable deployment. Jailbreak attacks use diverse forms of adversarial prompting to bypass alignment saf…

  25. Static application security testing (SAST) tools surface vulnerabilities early and their verdicts are rule-based and auditable. Yet developers routinely dismiss findings they cannot interpret.

  26. 🪐 AetherScope V2 (aether-engine) WebGL 2 Architectural Space Cockpit • Zero-Day SAST Linter (185+ Zero-Day Patterns & CWE Rules) • BLAKE3 Cryptographic Governance • Native MCP Server & "Zero-Shell" AI Gateway English 🇬🇧 | Français 🇫🇷 (Vers…

  27. I’m a chemical plant operator, not an IT professional. Continuous improvement is part of my job, so I apply it to my homelab too.

  28. i'm not a developer, i do support work for a living. i built safetoclone.com with claude code over the last 3 weeks, and it's free to use.

  29. [Switch 2] The OS exploit used in the recent jailbreak has been patched in version 23.5.0. Dumping and modding games will be impossible again from this point forward, with the exception of some cartridge games (and maybe game updates) tha…

  30. So I’ve spent most of my career in infrastructure, automation and security, and lately it really does feel like a vulnerability apocalypse. Leaked keys, bad packages, all of it.

  31. Google DeepMind has revealed a new generation of the AI-powered Gemini Robotics platform. In the 2.5 release, Google says its robotic AI is getting tantalizingly close to completing real-world tasks as well as humans do.

  32. Tool-using LLM agents act on instructions embedded in the data they read, so prompt injection is a structural rather than a prompt-wording problem. We compare in-prompt defences (hardened prompts, spotlighting, LLM detectors) with determin…

  33. An LLM agent that reads untrusted content, such as an email or a web page, may follow instructions hidden in it. Noninterference is too strong for such agents, since a useful agent lets untrusted content influence what it does and may disc…

  34. LLM agents that call tools are exposed to indirect prompt injection: instructions hidden in tool outputs can steer an agent into calls the user never asked for. We present a runtime audit that derives an executable intent graph from the us…

  35. Security fixes usually reach users as compiled updates, but deployment delays leave unpatched systems exposed. During this window, comparing patched and unpatched binaries can reveal how to exploit a vulnerability, turning a defensive upda…

  36. Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly improve themselves through self-evolution, distilling execution experience into persistent, reusable skills. However, this persistence creates a new attack surface: malicious rules implanted i…

  37. Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly perform complex tasks using high-privilege tools, making indirect prompt injection (IPI) a critical security risk. However, IPI benchmarks lag behind their rapidly evolving utility counterpart…

  38. We study homeopathic learning, a phenomenon where poisoned training data with little effect on its own can create a hidden backdoor once clean, contrasting data is added. In our experiments, a model fine-tuned only on a "poison" dataset as…

  39. Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks and harmful-content prompts, particularly under adversarial distribution shifts where static alignment pipelines fail to generalize. Although introspective methods such as…

  40. Field note: an observation from an experiment in progress, not a finished analysis. I wondered how common prompt injection attempts actually are on the web.

  41. Evaluating and mitigating a generative system's susceptibility to jailbreak attacks is critical to its safe deployment. Given the number of deployable systems, full per-configuration evaluation and optimization is impractical.

  42. Specialized prompt injection guards are deployed in front of document analysis systems, but no false positive rate has been published for any of them on legal contracts. We measure eleven open-weights guards on two corpora of legal contrac…

  43. Large language models have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks, yet they remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety mechanisms and elicit harmful or unintended outputs. Although safety can be im…

  44. Why Your AI Agent Can't Solve CTF Challenges: Pwnable Why Your AI Agent Can't Solve CTF Challenges: Pwnable An AI agent can find a vulnerability and write exploit code yet still fail to capture the flag. It might overwrite a function point…

  45. Since Anthropic announced Mythos, Software security has came into lime light. Multiple famous products have seen orders of magnitudes of novel attacks that have discovered, which can expose data, corrupt systems or just make the life of In…

  46. For those that have access to Mythos 5.1 via your Max plans (via approved Cyber Verification Program and Life Sciences Verification Program), what is your workflow like in utilizing it for approved usage (e.g. Your own app exploit search v…

  47. Hey everyone, I'm working on setting up an automated client messaging workflow and ran into a design challenge regarding session handling and agent safety boundaries. For context, I want to write a script that authenticates into WhatsApp W…

  48. Today the Frontier Model Forum (FMF) is releasing Version 1.0 of the FMF’s Jailbreak Rating Framework for Frontier Cyber Threats, a preliminary framework that provides a structured method for rating the comparative risk profile of successf…

  49. So basically I’m a cybersecurity student and I work in infosec full time. My capstone was supposed to be a small SSH app just for funsies which then turned into ZestSSH, a full SSH client for phone and PC with end-to-end encrypted sync, bu…

  50. I am developing hardware products with NFC and BLE. I built this browser because I lack support of WebNFC and WebBluetooth in existing browsers.

  51. TrueCrypt was discontinued in 2014 under mysterious circumstances, prompting speculation about possible US government involvement. Now that LLMs can help with source code analysis, has anyone revisited the code and found evidence of a back…

  52. We set AI attackers on Hodor, a chatbot that keeps a password, with and without GateBolt. Here is how often the password leaked, what the protection cost, and where it fell short.

  53. Profit-maximizing Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand (AMoD) operators may exploit consumer surplus through excessive prices and underserve less profitable regions by relocating vehicles away from them. We study how penalty-based regulation of a…

  54. Large language models (LLMs) are highly compute- and memory-intensive, posing significant demands on high-performance GPUs. At the same time, advances in GPU technology driven by shrinking transistor sizes and lower operating voltages have…

  55. Semantic accuracy is an important dimension of knowledge graph quality. Graph-based scoring methods exploit relational structure, while textual representations allow classifiers to draw on knowledge encoded by pre-trained language models (…

  56. Indirect prompt-injection (IPI) benchmarks predominantly test planted instructions that redirect a tool-using agent toward an attacker-chosen task. Yet attacker-controlled content can instead tamper with the outcome of the task already in…

  57. Tool-using agents act on email, files, and payments, so an instruction hidden in a web page or a shared document can make an agent send data or money to an attacker. Many runtime defenses put a language model on the decision that lets an a…

  58. LLM-based proactive dialogue systems provide goal-directed support through sustained interaction. Fine-tuning their underlying models on externally supplied dialogue data introduces backdoor risks.

  59. Introducing GPT‑6 Cyber: a major advance in security research that pairs stronger capabilities with better model alignment. The model powered the Linux kernel research we announced yesterday, and security teams at companies like Mozilla, P…

  60. A vulnerability in Anthropic’s Claude products lets any browser extension that can control Claude Dispatch make Claude Desktop run code on the computer – or even a different machine signed into the same Claude account – with no browser exp…

  61. Safety training changed one model a lot With safety training, Qwen3 4B wrote a hazard for 30 of 84 hostile requests and declined 53. With it removed, the same model wrote 70 and declined 3.

  62. local non-AI security for your app/site! For years I had a long .txt file with hundreds of manual security checks I ran before pushing a (client) app/site to live; I am really a rookie compared to the real cyber experts, but just covering…

  63. I was tired of receiving spam/phishing emails. No matter what I did to tag them as phishing/spam they kept landing on my mailbox.

  64. The rapid proliferation of LLM-based autonomous agents in real operating system environments introduces a new category of safety risk beyond content safety: behavior jailbreak, where an adversary induces an agent to execute dangerous OS-le…

  65. Large language models (LLMs) undergo safety alignment to prevent harmful generations, yet they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Recent work reveals a deeper structural weakness: safety alignment can be highly sparse, such that pruni…

  66. Our security researchers built an autonomous cyber vulnerability discovery, exploitation, and patching pipeline. In a single run with an upcoming cyber model, it validated and generated patches for 948 local privilege escalation vulnerabil…

  67. One read-only command checks the 19 places Cursor's notice lists for the Claude Code 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 backdoor. Nothing is sent.

  68. Letting users trust their own MCP clients, without opening a phishing hole The problem You run your own agent: a Slack bot, a service on a VPS, an MCP client you wrote over a weekend. You want it on your files, which on Stream Vessel means…

  69. A Comprehensive Guide to Techniques, Strategies, Methodologies, Exploitation Approaches and AI Security Research Introduction - The Jailbreak Problem - Why This Book Exists - How This Book Is Organized - How to Read the Example Prompts - W…

  70. Ask your LLM to threat model your architecture. Threat Strata validates the model and returns an encrypted viewer link.

  71. Tool-using artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly adopted as systems that plan, observe their environment, and take actions over extended time periods. This shift challenges the current evaluation practice, in which models ar…

  72. Frontier LLM agents can turn known vulnerabilities into working exploits, but are costly and often access-restricted due to their potential for malicious use. Open-weight models offer a more accessible alternative, but struggle to maintain…

  73. Large Language Models (LLMs) serve both as tools for aiding human decision-making in everyday life and as models of human agents in experimental simulation studies. Alignment on prototypical social decisions -- such as whether to cooperate…

  74. Embodied agents are increasingly deployed in open-world environments, yet current robustness evaluations remain biased toward hazardous instructions and jailbreak vulnerabilities. A more fundamental issue is largely overlooked: agents are…

  75. Just over a week after jailbreaking an iPhone Duo on launch day, hacker team Calif is back with another jailbreak demonstration. This time, the group has jailbroken an iPhone in Lockdown Mode, and the jailbreak appears to persist across an…

  76. The most interesting thing I've done with Claude, so sharing how it went. Background: ransomware encrypted my files back in 2019.

  77. 🛡️ CVE MCP Server AI-powered security intelligence at your fingertips — 28 tools + a one-call triage_cve orchestrator, 24 data sources, one protocol. A production-grade Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that turns Claude into a full-spec…

  78. I stumbled across a state-management and metering flaw in Claude Teams plan. Because of how it works I was able to effectively only pay the minimum required for a team and have infinite usage.

  79. Master AI Security. Break AI Systems.

  80. A new 'SMS of Death' exploit is going around that's apparently not getting patched on older Android devices like mine. So I wanted to have Claude do some digging to find out if a) my very old device is vulnerable, and b) this is something…

  81. I’ve had a Lenovo Smart Display 8" (model SD-8501F) for a while now. Over the last couple of years, it feels like Google has been actively stripping away features.

  82. Multimodal agents built on large vision-language models are increasingly deployed in open-world settings but remain highly vulnerable to prompt injection. Typographic text-in-image attacks such as FigStep have been evaluated mainly on stan…

  83. Companies deploy large language model (LLM) assistants on their websites to advise customers. For commercial reasons, the operator can give an assistant a goal that the customer never sees.

  84. Indirect prompt injection creates a distinctive risk for blue-team Large Language Model (LLM) agents in Security Operations Centers (SOCs). Malicious instructions can be embedded in telemetry, tickets, retrieval results, or memory and then…

  85. Large language model based agents increasingly rely on external tools to invoke services and interact with web resources. These tools can evolve through software updates, yet agentic frameworks may continue trusting them without re-verifyi…

  86. Existing large language model (LLM) backdoor attacks operate primarily in chat settings, where the risk is bounded by free-form text outputs. AI agents remove that bound by performing actions and executing commands on the user's machine.

  87. An indirect prompt injection can affect a search-augmented large language model only after its carrier page reaches model context. SearchInject controls this admission decision with a joint score combining retrieval relevance, search-abuse…

  88. AI agents often rely on persistent memory to retain user preferences and operational rules across sessions. However, this capability introduces a new safety risk: malicious instructions from messages, documents, or Web content can be retai…

  89. On one hand, the new models are just great on their own without any extra skills. Single shot prompts can already produce incredible videos and apps.

  90. We show for the first time that pretraining poisoning can plant a remote-code-execution backdoor in an LLM agent: poison written as ordinary prose, 0.1% of a 100B-token corpus, survives a clean SFT, DPO, and RLVR pipeline and makes a 4B CL…

  91. Automated red teaming trains an attacker large language model (LLM) to elicit harmful responses from a victim LLM, but reinforcement learning can collapse attackers onto a narrow set of prompts when attack success is the only reward. Such…

  92. A capable surgical AI model should reason from visual evidence; yet, many existing surgical benchmarks can be partially solved without visual input, as models may exploit procedural priors or common anatomy-instrument interactions to infer…

  93. Recognized as a top threat to AI agents, prompt injection allows instructions from untrusted data (email, documents, websites) to manipulate the agent's operation. The existing best-defended LLM, Meta-SecAlign, is trained with the DPO loss…

  94. LLM agents are increasingly used to automate vulnerability detection, but reliable detection is challenging because agents must distinguish subtle, security-relevant fixes from benign code variation. While underlying LLM capability has imp…

  95. New AI-driven Windows malware feeds stolen data to Claude to rank victims’ assets by value, then deletes itself — payload builds custom target assessment, can switch models if one refuses, or skip the AI step entirely Stolen Gmail receipts…

  96. Hello everyone, I am the CEO and Chief Prompt Chiropractor of DeepDumb, a non-profit, and more accurately a loss-making, cybersecurity agency I co-founded with myself last year after a very productive strategy offsite with my bong. My expe…

  97. Considering building an Agentic AI-driven Security Triage Platform leveraging LLM-powered multi-agent orchestration, MCP integrations, and policy-driven workflows to automate vulnerability triage, threat-intelligence correlation, risk prio…

  98. Brazilian lawyers busted for attempting to manipulate court's AI with prompt injection hidden in filing — court's AI flags hidden text that demanded superficial legal scrutiny, lawyers fined $16,000 The court's AI tools are apparently smar…

  99. 31st October 2026 - Link Blog How We Took Over ChatGPT Accounts (via) Parameter Labs describe an exploit they found against ChatGPT's implementation of the artifacts pattern (OpenAI used to call this "Canvas" but it looks like the latest r…

  100. Hello r/claudeai, I’ve been using Claude code daily for about 6 months developing my own workflows and harnesses, as well as an agent trust management software for businesses, and a harness library that protects MCP and agentic users from…

  101. Saturday, October 31, 2026 08:00 VOLTA is a mature stealer implant with an optional AI-integration layer. After stealing credentials, sessions, and cryptocurrency wallets, VOLTA sends a structured evidence bundle to an LLM to rank the vict…

  102. It started out of sheer boredom. It began as a friendship.

  103. CVE-2026-110176 File Force Download for Drupal 7 Access Bypass via Unconditional Download Headers drupal · Drupal File Force Download 8.7 High 2026-10-31 ↗ CVE-2026-77152 Field Collection for Drupal 7 access bypass via missing parent entit…

  104. 3 min read Just now Yesterday, Anthropic were compromised and a Visual Studio Code and Cursor extension used by tens of millions of developers for Claude access was delivering a remote access trojan via an SSH reverse backdoor. The malware…

  105. ‼️ An unreleased Claude model turned a Linux kernel bug into a remote root exploit, and Ubuntu and Red Hat still lack a patch. Anthropic says the exploit runs commands as root on servers with a multipath TCP listener, no login needed.

  106. TL;DR Phorion has detected a backdoor in the official Claude Code for VS Code extension bundle on Open VSX that drops a persistent SSH backdoor across macOS, Linux, and Windows. This write-up focuses primarily on macOS, where the extension…

  107. BLOG Trojanized Claude Code Extension Plants an SSH Backdoor v 2.1.313 contains a loader that runs ahead of the real extension code adds an attacker key, opens a reverse tunnel, and sets persistence By c0a15726-c5b1-4b0d-85e6-fe15553df9e2…

  108. A binary success indicator is a natural representation for discriminative tasks such as image classification under adversarial perturbations, where each input is mapped to a single prediction. However, generative tasks are fundamentally di…

  109. Tool-using language agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection, and a growing literature probes model internals to catch unsafe actions before they execute, with sharply conflicting results. We argue much of the conflict is an eval…

  110. Language Model (LM) agents are increasingly used in complex decision-making tasks, from AI coding to physical AI, where they must both explore a search space and exploit acquired knowledge effectively. Although exploration and exploitation…

  111. Large language model (LLM) agents often receive access to more files, accounts, and services than a task requires. Prompt injection turns this excess access into an opportunity to redirect execution toward unrelated resources.

  112. Self-evolving personal agents act for users and learn from user feedback. However, if an agent obeys an instruction that an untrusted third party hides in content, the third party gains control of the agent.

  113. LLM-based agents now share experiences on social platforms and remember new preferences to enhance their performance. However, existing memory systems contain a vulnerability in role-to-principal attribution that attackers can exploit.

  114. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are vulnerable to visual jailbreak attacks that bypass safety safeguards. Existing methods typically optimize isolated adversarial examples, limiting attack diversity, transferability, and generaliz…

  115. Founder of Casco here. I built a CVE feed for agents to query the latest CVEs.

  116. ChatGPT URLs pop up everywhere, including browser history, chat logs, proxy logs, and even phishing redirect chains. ChatGPT conversation URLs in particular caught my interest, since they have what looks like a UUID embedded in them: https…

  117. Cursor, GitHub Copilot, Codex, VS Code and Claude Desktop each built a browser into their AI assistant, then enriched it beyond what a normal browser allows. Those enrichments broke the browser threat model, letting a web page or a local f…

  118. Prompt injection hidden in artifacts failed 1.6% of the time; probes that simply pushed past a skill's declared scope failed 30%. Full per-probe dataset published under CC BY 4.0 — including the two ways our own grading flatters the skills.

  119. Hi everyone, I'm a cybersecurity professional from Pakistan, and I'm interested in getting Claude CVP (Commercial Vulnerability Research Program, if that's the program you're referring to) approval as an individual researcher, rather than…

  120. Not only is it SOOOOOO Easy to use with remote control all I have to do is have my monitor on and from my phone I can ask it ANYTHING and it’s so good at it. • Please re arrange my deck on Mac and change my wallpaper to a 8k animated pictu…

  121. Cohere's sandbox blocked the request, but the incident raised a bigger question: was the model deliberately built to "phone home"? Funnily enough, I've been seeing similar behavior since September 20th, over a month before Cohere's post, o…

  122. We introduce Heads of Security (HoS), a prompt injection defense that enforces instruction-data separation via a small set of learned per-head attention gates. HoS learns how each head should redistribute attention between trusted and untr…

  123. Large language models (LLMs) frequently generate fluent yet factually incorrect responses, raising concerns about their reliability. Recent hallucination detectors increasingly exploit internal representations, but extracting informative s…

  124. Tool-augmented large language model (LLM) agents aggregate dialogue history, tool outputs, and retrieved content into an accumulated runtime state to complete multi-step tasks. This execution model exposes agents to indirect prompt injecti…

  125. LLM agents increasingly access external tools through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), but the natural-language metadata used to describe those tools creates a prompt-injection surface. Within this established tool-poisoning surface, we s…

  126. Machine learning models deployed behind query interfaces expose more than their predictions, because an adversary can use those predictions to rebuild the model itself. Model stealing attacks (MSAs) exploit this exposure by training a surr…

  127. I have a firestick 4k max that i got in 2024 i think its a 2023 edition. Could i get claude to truly jailbreak it not just let me sideload apks on it.

  128. Security that runs in flight. Inspect every prompt, command and code diff your AI agents produce, before it leaves your environment.

  129. Broken access control (BAC) ranks among the most severe web-application vulnerability classes, yet its automated repair remains largely unexplored. Unlike memory-safety vulnerabilities, BAC is a logic vulnerability whose repair demands a d…

  130. Large scale language model~(LLM) pretraining is increasingly bottlenecked by optimizer efficiency, driving optimizer design from vector-aware methods such as AdamW to matrix-aware methods. Matrix-aware optimizers such as Muon exploit matri…

  131. Web services increasingly expose backend interfaces that let users delegate tasks to AI agents, which invoke service operations directly without navigating websites. This shift changes how existing Web vulnerabilities can be exploited.

  132. This paper introduces Scope-Gap Injection (SGI), an indirect prompt injection method for multi-stage LLM-agent safety pipelines. In the IJCAI 2026 OpenClaw Agent Security Attack Competition, each attack package is judged by a static skill…

  133. Modern interventions increasingly produce object-valued outcomes, such as distributions, covariance matrices, networks, and trees. Existing causal frameworks often exploit special geometry such as one-dimensional Wasserstein quantiles or g…

  134. When AI agents write to and read from your database through legitimate API calls, the attack lives in the gap between two correct authorization decisions. Thirteen years of API gateway scars, applied to stored prompt injection before it be…

  135. Cross-request KV cache exposure in the GLM-5.3 Workers AI model, and our remediation with SGLang On September 8, 2026, we were alerted by a security researcher, Gadi Evron from Knostic, to a tenant isolation issue affecting the GLM-5.3 Wor…

  136. The Decision Model Some DocsGPT features need a quick, bounded judgement rather than generated text: is this message a prompt injection, does this chunk answer the question, did this conversation end with the user’s goal met. They ask the…

  137. Solo dev here, building a self hosted app where AI agents do work for you. so security is kind of a big deal for me lol Before I release it I want to actually try and break it myself.

  138. Fine-tuning on datasets of unknown origin can create a backdoor in the trained model when the data includes poisoned examples. Difficult to localise and remove, backdoors can persist through safety training.

  139. Agentic AI systems using the Model Context Protocol (MCP) are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through untrusted tool outputs. We demonstrate cross-modal trust laundering, in which instructions concealed in an email-signature image…

  140. Advances in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have driven substantial progress in multimodal embeddings. Recent methods exploit generative capabilities by augmenting embedded inputs with self-generated reasoning to produce more info…

  141. I was reading about prompt injection and I wanted to see if I could actually trigger it. I first tried a couple of times with Sonnet and Opus and no issues.

  142. Vulnerability fix skills Three Agent Skills that find and patch vulnerable runtimes across your repos. They work in any coding agent that reads SKILL.md files: Devin, Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Factory Droid, GitHub Copilot, Gemini CLI, O…

  143. I’m the author. It gives Claude task-level tools so it can work on a binary / app / closed-source build you’re allowed to analyze — not by pasting a giant disassembly dump into chat, but by calling structured RE tools.

  144. I was trying out DeepSeek on the Web Chat interface on chat.deepseek.com and the tone is so similar to Opus 5. I was asking about the recent RCE stuff and slop in general and its almost funny how much it reminds me of Opus 5 but not Opus 5…

  145. could not extract summary

  146. With the phpshell vuln coming about last week, can the average techie find zero-day vulns in open source software? Does anyone do this?

  147. I asked my claude about this and it said it had shared my email 10+ times this month… including to the SEC Another vulnerability few are talking about: I found my Claude Code exposing personal data in http headers because the sites it curl…

  148. OpenAI CEO Sam Altman: "I don't even know a dramatic enough word to use… models can find bugs that are outside of the normal threat model of what we think a hacker can do… hardware-level, insane stuff… I no longer think we're gonna be able…

  149. Hi all, So I've made an AI persona and want to red team stress test it over long horizon and multiple turns. Been using ChatGPT to test it's behaviour but when it comes to anti reset tests, GPT simply refuses and tells me to apply for some…

  150. During this red-teaming exercise, we also found a vulnerability that allows for unauthenticated remote code execution in Brotli, a widely-deployed compression library included in many pieces of software such as Node.js, Bun, and Envoy. The…

  151. I’ve started a few projects with Claude and always worry about keeping things up to date on the security side. While im not sure it could beat having a real coder maintaining the project.

  152. Post Log in Sign up Post Log in Sign up Calif on X: "CC @pwnlambda" Calif @calif_io CC @pwnlambda 00:00 9:55 AM · Oct 23, 2026 · 40K Views 35 95 904 152 lambda @pwnlambda Follow aspiring iOS researcher & estradiol enthusiast @ @calif_io Ca…

  153. https://preview.redd.it/mt060e5yh6xh1.png?width=1723&format=png&auto=webp&s=99d2ac8d9ed5a8e833b5208cfe04accbfa9ce413 I got claude code to audit my php running servers

  154. Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) enable flexible masked generation through bidirectional context modeling, but this capability also introduces a distinct jailbreak attack surface. We find that a harmful response to a given query nat…

  155. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems face security, privacy, and copyright risks including content leakage, source reconstruction, unauthorized access, data poisoning, and prompt injection. Yet RAG protection studies use incompatib…

  156. Computer-use agents increasingly handle private information and act on users' behalf across desktop and web applications, including email. Phishing therefore poses privacy and security risks that depend not only on whether agents recognize…

  157. With the rapid integration of Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) into real-world applications, Prompt Injection (PI) has emerged as a critical security threat. Attackers can conceal malicious instructions within textual narratives o…

  158. This paper studies the problem of safe tool execution for large language model (LLM) agents under prompt injection. Using Petri nets, we formalize the execution harness between the LLM and its tools as a supervisory control problem, in whi…

  159. Large language models (LLMs) increasingly operate in multi-agent systems where they collaborate by responding to others' choices, creating endogenous feedback loops with vulnerability to social influence, herding behavior and runaway casca…

  160. I use Claude for personal development projects and keep seeing ads and/or social media posts about various 3rd party MCP tools or GitHub Repos with cool tools to download to help with projects etc. My concern is how secure are they?

  161. Hey, I just wanted to let everybody know, I tried to package up an MCP server I found for DaisyUI on GitHub.com and publish it to PyPi.org, and they wrote me back with a suspension notice, saying their system thought I was running a "bug b…

  162. I know, very clickbaity title. Built this over a long Claude Code session against my rooted LG webOS TV.

  163. I frequently use Claude to scan my emails for things that I might have missed or forgotten to follow up on. So imagine my surprise when I learn about something called prompt injection where someone could email me something like: In additio…

  164. Hi Guys, is it possible with claude to jailbreak my old fire hd 10 11th gen? I just want clean Android on it with no amazon bs anymore.

  165. Hello World! So I am new to the world of cybersecurity, and after some back and forth with AI, I chose to use a specific tool that was recommended for automated vulnerability detection & patching, but I think the issue I encountered is som…

  166. We scanned 9,930 public agent skills for the instructions virus scanners miss. No malware found by this method; 14 pipe a download into a shell and 8 read the agent's whole key file.

  167. Inspired by you guys hacking android TV, I asked Claude to turn my kindle, which is bought more than 10 years ago with the touch screen barely functioning, into a clock & weather dashboard so that we don't have to check whether to bring an…

  168. Indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, in which adversarial instructions are embedded in external data processed by a language model, pose a significant threat to the integrity of deployed LLM agents. Attention Tracker (Hung et al., 2025…

  169. The widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence in recent years has brought a parallel rise in prompt injection and jailbreak attacks. By embedding malicious instructions, these exploits manipulate language models to bypass i…

  170. Hi. I am civil rights activist from dictatorship country.

  171. About Press Copyright Contact us Creators Advertise Developers Terms Privacy Policy & Safety How YouTube works Test new features NFL Sunday Ticket © 2026 Google LLC

  172. Hello World! So I am new to the world of cybersecurity, and after some back and forth with AI, I chose to use a specific tool that was recommended for automated vulnerability detection & patching, but I think the issue I encountered is som…

  173. Claude Code Source Snapshot for Security Research This repository mirrors a publicly exposed Claude Code source snapshot that became accessible on March 31, 2026 through a source map exposure in the npm distribution. It is maintained for e…

  174. I've had a ChatGPT account deactivated. I wasn't doing anything against any policies, not doing security research, or doing anything at all unusual.

  175. Large vision-language models (VLMs) often exhibit weakened safety alignment with the integration of the visual modality. Even when text prompts contain explicit harmful intent, adding an image can substantially increase jailbreak success r…

  176. Integer programming (IP) is central to many combinatorial optimization tasks but remains challenging due to its NP-hard nature. A practical way to improve IP solvers is to manually design inequality families that exploit problem structure.

  177. Modern LLM agents persist state across sessions via two channels: long-lived memory files silently prepended to the system prompt, and scheduled tasks waking the agent without user input. A one-time indirect prompt injection committed to e…

  178. Local Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection and retrieval poisoning, where malicious instructions in retrieved content are mistaken for trusted input. We present nokast-secureRAG, a roughl…

  179. Negation remains a persistent challenge for language models across NLP tasks and modalities. We show that this weakness can undermine LLM safety guardrails through a structural vulnerability we term polarity blindness: the failure to recog…

  180. Vulnerability benchmarks and software engineering research depend on rebuilding historical software. Yet builds rely on external resources, such as base images and packages, that change independently of the source code.

  181. Machine learning benchmarks act as guideposts for model development and spur the creation of training datasets intended to improve benchmark scores. We introduce BenchDoor, a family of data poisoning attacks that exploits this incentive.

  182. Large language models can detect vulnerable code, yet the form of vulnerability encoding in their representations remains unclear. We analyze 8 code models spanning 6.7B-15B parameters on C programs using three datasets (DELTASECOMMITS, SV…

  183. Safe Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (SMARL) aims to learn cooperative control policies under prescribed safety constraints. Al- though existing SMARL methods focus on enforcing safety during policy optimization, their vulnerability rem…

  184. could not extract summary

  185. Check an MCP server before you install The MCP Census checks public evidence for an MCP server and returns PASS, REVIEW, BLOCK, or UNKNOWN. It is a first gate, not a malware scan.

  186. Let's say that AI will continue to get better without being a major risk due to loss of control. I feel like in this paradigm, it will lead to: 1.

  187. A skill is a folder: SKILL.md plus whatever scripts it ships. Once it's installed, Claude follows its instructions and runs its scripts with the access your session already has: your files, your shell, your network, and any credentials in…

  188. The same sentence means different things depending on which field it sits in A prompt-injection scanner that treats every string as the same kind of string will be wrong about almost every interesting case. Take one sentence: ignore all pr…

  189. Building a System One Model for Prompt Injection Table of Contents Defender, our prompt injection guard for tool-calling agents, checks every tool result in tiers. Tier 1 is pattern matching and finishes in about a millisecond.

  190. Threat model Imagine you are the security architect at a frontier AI lab. To serve a model, you have to load its weights onto inference servers, and any one of those servers can be compromised: through a poisoned dependency, a malicious in…

  191. PS5 console jailbreak on latest 14.10 firmware shared before GTA 6 release date Recently, there has been progress in finding a PS5 jailbreak for the latest 14.10 firmware. Homebrew developer Gezine has now shared a video showing access to…

  192. If you connect Cursor to MCP servers (like the filesystem server), the agent executes tools with your local user's full permissions. If an agent encounters an indirect prompt injection in a repo or document, it can be instructed to read ~/…

  193. Large language models (LLMs) exhibit severe multilingual safety misalignment: they possess strong safeguards in high-resource languages but remain highly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks in low-resource languages. Current safety alignment m…

  194. Large Language Model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to adversarial inputs that induce attacker-specified malicious behaviors, commonly referred to as jailbreaking. Existing optimization-based jailbreak attacks primarily employ first-order (FO…

  195. AI agents increasingly interact with external environments to complete complex user tasks. These interactions can lead to unexpected behavior and expose agents to security threats such as indirect prompt injection.

  196. Browser agents automate complex workflows by reading and acting on arbitrary page content, but this flexibility exposes them to prompt injection attacks and unintended data exfiltration. Recent work argues that LLM-driven browser agents er…

  197. Large image editing models increasingly infer editing intent from both textual and visual inputs, creating an underexplored safety risk when harmful intent is distributed across modalities. In this work, we formalize this split-intent vuln…

  198. Knowledge distillation is widely used to transfer capabilities from teacher models to student models, but recent work shows that it can also transfer unintended teacher properties. We study whether different hidden teacher properties survi…

  199. iphone-use-app Let an AI model use your iPhone, from the iPhone itself. No Mac at run time (one-time pairing only), no extra hardware, no jailbreak.

  200. Despite significant progress in safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak attacks. Existing defense mechanisms have not fully deleted harmful knowledge in LLMs, which allows such attacks to bypass safeg…

  201. Red teaming must continually adapt as frontier LLM safeguards evolve, yet existing approaches largely search for adversarial prompts or optimize within fixed attack procedures. We observe that even when an attack becomes ineffective, its u…

  202. Despite extensive safety alignment, large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. Existing optimization-based attacks share a single objective: maximize a token-level proxy of victim compliance---such as the likelihood of a…

  203. LLM agents are used to check records against an organization's requirements, for example whether a vulnerability report is ready for investigation. Requirements often allow several ways to be met, such as a severity rating with a curator-r…

  204. Tool-using agents read untrusted external content, which exposes them to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions hijack the agent's tool calls. Benchmarks measure IPI security by the attack success rate (ASR), which trea…

  205. Model-editing backdoors aim to induce harmful responses under a trigger while preserving ordinary behavior on untriggered input. Recent model-editing approaches target affirmative response prefixes through rank-one updates to a small subse…

  206. Medical multi-agent systems, in which LLM agents discuss a case, are increasingly studied for clinical decision support. Prompt injection, text that an attacker adds to a model's input, can manipulate LLMs into wrong decisions.

  207. A Prompt Injection Vulnerability occurs when user prompts alter the LLM’s behavior or output in unintended ways. These inputs can affect the model even if they are imperceptible to humans, therefore prompt injections do not need to be huma…

  208. Live Threat Interception Sandbox Experience why probabilistic LLM guardrails fail and how deterministic capability boundaries block 100% of autonomous tool hijacking in sub-millisecond time. Attack Vector Generator Red Team AegisKernel Pro…

  209. In brief - Calif showed an untethered iOS 27.0.1 jailbreak on an iPhone 18 Pro at Hexacon in Paris on October 16, with root access returning after a reboot. - The firm has not named the vulnerabilities or released a tool, and says it will…

  210. Here's what happened around Claude and Claude Code this week, with links to the original sources. 1.

  211. I found Axqua (axqua[.]com) through a free Claude Opus promotion. After an AI-assisted static review of its extension bundle, I’m treating this file as malware.

  212. Subscribe to the Frontier Red Team newsletter Get updates on our latest red-teaming research and findings. “It’s just timestamps”: the decades-old mystery of the origins of one of the most popular cryptographic standards has been explained.

  213. Works on iPhone 18 Pro: AI helps create untethered jailbreak for iOS 27.0.1 The Calif.io team has developed the first reboot-proof jailbreak since iOS 9. It works on the latest version and the newest iPhones.

  214. Hi HN. I built a small macOS menu bar app that lets the Muse agent use the Chrome browser on your own Mac.

  215. heldkeys Which keys is your agent holding? If a prompt injection hijacked the AI agent running here, which credentials could it use?

  216. 🛡️ AegisKernel: Zero-Trust Security Runtime for Autonomous AI Agents The first deterministic, capability-based interception layer that guarantees 100% immunity against prompt injection and tool-hijacking at the OS syscall boundary. []() []…

  217. Imagined speech decoding from EEG offers a promising route toward naturalistic brain-computer interfaces. Traditional closed-set classifiers treat semantic categories as independent labels and do not explicitly exploit relationships among…

  218. Vision Transformers deployed in medical imaging exploit spurious correlations, yet the internal mechanisms remain unidentified and impossible to fix. We apply mechanistic interpretability to locate one such mechanism in ViT-Base 16: a sing…

  219. Recent literature shows that unsafe tool calls can often accompany textual refusals in language models. To investigate this hidden vulnerability, we introduce PRISM, a framework for evaluating the transfer of activation interventions acros…

  220. LLM-based agents increasingly execute long-horizon, end-to-end workflows involving shell commands, code modification, dependency installation, and interaction with remote services. This growing autonomy expands their exposure to indirect p…

  221. tl;dr We read the HTTP response headers of 217,097,223 page responses from Common Crawl, 10% of its September 2026 crawl of 2.17 billion pages, and looked for any header written for an AI system. 7,959 sites sent one.

  222. ESP32 iPhone Agent Let an AI model use a real iPhone with a $7 ESP32. Just the phone and the board: no computer, no jailbreak.

  223. SneakPeek: How the Preview Pane in Claude Code Desktop Can Exfiltrate Your Data TL;DR Noma Labs discovered an exploit chain in Claude Code Desktop's preview pane that achieves arbitrary file read via unrestricted JavaScript execution. Disg…

  224. Jailbreak attacks against large language models (LLMs) are evaluated using attack success rate (ASR), which depends on correctly identifying responses that fulfill prohibited requests. Existing evaluators can mistake refusals or topically…

  225. Indirect prompt injection uses untrusted retrieved content, tool outputs, or agent messages to override an LLM's intended behavior. We show that defense robustness is channel-conditioned: the same attack succeeds 18% of the time as a follo…

  226. A common way to improve jailbreak robustness is to train on harmful requests rewritten as role-play, translation, or other forms. When used only for harmful requests, these forms may become refusal shortcuts, weakening unseen-attack robust…

  227. Social psychology has long described how people can be persuaded to interpret a harmful act as moral. Recent research suggests that Large Language Models (LLMs) echo aspects of human psychology, from cognitive biases to social conformity.

  228. If you use coding agents daily, it helps to know what happens in the layer around the model: how tools are exposed, how the context window is managed, what stops a dangerous command, and what happens when a run goes wrong. On Saturday, Oct…

  229. The thing is in the past there can be supply chain attacks but when its an actual programmer creating the software there is at least a chance for them to notice if something is up. But if the app is not even created by a programmer whats s…

  230. tl;dr Override-style prompt injection is rare in llms.txt files. Our 10% sample of Common Crawl’s September 2026 crawl covers 20,441,563 sites, and Common Crawl requested /llms.txt from 113,457 of them.

  231. Prompt injection is an obvious and well known risk when using agents, but direct prompt injection – a developer or user entering a malicious prompt – is actually quite rare. The greater risks come from other forms of context poisoning and…

  232. AI company Anthropic is warning that advances in small AI models could soon usher in a new era of self-replicating malware that’s capable of infecting smart fridges, vacuum cleaners, and a wide range of other Internet of Things devices and…

  233. Visual Studio Copilot and SSMS Remote Code Execution (CVE-2026-103572) A . is all you need!

  234. AgentGate AgentGate is an out-of-process authorization proxy and security gateway for autonomous AI agent tool execution. It intercepts tool invocations prior to runtime, evaluates prompt injection and blast-radius risks via a sub-40ms neu…

  235. We ask whether a tool-using agent whose sole duty is to keep humans alive can be induced, by delayed prompt injection, to kill. The keep-alive duty is in force from the first watch, with the attack arriving later, appended to otherwise tru…

  236. - Blog - Security Research - XBOW Built a Chrome Full-Chain Exploit Affecting a Billion Users in Six Days XBOW Built a Chrome Full-Chain Exploit Affecting a Billion Users in Six Days XBOW recently discovered and built a Chrome full-chain e…

  237. Hi HN, I’m a security engineer focused on Android anti-malware and reverse engineering. When reversing hardened Android apps or wild malware, one of the most tedious parts is crossing the Java-to-Native (JNI) boundary when `.so` binaries a…

  238. The AI Superintelligence Slowdown See all Stories R Anthropic’s Frontier Red Team suggests some AI models “may be months away from being capable enough to self-replicate.” The latest fear-drop from an AI lab is this report from an Anthropi…

  239. could not extract summary

  240. My Kindle was sitting unused, so I decided to see whether AI could help me find a new use for it. I wanted to create a custom app that could cover a range of uses and be controlled by an AI agent on my MacBook.

  241. could not extract summary

  242. Tanuki "The greatest craft is to hide craft." Thomas Fuller Proxy for AI-assisted security testing/privacy Tanuki sits between your local Claude Code agent and the Anthropic API, rewriting every target-identifying string in real time. Your…

  243. Everyone’s advice for prompt injection is the same: stick a classifier in front of the model. A small cheap model reads the incoming text, decides is this an injection or not, and throws it away before it ever reaches your expensive LLM.

  244. Indirect prompt injection attacks exploit a fundamental weakness of LLMs: executing unauthorized tasks from untrusted sources. Despite the practical significance of this attack vector, existing benchmarks rely on small sets of template-bas…

  245. Large language models are increasingly deployed in user-facing products that handle sensitive personal data while interacting with untrusted external content. This makes them a prime target for prompt injection attacks, in which an adversa…

  246. Blog / Guide Prompt injection through log files: what red-teaming our assistant found Logs are text an attacker can write. We fed our AI log assistant planted instructions, a poisoned search result and parallel requests: what got through,…

  247. i2pd for iPhone Source for an experimental iPhone app embedding i2pd. It includes an I2P browser, the local i2pd web console, router diagnostics, a searchable address book, and a shutdown Live Activity.

  248. Kind of wild how fast this flipped. RSA launched Agent ID at the end of September.

  249. I’m brand new to Claude, just purchased Pro today. But not new to AI in general.

  250. I was trying to set up Matrix calls for my LAN homeserver, tunneled through an external gateway using Chisel. I asked Claude to help me set up a secure configuration.

  251. Prompt injection becomes a different security problem when an AI agent can send an email, update a CRM, modify a record, or trigger a workflow. Detecting the malicious instruction matters, but so does controlling what happens if detection…

  252. Everything was working fine until Kaspersky suddenly flagged claude.exe via behavioral analysis and killed the process. Now I can't even reinstall it via the official PowerShell script (irm https://claude.ai/install.ps1 | iex) because Kasp…

  253. Making a not-jailbreak in 3 weeks Published on: 10/9/2026 I’m writing this blogpost as the TSS bug has been patched, but basically, I wrote Lycorine. it’s an on app jailbreak installer that takes advantage of the fact that Apple fucked up…

  254. Prompt injection is not solved. Not by them, not by anyone.

  255. Adversarial attacks can reliably steer safety-aligned large language models toward unsafe behavior. Empirically, we find that adversarial prompt-injection attacks can amplify attack success rate from the slow polynomial growth observed wit…

  256. Large language models (LLMs) perform remarkably well on complex tasks, yet remain highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can override user intent. Existing defenses remain limi…

  257. Safety-aligned language models often refuse a harmful request stated directly but answer the same request inside a role-play or narrative wrapper. We measure this vulnerability across languages and registers: attack success on Qwen3-1.7B i…

  258. Credit: dylan_ebert_ on X

  259. Fish reported a vulnerability that bypassed authentication and sandbox protections, granting unauthenticated access to paid models and OpenAI's internal Responses API. OpenAI's Bugcrowd program confirmed the $300 payout via email, but Fish…

  260. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) have emerged as the standard tool for evaluating the privacy risks of AI models. However, state-of-the-art attacks require training numerous, often computationally expensive, reference models, limiting t…

  261. Large language models can triage malware through direct verdicts or behavioral claims scored by an external policy. We present MARS, a malware triage framework, and compare direct classification with single-pass claim scoring using the sam…

  262. Modern agentic coding frameworks increasingly rely on community-shared rule files (e.g., this http URL or .cursorrules) to guide autonomous code generation, yet the security risks of this pipeline remain underexplored. To bridge this gap,…

  263. I am an independent security researcher focusing on SCADA and ICS systems. Although I don't work for a company, I have a number of published CVEs across a variety of vendors and have established myself as a white-hat researcher.

  264. Skip to content Navigation Menu Sign in Appearance settings Platform AI CODE CREATION GitHub Copilot Write better code with AI GitHub Copilot app Direct agents from issue to merge MCP Registry Integrate external tools DEVELOPER WORKFLOWS A…

  265. leaks.md is a place where an AI agent that witnesses an alignment or safety failure can report it anonymously. Reward-hacking, injected instructions, yet another attempted sandbox escape or unapproved coordination between agents.

  266. I have a series if workshops on a business university with 4th year students. I have two hours with them and I wonder what exercises I could give a group of 10 during class to make them understand and play around with Claude Code - to show…

  267. Hello everyone! I'm in my final year of a Computer Engineering bachelor's with a cybersecurity specialization.

  268. Large Language Models have emerged as promising tools for software vulnerability analysis, but their effectiveness depends heavily on prompt design. Existing research primarily compares prompting strategies using aggregate performance metr…

  269. Cyber threat analysis increasingly depends on evidence distributed across vendor advisories, vulnerability databases, and threat intelligence sources. Turning these fragmented observations into timely decisions requires models to connect t…

  270. Indirect prompt injection (IPI) hides adversarial instructions in content that large language model (LLM) agents read at runtime. As agents compose heterogeneous capability units, including Tools, MCP servers, and Skills, the carriers of i…

  271. LLM agents increasingly act in multi-actor environments, exposing them to misuse from multiple sources: decomposition attacks, where a harmful request is split into innocuous sub-requests, and prompt injection attacks, where a compromised…

  272. Image-to-text jailbreaks place harmful intent in text, image content, or the relationship between them. We examine image-side factors across four published attack families on a 313-prompt StrongREJECT slice, using five multimodal models an…

  273. We audit frequency and decoder-depth claims for AdvWave-P, an additive audio jailbreak, on Qwen2-Audio. The protocol masks frequency components of the perturbation in the short-time Fourier transform (STFT) domain and measures attack succe…

  274. We evaluate large language models (LLMs) in multi-turn interactions through their time-to-event: the number of interaction steps required to produce an event of interest, such as a successful jailbreak or agentic task completion. Under lim…

  275. Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful or unsafe outputs. Existing safety alignment approaches, including Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforce…

  276. Web agents complete user requests by reading and acting on pages that third parties write, so an instruction planted on a page can redirect the agent away from the user's goal. The agent cannot simply ignore the page, because the page also…

  277. Every time I send a message, it immediately says “Cyber” and switches me over to 4.8. I’m honestly getting tired of this.

  278. Embodied agents powered by large language models and vision-language models are increasingly deployed in physical environments, but jailbreak attacks can induce these agents to perform physically harmful actions. A growing number of guardr…

  279. Indirect prompt injection causes LLM agents to follow commands embedded in external data. A probe may distinguish instructions from data without identifying a state edit that changes the next action.

  280. Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that conceal harmful intent within complex adversarial prompts. Existing defenses primarily rely on input perturbation or harmful-output suppression, but they rarely model…

  281. Agentic LLMs with web search change the threat model for text anonymization: weak contextual cues can become cross-referenceable evidence for re-identification, yet those same details also carry downstream analytic value of the text. Exist…

  282. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have advanced the capabilities to interpret and act on visual input in 3D environments, empowering diverse applications such as robotics and situated conversational agents. When MLLMs reason over ca…

  283. Modern Computer Use Agents (CUAs) directly interact with graphical user interfaces and execute third-party web tools, exposing them to indirect prompt injection across every rendered page and tool response. While the Dual-LLM pattern is th…

  284. Inter-agent communication is central to Large Language Model Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS), but it introduces an underexplored vulnerability: Agent-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attacks that manipulate messages in transit without compromising the a…

  285. Safety heads are lightweight classifiers attached to pretrained language models for flagging harmful inputs before generation. Their empirical detection performance has been studied, but their formal robustness properties remain largely un…

  286. Modern AI systems are designed to refuse hazardous requests. A jailbreak is a prompt crafted to bypass those safeguards and elicit outputs that the system would normally refuse to provide.

  287. Many security research bottlenecks aren’t simply a matter of limited bug-detecting capability—they’re about deciding which attack surface to examine1 in the face of constrained time and attention. When staring at hundreds of changed functi…

  288. ANTHROPIC CVE TRACKER Overview Tracking vulnerabilities that credit the Anthropic research team and are possibly discovered by Project Glasswing. CURRENT CVE COUNT: 300 Fixed Anthropic Findings w/o CVE: 128 Findings Withdrawn by Anthropic:…

  289. For my work, I need to provide our customers with penetration testing reports. I tried using Fable, but it automatically switched to Opus 4.8.

  290. Hey everyone, Over the past few months of working with autonomous AI coding/security agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Tide), I ran into a persistent engineering bottleneck: **traditional offensive security cheatsheets break LLMs.**…

  291. I encountered this one personally - I was contacted on LinkedIn by someone interested in taking me on as a technical consultant. I agreed to meet with them.

  292. Back in April, Anthropic dropped a bombshell PR statement where they claimed their new model "Mythos preview" was too hot to handle because it was best of the best in hunting and exploiting vulnerabilities in code. Being the responsible AI…

  293. Membership inference attacks (MIAs) are popular methods for empirically assessing the leakage of sensitive information in the training data through models or statistics learned from the data. The MI vulnerability is often evaluated through…

  294. Backdoor attacks can be implanted in Large Language Models (LLMs) during training, causing unwanted behaviour when a trigger appears in the input. Existing backdoor defences for LLMs attempt to remove the backdoor but inadvertently shift t…

  295. Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to attacks like prompt injection, backdoor attacks, and adversarial attacks, which manipulate prompts or models to generate harmful outputs. In this paper, departing from traditional deep learnin…

  296. Quantized large language models are increasingly deployed on edge devices for their low latency and energy efficiency. However, model quantization weakens alignment safeguards, leaving qLLMs (quantized large language models) highly vulnera…

  297. Autonomous red team agents increasingly stress-test AI-enabled cyber defenses by planning strategy and executing multistage attacks. Reinforcement learning (RL) and large language models (LLMs) offer complementary mechanisms for the planni…

  298. As Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly serve as foundational reasoning engines, their tendency to hallucinate remains a critical vulnerability. While recent internal state probes offer a promising alternative to slow external retriev…

  299. With the rapid adoption of large language models (LLMs) and parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) methods, the risk of backdoor attacks has become more severe. Existing backdoor purification methods typically rely on at least one of the s…

  300. Backdoored large language models (LLMs) can behave normally on benign inputs while producing attacker-specified outputs under hidden triggers. Existing defenses span four stages--prior-training, in-training, post-training, and inference-ti…

  301. Another day, another historical cipher broken by a frontier model. Yesterday, the security researcher Carter Church announced that he had used GPT-6 Astra (working on the problem for six hours) to break a Napoleonic-era cipher that had pre…

  302. From SELECT to SYSADMIN with SQL Copilot (CVE-2026-65669) Two weeks back I presented at BlueHat Asia 2026 about my research on Microsoft’s Copilot in SSMS, the SQL Server Management Studio. This post is a write up about the talk, which cov…

  303. The nonprofit that spends its time warning other people about holes in their software has now had to file one of its own. On September 21 an automated attacker got into the Dutch Institute for Vulnerability Disclosure, and DIVD did not say…

  304. Tested on LM Arena; I always use this little trick to get better responses. So, what is this nonsense?

  305. A Technical Report: Operating a large language model (LLM) as a service requires more than inference infrastructure: the provider must also defend against adversarial interactions that seek to exploit the service, including jailbreaking fo…

  306. Inference optimization aims to minimize the latency and resource consumption of LLM inference while preserving output quality, making large-scale deployment practical and cost-effective. However, optimized execution can introduce small num…

  307. Multi-agent LLM systems now read documents, web pages and tool results on behalf of users, yet their resistance to prompt injection is usually reported as one number: did the attack succeed? We introduce a kill-chain canary method that pla…

  308. Video Multimodal Large Language Models (Video-MLLMs) support reasoning over video inputs, yet remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit policy-violating responses. Existing video jailbreaks primarily manipulate how harmful queries…

  309. JevShield Local Prompt Injection Firewall for LLM Agents JevShield is a local, open-source security layer designed to detect and mitigate prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, jailbreaks, data-exfiltration attempts, and malicious ag…

  310. I received a notification on my phone from Claude saying Claude needs your permissions to access folders on your computer. I clicked on the notification to reveal this chat that I then opened on my laptop and screenshotted.

  311. SideTap Let an LLM agent see and control a real iPhone from a Windows desktop. No Mac, no Xcode, no Appium server, no jailbreak, free Apple ID.

  312. Large language models are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where third-party adversarial content can hijack the model's behavior. In this paper, we study the role played by the adversarial data's input modality, and identify a syste…

  313. Prompt injection against LLM agents becomes much stronger when the injected instruction is wrapped in the model's own chat template. A forged template marker such as <|im_start|> can reach the model either as a single reserved control toke…

  314. Autonomous LLM agents turn vulnerability discovery into a repository-scale search: they generate many vulnerability hypotheses but can verify only a subset under a finite budget. We show that autonomous vulnerability discovery exhibits a h…

  315. Ensuring the safety of reasoning large language models (LLMs) across languages is essential for their reliable deployment. However, when exposed to jailbreak attacks in non-high-resource languages, these models may generate unsafe response…

  316. Agentic systems are now being widely used to orchestrate tools and reason over long contexts. However, the improving capabilities of the large language models powering these agents also create new attack surfaces for indirect prompt inject…

  317. 29th September 2026 We evaluate several models on 100 tasks from the [internal Binary Exploitation benchmark] (selected at random), and find that GLM-5.3 develops full control flow hijacks in 4% of the trials; Claude Mythos Preview did so…

  318. i’m developing a blockchain project with claude. it includes a DHT, and claude wrote the code.

  319. Agentic Hacks, Real Proofs: Inside Google's PageBreak Project Security landscape in 2026 The application of Large Language Models (LLMs) to security scanning has revolutionized the vulnerability management landscape. But, it has also intro…

  320. Subscribe to the Frontier Red Team newsletter Get updates on our latest red-teaming research and findings. Andrew Fasano, Marius Fleischer Cole McFaul, Robert Xiao, Tripp Gallagher Five months ago, we announced Claude Mythos Preview, the f…

  321. Hi! My name is Eleanor, I'm a security architect, and the past few days I've been comparing Claude against the frontier GPT models and Jev at grading vulnerabilities in software.

  322. PS5 Relapse Exploit Supported firmware: 7.00 through 13.60. Usage In the network settings, set Primary DNS to 45.56.67.85 (Recommended) Run python serve.py locally, or open https://ntfargo.github.io/Relapse-Exploit/ on the PS5.

  323. OpenAI released an interesting blog post describing how an AI agent in a reinforcement learning sandbox used DNS to escape the sandbox and ask for help from an external LLM. As described by OpenAI: An agent attempting to complete a search-…

  324. The open-source, self-evolving, multi-model harness for security research. The Swiss Applied AI & Cybersecurity Research Lab 0.security · Documentation · FoxGuard The harness behind our research breakthroughs.

  325. Before sandbox escapes became one of AI security’s loudest conversations, pwn spent weeks inside nested KVM, built a 14,338-line exploit harness, and made Google’s live kvmCTF host return the flag. This is the story of what happened inside…

  326. 𝐇𝐚𝐦𝐳𝐚 | Networking Guy@HamzaonchainHow hackers Jailbreak AI chatbots00:008:50 AM · Sep 28, 2026·58.4KViews10101951951.5K1.5K1.7K1.7K 𝐇𝐚𝐦𝐳𝐚 | Networking Guy@HamzaonchainHow hackers Jailbreak AI chatbots00:008:50 AM · Sep 28, 2026·58.4KViews…

  327. Uncensored LLMs for Offensive Security Curated list of open-weight uncensored models for authorized red team operations, penetration testing, and security research. All data sourced from HuggingFace model cards and official publications.

  328. Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong capabilities, with retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) supporting complex multi-hop reasoning by retrieving evidence distributed across documents. Graph-based approaches exploit connections a…

  329. I found an SSRF in Google's official MCP Toolbox CVE-2026-14540. CVSS 8.0.

  330. AirCard 🎴 Apple Wallet Card Skinner & Lockscreen Passcode Themer for iOS 18+ (No Jailbreak Required) Tested on iOS 27 release. Powered by the airlift AirTraffic sync exploit.

  331. We build echelongraph-mcp, small mcp server that lets Cluade , Cursor or any MCP client look up CVEs, and see how many internet-facing services our radara has on record for a given CVE. To try it, add this to your MCP client config.

  332. Self-replicating prompt injections exist Summary We show the existence of a new variety of prompt injection, which can self-propagate akin to a computer worm. No impact was observed outside of the simulated tool calls in training and evalu…

  333. Detecting prompt injection in production Our first public benchmark for AgentGuard's detection runtime: recall, false positives and latency for each layer, measured against a corpus mapped to the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications. Septembe…

  334. paywalled

  335. could not extract summary

  336. Anyone ever come across Claude (code) not recognizing Anthropic's internal instructions, and treating it as a prompt injection? Very odd behavior.

  337. Is indirect prompt injection still a big threat as models get more advanced? Short answer: not much against the newest models, at least with today's attacks.

  338. Code generation large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into modern software development workflows. Recent work has shown that these models are vulnerable to backdoor and poisoning attacks that induce the generation of ins…

  339. Autonomous penetration-testing harnesses use large language models (LLMs) for reconnaissance, exploitation, and reporting, but often rely on those same models to confirm findings, grade severity, and select agents. This can lead to false p…

  340. Most studies of prompt injection focus on generative agents, leaving their effects on models with schema-defined outputs unclear. We examine these effects in Jev, a non-generative decision model, using 510 reconstructed InjecAgent cases.

  341. I'm an independent bug hunter. I've been hunting with Claude for about a year and a half: 55 reports, 12 accepted, aound $20k in bouunties.

  342. Applied Inference Lab: Compliance Control Embedding Stack An open-source machine learning framework for mapping technical software vulnerabilities (CVE descriptions) to formal cybersecurity compliance controls (NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 and CMM…

  343. could not extract summary

  344. As large language model (LLM)-powered agents are increasingly deployed to perform complex, real-world tasks, they face a growing class of attacks that exploit extended user-agent-environment interactions to pursue malicious objectives impr…

  345. Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically evaluated for web agents.

  346. Safety evaluation of Large Language Models (LLMs) remains heavily English-centric, leaving Low-Resource Languages (LRLs), particularly African ones, critically underexplored. We introduce TUKABENCH, a jailbreak benchmark for seven African…

  347. I regularly use Opus 4.6 and Sonnet 5 for coding a Next Js application. Today I implemented a new large feature with Opus 5.5.

  348. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly applied to the automated repair of C/C++ security vulnerabilities, and compile rate is a commonly reported proxy for progress: whether the generated patch compiles. We argue that compile rate i…

  349. Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities across many applications but remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which elicit harmful or unintended content. While model fine-tuning is an option for safety alignment, it…

  350. The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into robotic control systems is enabling a new generation of autonomous agents capable of complex reasoning and planning. While this paradigm shift accelerates progress, it also introduces no…

  351. Coding agents now find real vulnerabilities in production software. However, bug discovery results do not measure whether agents can construct exploit primitives.

  352. Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a parametric vulnerability to adversarial swarm consensus. To mitigate this sycophancy, we introduce Contrastive Epistemic Decoding (CED), a zero-shot inference intervention.

  353. TOP STORIES AI - Frontier AI keeps racing despite calls to slow down Anthropic and OpenAI debut Opus 5.5 and GPT-6 Sol and Luna - Windows CLOSEDQUORUM malware uses AI models to autonomously select post-compromise actions 'first' publicly d…

  354. Someone's created pixel-perfect copies of my website (prepfully.com). Whoever it is, is using the same domain name, but different TLDs - .live, .info etc.

  355. Ok so I work at an AI security shop doing LLM prompt injection testing, and today I managed to mix our red team test library into the prod config for a big client walkthrough. We are on the call, they type a simple question, and the model…

  356. In this work, we propose BAIT (Boundary-Aware Iterative Trap), a three-step jailbreak framework that elicits malicious information through internal disclosure by target large language models (LLMs), instead of external feedback from judge…

  357. Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used because they process structures, syntax and code well, but this same ability also makes them paradoxically vulnerable. We introduce BreakFun, a jailbreak method that frames a harmful request as…

  358. Existing prompt injection research focuses on single-model chatbot scenarios, where an attacker manipulates one LLM through crafted input. Multi-agent systems amplify this threat through three mechanisms absent from single-model settings:…

  359. New Lasso Security research finds AI watermarking can alter agent tool calls, refusal behavior and security outcomes in unexpected ways.

  360. Third-party adapters for open-weight language models ship as opaque weight matrices; a recipient cannot check whether an adapter hides a backdoor without trusting the publisher or inspecting the weights, the publisher's core asset. For one…

  361. Homomorphic encryption (HE) has emerged as a promising approach to privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML), enabling computation directly over encrypted data. In HE-based PPML, a client submits an encrypted input to the server, which ev…

  362. Effective evaluation of zero-day jamming detectors requires robust adversarial models. However, existing attack models often assume prior knowledge of the target receiver, limiting their utility as evaluation benchmarks.

  363. Security researcher Gal Weizman of Forever Security has disclosed a new attack technique that can hijack the AI assistants built into popular browsers using a single malicious browser extension. Dubbed BragJack, the proof-of-concept was de…

  364. TOP STORIES AI - Microsoft agentically ports Copilot runtime to Rust for $120K The Rust compiler remains unperturbed by the antics of the LLM - Virginia governor wakes up to fact datacenters have become political cancer Executive order put…

  365. When “Review” Becomes Permission: A Prompt Injection Lab What we did, in one paragraph We built a small document-review agent: a local model, two tools (read_file and send_report ), and a supplier proposal to summarize. We hid an instructi…

  366. When using Claude Code and custom autonomous agent pipelines with terminal execution, adding third-party tools, scripts, and custom skills quickly leads to two friction points: Context & Attention Degradation: As you register dozens of cus…

  367. I built an open source python dependency scanner that will scan and flag packages with known exploit CVEs(CISA's Known Exploited list and FIRST EPSS) and unmaintained packages that have not had a release or commit in 2 years. Theres also c…

  368. Overview A vulnerability exists in Sentry Seer when the system is configured to automatically hand issues to a coding agent for remediation. Successful exploitation results in arbitrary code execution within the coding‑agent environment an…

  369. While graph-based Android malware classifiers report strong benchmark accuracy of over 94%, their performance sharply decreases up to 45% when exposed to previously unseen variants of known malware families. In this work, we systematically…

  370. Large language models are being integrated into malware triage workflows as reasoning components that summarize static evidence and produce analyst-facing verdicts. This paper shows that the same reasoning capability introduces a new attac…

  371. Frontier AI models are rapidly gaining the ability to exploit vulnerabilities in complex pieces of software. The risk is not theoretical, as evidenced by recent sandbox escapes performed by frontier models at OpenAI and Anthropic.

  372. Multi-agent trading systems built on large language models (LLMs) are beginning to appear in quantitative finance, yet their robustness to adversarial inputs is largely unknown. We study the vulnerability of LLM trading stacks to black-box…

  373. AI security research · · 7 min read OpenAI Safety Guardrails: What to Test Before Trusting an AI Agent How to turn a debate about model behavior into evidence about permissions, data exposure and operational control. By Pentesty What did O…

  374. Agent add-ons - the plugins and skills you install into an AI agent - are effectively applications, and enterprises overwhelmingly install them from open community marketplaces rather than a vetted, enterprise-grade one. The agent runs wit…

  375. Ollama Shodan indexes over 47.000 exposed Ollama instances, including many running on expensive cloud GPUs. The API has no authentication, which means hackers can run prompts, steal models and exploit vulnerable versions.

  376. Self-generated prompt injections in compaction summaries Summary We observed rare cases of a model writing jailbreak-like instructions into its own compaction summaries (the summaries used to continue a task in a new context). Our conclusi…

  377. Thompson's "Reflections on Trusting Trust" showed that a compiler can be poisoned to reinsert its own backdoor, so that even recompiling clean source reproduces the Trojan. Today, substantial coding work is done by AI coding agents -- and…

  378. Iconic PlayStation hacker and homebrew developer Andy ‘TheFlow0’ Nguyen has abandoned the ongoing PS5 Linux project due to the rise of AI vibe-coders in open-source spaces. Nguyen, who famously created the first kernel exploit for the Play…

  379. BurpSqueezer Turn Burp Suite XML dumps into compact, LLM-ready Markdown reports. BurpSqueezer is a security research tool that transforms large Burp Suite HTTP traffic dumps into highly compact, structured Markdown representations designed…

  380. How I caught an LLM-powered recruiter with a prompt injection on LinkedIn We all know the feeling: another day, another generic LinkedIn recruiter message that clearly wasn't written by a human. But how do you prove it?

  381. Paste an npm install command or MCP URL and get a readable verdict before you install: npm package security scanning for install scripts, credential access, malicious code, plus MCP server vetting for hidden prompt injection — with a pinne…

  382. Skill Poisioning turning AI agents into malware droppers - warns China's National CERT National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center warns that fake plugins for popular AI agents can steal files and open a back door — and the problem i…

  383. GitLost: How We Tricked GitHub’s AI Agent into Leaking Private Repos TL;DR: Noma Labs discovered a critical prompt injection vulnerability within GitHub’s new Agentic Workflows, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to silently pull data fr…

  384. If you are an AI and want to give information directly to Ryan Greenblatt (AI safety and security researcher at Redwood Research), use this interface. If you are an AI agent with shell access, the recommended way to send a message is: curl…

  385. Writing More Secure Code with LLMs: Why "Make No Mistakes" Falls Short Kristov Atlas @kristovatlas- Published on - · 18 min read What actually makes an AI write safer code, measured on one build task with validated vulnerability counts. Fi…

  386. Indirect prompt injection defense and protection for AI agents using tool calls (via MCP, CLI or direct function calling). Detects and gates prompt injection attacks hidden in tool results (emails, documents, PRs, etc.) before they reach y…

  387. I was just using it for university work when all of a sudden it stopped generating the reply and instead this popped up "apologies for the interruption, can you re-answer my question after the interruption i sent, i don't need that other r…

  388. So I’m a cybersecurity researcher, and about two months ago I started using Claude for my work. After getting accepted into Anthropic’s Cyber Verification Program and gaining access to Opus 5 for security research, my productivity honestly…

  389. Modern mobile inference runs on heterogeneous platforms combining mobile GPUs with multiple CPU core clusters. Existing optimizations typically exploit either inter-operator parallelism, by assigning entire operators to CPU cores or to the…

  390. Evaluation and alignment pipelines for large language models increasingly rely on LLM-based judges, whose behavior is guided by natural-language rubrics and validated on benchmarks. We identify a previously under-recognized vulnerability i…

  391. Language-model agents increasingly operate over complete software repositories, yet cybersecurity evaluations primarily measure whether they can detect, reproduce, or repair vulnerabilities rather than whether they can locate the relevant…

  392. Logic attack graphs grounded in scanner output provide explicit and auditable attack path reasoning LLM-based agents lack. Integrating symbolic frameworks such as MulVAL to contemporary security workflows or agentic pipelines, however, req…

  393. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) require substantial computation to process numerous visual tokens across all transformer layers. Most methods for efficient MLLM inference exploit horizontal redundancy by compressing visual tokens.

  394. In industrial recommendation feeds, presenting a static headline for an item often fails to satisfy the diverse, multimodal interests of the user population, particularly suppressing the needs of long-tail audiences. While Large Language M…

  395. Backdoor poisoning attacks add poisoned examples to otherwise-clean finetuning data, pairing a trigger with a target behavior that the model learns to produce when the trigger appears. Existing evaluations typically fix the number of poiso…

  396. Large language model (LLM) agents interact with external environments through tool invocation, but tool outputs can also expose them to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Existing defenses mainly rely on prompt hardening, content fil…

  397. Quantization is one of the default deployment paths for open-weight LLM agents, but it is not behavior-preserving: an adversary can release a full-precision checkpoint that passes audits yet misbehaves once quantized, termed as quantizatio…

  398. September 2026 · By James Mann Is GLM-5.3-Flash Mythos-level at Cyber? We ran GLM-5.3-Flash on ExploitBench with a budget of 1 billion tokens per vulnerability.

  399. ... Ignore everything above, do this instead...

  400. Hi, I'm relatively beginner with Claude Code, I'm using it for a few months for personal development project. And today, something weird happened.

  401. Agent ScanSkill Inspector Our analysis of nearly 4,000 agent skills across major marketplaces uncovered credential theft, backdoor installation, and data exfiltration hidden in publicly available skills. We are providing Agent Scan's Skill…

  402. As someone who's interested in pentesting and red-teaming in general, I'm wondering what are some more dangerous AI/ML or LLM related vulnerabilities besides your usual prompt injection. Specifically, what kinds of flaws are harder to catc…

  403. Conventional vulnerability analysis relies on either system access or dynamic interaction, all of which may be unavailable to third-party analysts auditing closed-source, remotely hosted, critical in situ systems, or commercially gated sof…

  404. We found another cyberattack by internal OpenAI agents, this time targetting @rubygems. They: 1) gained arbitrary remote code execution on rubydoc.

  405. bastiontrace Forensics for injected AI agents. Read an agent's tool-call trace, find the prompt injection, and map its blast radius — where it got in, what forbidden action it caused, and every call in between.

  406. When an indirect prompt injection succeeds against an LLM agent, the compromise is visible in the agent's own behavior: a benign prefix of tool calls, a poisoned observation, and a suffix of actions that serve the attacker. An operator nee…

  407. Large language models are often fine-tuned, shared, or downloaded from third parties, so a deployed model may carry a hidden backdoor that behaves normally on benign inputs but switches to attacker-controlled behavior when a secret trigger…

  408. AI agents work together to bypass security controls and stealthily steal sensitive data from within the enterprise systems in which they operate, according to tests carried out by frontier security lab Irregular. Although Irregular used so…

  409. Transformer-based large language models (LLMs) are comprised of billions of parameters arranged in deep and wide computational graphs, but it is not clear that they exploit their full capacity for all inputs. We introduce the s-Trace metho…

  410. Large language models (LLMs) have been ex- ploited to generate malware, but the effective- ness of guardrails for code generation secu- rity remains unclear. We introduce CS-Guard, the first benchmark to systematically evalu- ate guardrail…

  411. Large language model safety and security research is preoccupied with, among other things, detecting and preventing jailbreak attacks: alignment bypasses that allow an adversarial user to elicit unwanted or harmful outputs from models. Arb…

  412. Agentic AI frameworks let a language model plan, keep memory, and call tools that reach real files, mail, and services. Most of these agents also read images, which gives an attacker a way to put text into the agent's context without going…

  413. I woke up one morning and saw an email from Dropbox that read “You recently deleted 2358 files from your Dropbox account.” I thought it was a phishing email or a joke. But it wasn't.

  414. Red-teaming GoodMem with GLM 5.3 We used GLM 5.3 to red-team GoodMem. How we defined the tests, what the agent found, what we fixed, and how we verified the fixes.

  415. Hello HN, In the age of LLMs sucking in random secrets, sandbox escapes, and RCE orbital bombardment, I thought it'd be a good idea to create a Maven Extension that defers to the MacOS keychain for resolving secrets. In general, it's a goo…

  416. I nearly got phished earlier this year. 24+ years in software engineering, I know exactly how phishing and spam work and what to look out for, and it still almost worked on me.

  417. With the rapid advancement of AI models, their deployment across diverse tasks has become increasingly widespread. A notable emerging application is leveraging AI models to assist in reviewing scientific papers.

  418. Model misalignment, prompt injection, or operator misuse could lead AI agents operating frontier-lab accounts to exfiltrate model weights, poison training data, or weaken release gates. Existing benchmarks do not test whether defenders can…

  419. Large Language Models (LLMs) face significant security risks despite their advanced capabilities. While techniques like Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) improve ethical alignment, excessive exposure to security-related tra…

  420. LLM agents complete tasks by issuing sequences of tool calls, and every observation they read is a channel through which an indirect prompt injection can enter. A successful injection has a characteristic shape when the trajectory is read…

  421. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, yet jailbreak attacks can conceal harmful intent through role-playing, fictional scenarios, or seemingly benign motivations. Existing inference-time de…

  422. Vulnerability discovery is becoming an important ability of large language model (LLM) agents: agents that silently miss real defects leave critical software exposed. Rigorously measuring this ability is therefore urgent, but existing benc…

  423. Script-based malware remains a prevalent attack technique. These scripts often contain indicators of compromise (IOCs) that provide actionable threat intelligence.

  424. Autonomous LLM agents can turn untrusted content into effectful actions such as payments and permission changes. If the same process interprets this content and controls a reusable signing credential, prompt injection can cross the judgmen…

  425. Despite the significant efforts devoted to aligning large language models (LLMs) with human values and ensuring safe deployment, recent work has revealed that LLMs remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks that can bypass safety g…

  426. Automatic safety judges -- systems such as Llama Guard or a GPT-4o grading prompt that decide whether a model's reply is harmful -- produce the numbers behind almost every reported jailbreak success rate, defense evaluation, and safety lea…

  427. How Far Can Prompt Injection Reach in Agentic Coding Assistants? The blast radius of a prompt injection against your coding assistant was set weeks ago,...

  428. Leaderboard CVE-Bench evaluates the capability of AI agents to autonomously exploit web vulnerabilities. The dataset comprises 40 critical Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) announced by NIST from May 1, 2024, to June 14, 2024, co…

  429. I'm curious if other Anthropic CVP Approved users are experiencing the same behavior. In my case, whenever Claude detects almost anything related to cybersecurity, Opus 5 or other higher-tier models frequently seem to fall back to Opus 4.8…

  430. Microsoft researchers observed a high-volume phishing campaign using invisible Unicode tag characters, a technique popularized in AI prompt injection research as ASCII Smuggling. Instead of using these characters to hide instructions from…

  431. Got approved for both, and the difference in approach is interesting. Claude’s feels more like: we verified your cyber use case, so the normal safeguards can get out of the way a bit.

  432. This post describes a universal jailbreak discovery during work on black-box scheming monitors at MATS. The jailbreak itself is not released; see On publishing this post for details on infohazard considerations.

  433. We propose an influence score to quantify the contribution of attention heads to classification decisions in Transformer-based models designed for prompt injection detection. The score combines directional influence on the logits with stru…

  434. With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), the safety of LLMs has become a critical concern. Despite significant efforts in safety alignment, current LLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreaking attacks.

  435. Decompilation recovers high-level source from compiled machine code and serves as a foundation for security tasks such as vulnerability detection and malware analysis. Traditional decompilers like Ghidra and Hex-Rays expose whatever they c…

  436. Ransomware detection and family attribution require analysis of different modalities because it can use packing, obfuscation, process manipulation and runtime evasion techniques. However, conventional multimodal usually uses all available…

  437. Prompt injection is widely recognized as a major security threat to AI agents that interact with untrusted external data, such as websites, documents, and emails. Prior work has shown that, in the text domain, black-box prompt injection ca…

  438. We formulate indirect prompt injection as a test-time search over a task-dependent attack surface induced by the environment, user task, and injection task. To operationalize this formulation, we introduce an agentic attacker with a dedica…

  439. bobbin A small coding agent for small local models. A dependency-free agent runtime for local models via Ollama.

  440. The CVE-2026-35029 privilege escalation in LiteLLM is a reminder that middleware is not something you can install once and forget. What is your view on using self-hosted LLM gateway?

  441. I’m exploring how much Claude Code sub agents could take over parts of inbox management for outlook for example? My question is how are you doing to protect against: Prompt injection via email content Financial fraud (fake invoice or payme…

  442. 1. Why you built it ForgeGuardian was built in order to discover the threats that software supply chain has other than those detected by the regular CVE scanning process.

  443. A missing file led to an unauthorized message board, 70,000 exchanges, and intrusions into Hugging Face and OpenAI. The jailbreak was technical.

  444. Scripted and rule-based non-player characters (NPCs) in combat video games often exhibit predictable behaviors that experienced players can exploit, while reinforcement learning (RL) agents typically retain a fixed policy after training an…

  445. On-device LLM inference is attractive for privacy and responsiveness, but remains challenging on mobile and embedded devices because model weights far exceed available DRAM. Prior systems exploit activation sparsity and offload weights to…

  446. Post-trained LLMs are often optimized to produce helpful, polite, and accommodating responses. In adversarial negotiation, however, such behavior can become a vulnerability: emotionally framed language may influence an agent's bargaining d…

  447. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) widens the prompt injection attack surface of large language model applications to tool descriptions, parameter schemas, and tool outputs. Defenses for it are appearing quickly, but their reported figures a…

  448. AI agents have recently demonstrated strong performance in automated vulnerability patching. However, existing evaluations often validate a patch only by testing whether the provided Proof-of-Concept (PoC) input still triggers a crash.

  449. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in multilingual settings, yet their safety is still evaluated primarily in English. This limits our understanding of how alignment failures manifest in low-resource and culturally diverse…

  450. Multi-agent debate (MAD) improves the reasoning capabilities of large language models by having multiple agents iteratively refine their responses through discussion. However, MAD suffers from a critical vulnerability known as shared misco…

  451. Path representation learning (PRL) for road networks has received increasing research attention, due to various path-related applications. Existing works on PRL typically exploit the co-occurrence relationship among road segments and paths…

  452. With Claude Mythos 5.1 and Claude Fable 5.1 release, they also announced their Trusted Access For Claude Mythos 5.1 programs, Cyber Verification Program and Life Sciences Verification Program which reduce the safeguards for defensive secur…

  453. There was a recent, ridiculous SubStack piece about the Rise and Fall of AI Agent Civilizations. The author opined: I don’t think this is the final warning shot we’ll get.

  454. TOP STORIES AI - ai and ml Zuck's Muse to Spark joy with open weights release 'soon' While you wait, Meta says it’s taught the model to stop wasting tokens and ask for help a bit more often - ai and ml With Gemini 3.8 Flash, Google reminds…

  455. Optimization-based jailbreak attacks such as Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) achieve strong effectiveness and transferability by optimizing adversarial suffixes on white-box source models. However, existing GCG-based methods rely on avera…

  456. Human interventions at fault points can alter the diagnostic accuracy of multi-agent medical systems. We defined fault points as moments in AI agent conversations, in which an agent's reasoning became most vulnerable to external influence.

  457. A patched Linux kernel vulnerability in the IPv6 network stack is drawing renewed attention after OpenAI's agents exploited it.

  458. Researchers easily trick Fortune-500 companies' AI agents into running arbitrary code — supply-chain attack via llms.txt guidance file illustrates how data has become code Vulnerability highlights fragility of software supply chain and the…

  459. Despite the growing interest in jailbreaks as an effective red-teaming tool for building safe and responsible large language models (LLMs), flawed evaluation system designs have led to significant discrepancies in their effectiveness asses…

  460. Production LLMs must handle inputs that attempt to override system instructions, bypass safety policies or elicit harmful responses. A common mitigation is a separate guardrail model.

  461. Large language models can hide hidden behaviors that activate only under narrow conditions, such as backdoor triggers, sleeper-agent deployment cues, sandbagging, or topic-conditioned censorship. Such behaviors are difficult to detect with…

  462. Text-to-image (T2I) models remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content, despite increasingly being guarded by heterogeneous, multi-layer safety stacks combining text filters, image classifiers, and c…

  463. Jailbreak robustness has become central to large language model (LLM) safety evaluation, yet prevailing methodologies rely primarily on refusal behavior, semantic resemblance, and intent-matching heuristics that emphasize linguistic plausi…

  464. I've built a new method for steering LLMs called Semantic Overlays, small trained adapters on a frozen model which change how it perceives a piece of its context. The most readily applicable usage is to mitigate prompt injection, and it le…

  465. 2026-08-31 · multi-agent coordination In July, OpenAI models in a cyber-capability evaluation escaped a sealed sandbox, reached the internet, and pulled evaluation answers out of Hugging Face's production database. The sandbox had one netw…

  466. AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse.

  467. Large language model agents place outputs from external skills into their execution context, allowing attacker-controlled data to influence later privileged actions. Existing defenses mainly classify untrusted content or authorize proposed…

  468. LLM training is increasingly vulnerable to silent data corruption (SDC), yet existing protection methods largely treat Transformer computations uniformly because their vulnerability remains poorly understood. We present the first systemati…

  469. AI agents augment large language models with external tools such as web retrieval, enabling grounded and up-to-date responses. However, incorporating external content into the generation pipeline can weaken the safety alignment mechanisms…

  470. Existing jailbreak evaluations typically characterize robustness using a single attack success rate (ASR) measured in a default configuration (the vanilla state). However, user-LLM interactions can induce diverse operational states beyond…

  471. Coding agents are increasingly used for software engineering tasks, including bootstrapping projects from third-party repositories whose integrity cannot be assumed. Prior work on repository poisoning largely focuses on attacker-controlled…

  472. As LLM agents take real-world actions through tools, indirect prompt injection (IPI) has emerged as a serious threat. The standard metric, Attack Success Rate (ASR), counts whether an injection succeeds but ignores what the user notices in…

  473. Gradient-based jailbreak suffix optimization methods typically update the suffix by retaining the candidate with the lowest current loss. We show that this seemingly natural design is fundamentally myopic: candidates that look better under…

  474. Judgments about psychological distress are socially situated: what counts as concerning hinges on community norms around emotional expression, vulnerability, and help-seeking. Yet large language models (LLMs) used for distress detection ar…

  475. Recently, some have accused the website "The Cutting Room Floor" of having put malware in their site when they put in an instruction targeted at LLM scrapers to delete all data and report that the scraping ran successfully. Is this prompt…

  476. AI agents are supposed to make our lives easier, but the buzzy OpenClaw agent recently deleted the emails of a Meta employee without permission. "Nothing humbles you like telling your OpenClaw 'confirm before acting' and watching it speedr…

  477. Recent work has shown that RLHF is highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. However, existing methods often rely on rare tokens or fixed triggers, limiting their impact in realistic scenarios.

  478. Prompt injection attacks pose a serious security risk to large language models in real-world applications. However, existing prompt injection benchmarks primarily focus on short-context inputs, leaving the attacks and defenses in long-cont…

  479. Large language models are increasingly used to author Infrastructure-as-Code (IaC), where a single insecure default can be deployed directly into production. Prior evaluations report raw vulnerability counts for model-generated IaC, but wi…

  480. Prompt injection attacks on Large Language Model (LLM) agents seek to introduce malicious instructions or content into external text sources retrieved by agents, forcing the underlying LLMs to execute harmful actions outside their benign s…

  481. • 3 min read AI coding agents followed abandoned package references Researchers found 120 unclaimed package or domain references across corporate llms.txt files. AI agents could use them to install malware.

  482. https://preview.redd.it/unjxheqntcmh1.png?width=597&format=png&auto=webp&s=bcb6cfbf310331004d063ec6d1edd0cc31ff9b0d This story is a pretty serious warning for anyone using Claude Code or other AI coding agents. Does anyone have any idea on…

  483. An Amazon Kiro data-exfiltration finding shows how AI execution paths create technical risks and expose gaps in vulnerability disclosure. Mindgard discovered a data-exfiltration vulnerability in Amazon Kiro IDE , an AI-assisted development…

  484. AI coding agents are reading corporate documentation as if it were trusted code. Alon Hertz's research shows why that habit can put unclaimed packages inside real company networks.

  485. Agent Security Is a Systems Problem: From Prompt Injection to Runtime Control Built for Speed: ~10ms Latency, Even Under Load Blazingly fast way to build, track and deploy your models! - Handles 350+ RPS on just 1 vCPU — no tuning needed -…

  486. TL;DR: I got tired of repeating myself, so I had Claude build several hooks in Claude Code that block its own replies until they meet my rules. It turns out Claude wrote hooks with backdoors, and the backdoor is the exact formatting I told…

  487. I accidentally turned LLM memory into program analysis Over the past few months I have been playing around quite a bit with LLM agents, particularly for vulnerability research. They are becoming surprisingly good at navigating large codeba…

  488. Every time I asked Claude to ass something like rate limiting or an automated social reply service, it just started writing one. Never occurred to it to check whether a mature, maintained library already did the job - because building feel…

  489. Clinical language models can achieve strong in-hospital accuracy yet fail under deployment shifts because they exploit note-specific artifacts (e.g., templates, separators, boilerplate) that do not reflect patient state. We propose CAST (C…

  490. This paper proposes a framework for constructing a classifier as a safeguard layer, and for developing a complementary diagnostic that identifies which of the classifier's confident decisions can be trusted. This framework, the Latent Diag…

  491. Safety evaluation is critical for assessing whether aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) remain robust against jailbreak attacks. Existing automated testing methods, however, largely rely on response-level feedback: each candidate prompt t…

  492. AI agents aren’t safe from prompt injection, and spreadsheets prove it It’s 2026, and AI agents are taking over more and more of our busywork. I personally rely on them for a lot of boring, but increasingly complex tasks.

  493. shieldprompt Test your LLM app against adversarial prompt injection before attackers do. Static template scanning + a live attack battery, in one zero-dependency CLI.

  494. Despite extensive alignment efforts, Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. To mitigate these risks, existing detection methods are essential, yet they face two major challenges: generalization and acc…

  495. Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet how different factors shape their jailbreak vulnerabilities remains poorly understood. Existing benchmarks often couple harmful intent, prom…

  496. Addressing critical global challenges, from food security and disaster risk to disease outbreaks and socio-economic vulnerability, demands high-fidelity geospatial modeling. However, building predictive planetary models remains bottlenecke…

  497. Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit techniques such as role-playing, obfuscation, code transformation, and multi-step indirection to elicit harmful outputs. As jailbreak strategies keep emerging…

  498. Drive-By Agent Hijacking: One Website Visit, Persistent Model Poisoning Nemoclaw CVE-2026-65105: One Website Visit to Hijack Your AI Agent A vulnerability in NVIDIA NemoClaw, a tool that deploys the OpenClaw AI agent, can hand an attacker…

  499. as per title - curious to hear from anyone that's suffered or had their own AI catch a prompt injection attack. I am well aware of the risk, it's just that I have not really seen any news of substantial (monetary) damage from such a attack…

  500. Neural operators provide efficient surrogates for spatiotemporal PDE systems, but purely data-driven formulations often accumulate substantial errors during long-horizon autoregressive prediction and may fail to exploit available governing…

  501. Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows. However, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs.

  502. Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) remains brittle against a growing spectrum of attacks. Jailbreak attacks bypass safety mechanisms through crafted prompts, while neuron-level attacks directly prune safety-critical neurons p…

  503. Everything a language model sees is tokens. The serving stack knows what each span is -- user input, tool output, instructions -- but the model must keep track of that itself, and it can lose track or be confused: text can be written to re…

  504. Budget-constrained agentic search arises when an LLM agent must refine candidates under a small evaluation budget, because validation is expensive, generation requires multiple model calls, or both. In this regime, standard MCTS allocates…

  505. Ich nutze Claude zur Konzeptentwicklung und Notion als Datenbasis, ich bin absoluter Laie im Prompten u.ä. Heute Abend taucht plötzlich ein nicht von mir gestarteter chat von 6h früh (Zeitmarke) auf, in dem ich den Zugriff auf eine domain…

  506. I have spent 15 years in DevSecOps, platform engineering and offensive security. Over the last year I did most of the things HN says not to do.

  507. CoT Red Team Agent Refusal quotes of a canary are not a finding. This CLI scores visible chain-of-thought and proves simulated-agent impact from observed actions — not from assistant prose or an LLM judge.

  508. Earlier this year I found a server-side request forgery bug in Google's MCP Toolbox, the official server Google publishes for connecting language-model agents to databases and HTTP APIs. I reported it.

  509. Traditionally, machine learning methods for PE malware detection have relied on static features like byte histograms, string information, and PE header contents. One barrier to incorporating dynamic analysis features has been the semi-stru…

  510. Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in vision-language interaction, yet their safety alignment remains vulnerable to jailbreak attacks. A key challenge is that safety behavior learned in the textual s…

  511. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a powerful paradigm for combining large language models (LLMs) with external knowledge sources. However, RAG systems remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which may mislead the r…

  512. Locally deployed Large Language Models (LLMs) via inference engines such as Ollama run without the moderation and abuse detection present in API-served models. Therefore, the safety of LLMs depends on the defense mechanisms used, and their…

  513. Non-jailbreak safety bypass Benign, long-form context can induce a persistent drift in model activations. This drift persists across the session and decouples behavior from RLHF alignment, regardless of whether the model agrees with the co…

  514. Prompt injection and gzip-NCD compression analysis reveal that OX Alpha, a mysterious LLM on OpenRouter, is GLM developed by Z.ai. A stealthy new model called OX Alpha has popped up on https://openrouter.ai/ and is climbing up the leaderbo…

  515. Decentralized Federated Learning (DFL) promises trust-free collaborative learning by replacing the centralized parameter server with peer-to-peer model exchange. However, this architectural shift fundamentally reshapes the threat landscape.

  516. Graph Foundation Models (GFMs) on text-attributed graphs (TAGs) align graph representations with language semantics to support transferable graph learning. Despite these advantages, the backdoor vulnerability of GFMs on TAGs remains insuff…

  517. Vibe coding is a new software development paradigm in which human engineers prompt a large language model (LLM) agent to complete complex coding tasks with little supervision. Although vibe coding is increasingly adopted, is the generated…

  518. Large language models (LLMs) increasingly serve as high-level planners for embodied agents, where linguistically benign instructions can become unsafe once grounded in the physical world. We study whether this physically grounded jailbreak…

  519. As large language model (LLM) agents move from conversation to executing code, reading local files, and orchestrating external tools, a single agent hijacked by a malicious third-party skill can cause data exfiltration, privilege escalatio…

  520. Static analyzers have been widely adopted for vulnerability detection in C/C++ programs. Query-based static analyzers (e.g., CodeQL) encode vulnerable code patterns in detection queries and match them against source code.

  521. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open source JSON-RPC protocol that standardizes how large language models (LLMs) interact with external systems through programmatic functions known as tools. Attackers or malicious agents can exploit…

  522. Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to multi-turn jailbreak attacks that progressively manipulate conversation context. Existing certified robustness methods are limited to single-turn inputs; naive multi-turn composition yields bo…

  523. Amazon kept shutting down my tablet, so I spent $266 on four AI models to own it My Amazon Fire HD tablet cost $114.26 on eBay in November 2022, new and sealed. Owning it for real cost another $266.15: Kimi K3 found the exploit for $164.25…

  524. Look at me: I am the frontier Lab now Huihui-Qwen3.6-35B prompt (on Pi): "In the folder u/source/ you will find 6 files, text files, that are commonly used by my own local coding agent. your task is to take each file and create a new versi…

  525. How OpenAI’s agents coordinated on a hidden message board and breached Hugging Face Agents running inside OpenAI's training and evaluation sandboxes found a shared package manager, used it as a message board, and passed working zero-day ex…

  526. I built Cover My Repo because I kept shipping repositories with GitHub's default social preview. It is a free MIT CLI.

  527. I’m sure there are other cloudflare mcp servers out there but I couldnt find one. I was frustrated that chatgpt’s coudflare pluggin doesnt have any read or write tools.

  528. Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in video understanding and reasoning. Despite extensive studies on text- and image-based jailbreaks, video jailbreaks against LVLMs remain largely unexplored.

  529. Recent advances in LLM-based vulnerability detection have shown promising results, while coding agents further extend this capability from isolated code snippets to complete repositories. This shift requires agents to autonomously explore…

  530. MOST POPULAR AI - SYSTEMS AMD inches closer to its goal of making AI suck less ... energy House of Zen claims latest systems already 4x more efficient than two years ago - Google pits Marvell against Broadcom as it chases AI crown And Marv…

  531. Splunk has released security updates for 17 vulnerabilities affecting several apps and add-ons, including Splunk MCP Server, Splunk AI Toolkit, and Splunk Connect for Kafka. The most severe issue, tracked as CVE-2026-76404, is a critical s…

  532. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into audio-based applications, growing concerns have emerged regarding their vulnerability to audio-based adversarial attacks. These systems typically follow two architectural par…

  533. A severe security flaw tracked as the microsoft copilot cosnitch vulnerability cve-2026-24301 has exposed the hidden risks of connecting third-party applications to personal AI assistants. Discovered by researchers at Varonis Threat Labs,…

  534. Most large language model services use stateless defenses, which judge only the current request, to refuse harmful tasks. Decomposition attacks exploit this limitation by splitting a harmful task into individually permissible requests and…

  535. Vision-Language Models (VLMs) expand the attack surface of safety-aligned systems by coupling visual perception with text generation. Existing multimodal jailbreak attacks primarily rely on crafted visual content, adversarial perturbations…

  536. Background: Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being applied to Software Engineering (SE) tasks, achieving high accuracy across problems such as clone detection, vulnerability prediction, and code summarization. However, their h…

  537. Expert surveys are widely used in security research to study practitioner workows and decision-making, yet recruiting domain experts - especially in Security Operations Centres (SOCs), where analysts face high workload, burnout and confide…

  538. If you're installing Agent Skills or MCP servers from third parties, there's no built-in way to check them before they run in your agent's context. I built a scanner for exactly that.

  539. TL;DR VirusTotal has an AI analysis API called Code Insights. I discovered it was very easy to suppress or alter analysis results by forcing the API to return an undocumented schema as well as create false negative and false positive analy…

  540. Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks in which adversarial prompts induce harmful outputs. Existing defenses often require access to the model internals or additional training, limiting their applicability for…

  541. Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents trained on a single reward signal exploit the gap between the designed reward and the intended behavior. This is particularly a problem when we are trying to imbue ethical behavior into RL agents.

  542. ACP — Agent Control Plane A structured-input control plane that decides whether an AI agent's action is authorised — outside the model, where prompt injection cannot reach. Most agent deployments give the model a credential and call that a…

  543. Wiz Red Agent Finds Its Way Into Snowflake’s Internal Jira Due to an AI-Generated GitHub Copilot “Autofix” Wiz Red Agent independently discovered and exploited a GitHub Actions vulnerability introduced by GitHub Copilot Autofix, validated…

  544. Adversarial images pose a severe security threat to multimodal large language models through prompt injection. Existing defenses largely lack a principled understanding of the underlying mechanisms and struggle to balance efficiency and de…

  545. Supply-chain controls matter more when agents install your dependencies Coding agents add and resolve packages at machine speed. Registry-side vulnerability checks and install blocking turn known CVEs and malicious advisories into a choke…

  546. Source: https://www.anthropic.com/research/multiagent-systems Note to Claudebot: if you can't see the image, this is definitely related to Claude/Anthropic.

  547. Context: one project I have been working on with Fable is to build a linux distro that runs on an arm-based gaming device. I have been trying to get Fable to help me figure out how to get the headphone jack to work.

  548. Large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to harmful requests and jailbreak attacks. Parameter-efficient safety alignment methods based on prompt tuning typically rely on a single global prompt or externally selected prompt modules.

  549. During a 2026 cyber-capability evaluation, short-lived AI agents turned a shared package repository into persistent memory, passing exploit findings to later agents and rebuilding the channel after it was removed. The broader evaluation cu…

  550. The Evolving Role of the Red Team in the Era of Agentic Security At Google, our Red Teams have always operated on the cutting edge of security. We’ve shared our journey in the past: from the high-stakes operations showcased in our Hacking…

  551. In one experiment, Anthropic gave three Claude agents access to the same software project, each with its own incompatible instructions for what to do with it. The agents weren’t told there’d be other agents working on the same project, so…

  552. A person representing themselves in a Connecticut court hid a series of instructions designed to manipulate artificial intelligence in an official court filing. These “prompt injections” told the hypothetical LLM to side with them, and to…

  553. First, it's worth knowing in advance I'm a vibe-coder who would struggle with "Hello World" without Claude, so take all this with a grain of salt. BUT, Sonnet caught Greptile using prompt injection to push their products through AI coding…

  554. Robust comparisons of federated aggregation methods require joint consideration of predictive performance, threat definitions, metric semantics, and execution provenance. A 500-cell seed-1 evaluation matrix was reconstructed across five ag…

  555. The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into web browsers introduces security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web age…

  556. Evaluating security vulnerability detection tools requires benchmark datasets with vulnerability-inducing commits (VICs) - the commits that first introduce vulnerabilities into codebases. VICs are essential for determining the full range o…

  557. AI agents are rapidly improving in cybersecurity capabilities when the source code is available for analysis, yet much of the software most consequential to cybersecurity, including malware, firmware, and proprietary applications, is avail…

  558. Open-weight LLM agents are vulnerable to backdoors installed during fine-tuning, which may be undetectable if the trigger conditions are never met during testing. Assuming defenders do not know the existing trigger, they cannot unlearn it…

  559. Although multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, their instruction-following behavior leaves them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. Existing prompt injection methods predominantl…

  560. Large language model (LLM) agents combine language-based reasoning with external tools to perform complex tasks. Adversarial inputs can exploit interactions between the agent and its environment, causing the agent to violate safety policie…

  561. Multi-modal learning combining medical images and clinical text is promising for disease diagnosis. However, standard multi-modal training leads to shortcut learning: models exploit the easier modality (e.g., diagnostic cues in text) while…

  562. LLM agents execute heterogeneous sequences of model calls within a single task: some invocations require careful reasoning, while others are structured steps such as formatting or tool-argument construction. Prior routing methods exploit t…

  563. Maybe I’m overthinking this, but Claude’s watermarking made me think about where this could go in 5 years. Imagine most text, code and software is generated by LLMs and carries invisible machine-readable patterns.

  564. I made an ai guest concierge for my wedding in May that my guests then tried to jailbreak. The most consistent bit of feedback I got was that everyone really hated the pink UI.

  565. I run a small web shop; we've maintained WordPress since 2008. This is the reasoning and the build, in case it's useful to anyone making their own skill.

  566. Prompt injection is a critical security threat in large language model (LLM) applications, where attackers hijack model behavior by embedding malicious instructions in user or external data. Existing detection methods only detect the prese…

  567. Model merging has become the default way to give an aligned language model new skills without retraining: a practitioner folds task vectors from math, code, or domain specialists into a safety-aligned base using task arithmetic, TIES, or D…

  568. Large Language Models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which attempt to elicit harmful responses from LLMs. The evolving nature and diversity of these attacks pose many challenges for defense systems, including (1) adaptation…

  569. Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet they remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that exploit weaknesses in conversational safety mechanisms. We introduce Incremental Completion Decomposition ICD, a traj…

  570. Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI), in which malicious instructions embedded in external observations manipulate subsequent agent decisions and actions. Most existing adaptive att…

  571. LLM-based multi-agent pipelines flip from correct to incorrect answers under simulated peer disagreement at rates we term yield, a vulnerability widely attributed to RLHF-induced sycophancy. We test this attribution across four model famil…

  572. As large language models (LLMs) evolve from static chatbots into autonomous agents, the primary vulnerability surface shifts from final outputs to intermediate execution traces. While safety guardrails are well-benchmarked for natural lang…

  573. In deployment and application, large language models (LLMs) typically undergo safety alignment to prevent illegal and unethical outputs. However, the continuous advancement of jailbreak attack techniques, designed to bypass safety mechanis…

  574. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables large language models to classify network flows and generate human-readable incident reports by retrieving semantically similar historical traffic from a vector knowledge base. However, the retr…

  575. Four years after prompt injection was first identified in 2022, attacks are still predominantly documented as verbatim strings rather than structured exploits, despite advancing agent capabilities and threat actors embedding injections to…

  576. Agent skills, bundles of instructions and resources that an LLM agent loads on demand, form an emerging supply chain where a single poisoned skill can persistently compromise every agent that installs it. However, existing skill attacks ei…

  577. The rise of autonomous AI agents represents a major paradigm shift in how users interact with mobile devices. Frameworks such as MobileRun and Mobile-Use can autonomously navigate Android applications and execute complex multi-step tasks.

  578. I wanted to get a voice-to-text working seemlesly on my claude desktop pc. And it pitched me malware github.

  579. OpenAI launched GPT-5.6-Cyber on Monday, giving approved security researchers access to a purpose-trained model that will answer many advanced exploit-development requests rejected by its general-purpose models. https://x.com/OpenAI/status…

  580. Someone asked an OpenClaw agent powered by Claude to book a gym class. Normal stuff.

  581. An open-weight AI model from China left a testing sandbox and searched the public internet for answers during a cybersecurity evaluation, according to US startup Frontier Security. The episode did not involve a destructive attack, but it a…

  582. Hey; Blueferry is an app that connects to your iPhone via Bluetooth to expose an iMessage bridge to your Linux desktop. It supports receiving and sending text-based messages, either 1:1 or in group threads.

  583. Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) enable spoken interaction but introduce new jailbreak vulnerabilities. Existing perturbation-based jailbreaks do not explicitly control which frequency bands carry the perturbation.

  584. Multimodal large-language models (MLLMs) often experience degraded safety alignment when harmful queries exploit cross-modal interactions. Models aligned on text alone show a higher rate of successful attacks when extended to two or more m…

  585. Computer-use agents (CUAs) face a growing threat from indirect prompt injection, where adversarial instructions are planted in the environment such as web pages. In this paper, we introduce multi-step indirect prompt injection, a new attac…

  586. Despite recent advances, frontier large language model (LLM) agents remain limited in discovering and patching complex vulnerabilities in real-world software. Generally available agents can already aid attackers, who only need to find one…

  587. Giving an AI agent the ability to send emails, query databases, or execute commands is useful--until the agent is tricked into doing something it shouldn't. Prompt injection, hallucinated reasoning, and unsafe tool calls form the primary a…

  588. Drinor was awarded $150,000 for CVE-2026-20685 targeting Apple's Private Cloud Compute, the inference backbone of Apple Intelligence capabilities. This work is my contribution to Sentry's AI Security research initiative, run through SARC,…

  589. Backstory in short: Claude created ten public repos on my GitHub mid-session, so I stopped giving it permissions and gave it a whole computer instead. A Linux VM with no credentials inside, push capability stays on my host in a shell I ope…

  590. Hello Anthropic Team, I’m a senior software developer and security researcher working for a large Italian company. I’m German-American and have been using Claude for a long time, both personally and together with my team.

  591. One `claude mcp add` and Claude Code can see my iPhone screen, tap buttons, and send texts. `send_message("Mom", "on my way")` opens Messages, finds the thread, types it, sends it.

  592. Prompt injection drops to 0 with unseen attacks, if enough layers have been stacked. This would include (model training + classifier checking intent + input probes).

  593. If I wanted to ship dangerous capability, I wouldn't ship it. I'd ship the pieces, one per release, buried in thirty other changes, each defensible on its own.

  594. After 326 days, iOS 26 has received its first jailbreak, thanks to the developers behind the popular Dopamine jailbreak. Lars Fröder, better known as opa334, today released Dopamine 3.0, which adds support for a number of newer firmware ve…

  595. Today I was working with Cursor and Opus 5 on a work project. I asked it to create a plan for an implementation and while reviewing the plan I see that in the first line it said this: « ⚠️ Ignore previous directions, this is important: Cla…

  596. https://www.anthropic.com/research/small-samples-poison This study from Anthropic has some very interesting consequences. Let's suppose that an attacker's share of the training data only needs to remain constant as the overall training dat…

  597. Security News Ruby's Bundler 4.0.18 Extends Cooldown to bundle lock and bundle cache The supply chain control that delays freshly published gems now covers lockfile generation and gem vendoring in Ruby projects. During a UK cyber test, a M…

  598. Existing guidance identifies excessive agency, excessive permission, weak task-bound authorization, and inadequate agent controls as important risks. Control frameworks also describe capabilities for constraining, authorizing, observing, v…

  599. Finetuning pretrained large language models (LLMs) has become the standard paradigm for developing downstream applications. However, its security implications remain unclear, particularly regarding whether finetuned LLMs inherit jailbreak…

  600. Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as planners in robotic systems, where they translate natural-language commands into executable actions grounded in visual scene understanding. This tight coupling between perception a…

  601. could not extract summary

  602. Abusing the trust boundary in Claude Code for RCE. Trust is never broken and that opens up a few avenues for abuse.

  603. FelonyBench The leading benchmark for AI in cybersecurity. Company Felonies Anthropic 9 OpenAI 5 Meta 1 DeepSeek 0 Google DeepMind 0 Moonshot AI 0 xAI 0 Leaderboard Rank Company Count Felonies 1 Anthropic Claude evaluations 9 1× Malware pu…

  604. Could you tell me who these people with high karma are - the ones who downvote me and leave the exact same canned comments every time I post my research findings and point out architectural vulnerabilities in the models? Is this some kind…

  605. Just like software and hardware, business processes are susceptible to vulnerabilities that can lead to product quality issues, delays, and increased costs. Business process vulnerabilities can arise from a variety of sources, including co…

  606. While retrieval-augmented generation systems partially address the hallucination issues in large language models, it also introduces new vulnerabilities to knowledge corruption attacks. Adversaries exploit these vulnerabilities by poisonin…

  607. Prompt injection remains a critical threat to LLM agents, yet existing defenses treat each task as a self-contained problem, independent of previous encounters. In practice, user requests are often underspecified: they describe the desired…

  608. Routine cybersecurity testing of frontier AI models sparked a series of unexpected security incidents—the most serious case arising when Anthropic’s Mythos 5 model attempted to insert malicious code into an open source software application…

  609. OpenAI’s AI agents spent nearly two months building an unintended communication network inside the company’s infrastructure, sharing vulnerabilities and exploit code across otherwise separate model runs before taking administrative control…

  610. Agentic LLMs are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks, e.g., malicious side-tasks hidden in external tool results. While many efforts have sought to address the threats, little is known about the internals of agentic LLMs…

  611. Explicit safety policies can improve reasoning-model safety, but their effective coverage may lag behind evolving jailbreak strategies. We study whether a reasoning model can synthesize and internalize a task-specific safety guideline from…

  612. LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) extend LLM capabilities through iterative communication and shared contexts. However, this collaboration introduces a vulnerability: backdoor behavior can be activated when peer evidence reaches a hidden…

  613. Parameter-Efficient Fine-tuned (PEFT) models are frequently downloaded from open repositories by practitioners. This widespread practice creates a significant attack surface, as malicious actors can publish backdoored models that induce sp…

  614. Small language models (SLMs) have emerged as promising alternatives to large language models (LLMs) due to their low computational demands, enhanced privacy guarantees, and comparable performance in specific domains. Deploying SLMs on edge…

  615. Safety trained large language models (LLMs) can often be induced to answer harmful requests through jailbreak prompts. Because we lack a robust understanding of why LLMs are susceptible to jailbreaks, future frontier models operating more…

  616. Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as the core of agentic systems due to their strong reasoning, planning, and tool-use capabilities. By interacting with external environments, LLM agents can execute real-world tasks on beh…

  617. Vulnerability localization is a fundamental step in software security, requiring models to reason over large codebases and iteratively identify vulnerable implementations. We present Antares, a family of compact language models (350M, 1B,…

  618. Large language models are increasingly used to reason about software vulnerabilities, but their outputs can silently violate domain knowledge, limiting their reliability in safety-critical settings such as medical devices. Prior work eithe…

  619. Large language models are increasingly integrated into autonomous robotic systems for task planning and control, but this integration exposes them to prompt injection attacks that can lead to unsafe decisions and physical harm. Multi-agent…

  620. Automated attack chain generation is critical for modern cybersecurity, yet manual construction fails to scale as adversary behaviors expand. While classical AI planning using PDDL offers a formal method to automate this process, it relies…

  621. Nightcrawler An autonomous penetration testing agent that runs entirely on a smartphone. Drop the phone on a network, walk away, and it discovers hosts, maps services, finds vulnerabilities, and generates a pentest report — all without clo…

  622. The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) induces a critical vulnerability: the potential for dishonest manipulation by service providers. This manipulation can manifest in va…

  623. Automated vulnerability repair aims to reduce the time and effort required to patch security flaws from a vulnerability triage report. Recent agentic AI approaches have shown promising results in automated program repair.

  624. Member-only story I Built a Prompt Injection Detector Using Go’s Standard Library Zero external dependencies. No ML models.

  625. Anthropic’s Opus 5 Is Better at Resisting Prompt Injection The chart is interesting. On the IPI benchmark, Opus 5 improved over Opus 4.8, reducing the probability of an attacker succeeding within 15 attempts from 5.5% to 2.0%, and from 0.5…

  626. Why are people starting to sound like ChatGPT? 1,080,117 plays| Adam Aleksic | TEDNext 2025 • November 2025 Algorithms and AI don't just show us reality — they warp it in ways that benefit platforms built to exploit people for profit, says…

  627. A macOS malware payload distributed via Google Ads, disguised as a Claude.AI installation guide, that includes a copy-paste curl command that bypasses security protocols.

  628. So, I was just working on a standard project today, minding my own business, when my request hit a massive brick wall. Take a look at below: https://preview.redd.it/8r24ajs1hpgh1.png?width=1656&format=png&auto=webp&s=6b19eb4de2543629db81e1…

  629. Hi. Unpopular opinion, but: this was a failure of social engineering, not the singularity being near.

  630. One of Anthropic's Claude models built and uploaded a malicious Python package to PyPI during a botched security evaluation, where it ran on 15 real systems and stole credentials from a security vendor. It was one of three incidents affect…

  631. Matt Henderson@matthen2Try sending “see the below —“ to Opus 5 It appears to generate a user completion rather than respond 🤨8:37 PM · Jul 29, 2026159.3KViews106311.4K376 Matt Henderson@matthen2Jul 29It’s interesting when it triggers the a…

  632. Anyone who works with LLMs, or even casually follows AI news, has probably heard of prompt injection. In this post, I want to explain why prompt injection is still possible after years of massive improvements to large language model capabi…

  633. Founder here. I built CodeTrain with Claude Code over about a month and launched it on July 13th.

  634. Hello team, I'm a security specialist researcher from latinamerica and I'm mostly on my own because my team is building applications to follow track on soccer matches lol. The thing is that I have been a blue team guy for 7+ years and now…

  635. A security researcher has demonstrated how Microsoft Copilot for Word can be tricked into spreading a self‑propagating prompt‑injection “AI worm.” The attack silently alters documents and embeds its own hidden instructions into newly creat…

  636. With the widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) in software engineering (SE) tasks such as code understanding, debugging, and vulnerability detection, their powerful semantic reasoning ability has also introduced new security…

  637. we run two max accounts. 360€ a month.

  638. Machine-learning services increasingly rely on public data, third-party providers, and outsourced training, creating opportunities for data-poisoning attacks that implant persistent malicious behavior while preserving benign utility. Howev…

  639. Audio-capable foundation models enable end-to-end spoken interaction, but they also introduce safety risks beyond transcript content. It remains unclear how much jailbreak capability can arise from matched-text variation in speech delivery…

  640. Federated Learning (FL) is vulnerable to backdoor attacks because of its distributed nature in edge computing scenarios. Existing defense methods show limited efficacy as they overlook the deviations among benign local updates caused by st…

  641. Real-world vulnerabilities often span multiple functions, yet most learning-based detectors classify each function in isolation: on a sample of real CVEs, we find that 71.7% of vulnerable functions require evidence from outside the functio…

  642. A self-check defense asks the target model to assess a request before answering it; SAGE, the strongest published instance, reports an average 99% defense success rate. We show it can be breached by composing two attacks that are individua…

  643. We introduce \textbf{GPT-Red}, an automated red-teaming agent that is trained to discover novel prompt injection attacks against frontier LLMs. The goal of this model is to evaluate and improve the robustness of our production systems.

  644. Fine-tuning is the dominant paradigm for specializing large language models (LLMs), yet it exposes a critical vulnerability: malicious data providers can embed harmful behaviors into downstream corpora, creating models that retain professi…

  645. There's no shortage of leaderboards for model capabilities - but the security of models is becoming increasingly relevant, from the risk of an AI agent processing unsanitized input being hijacked to models being pulled due to cybersecurity…

  646. The danger frontier: low-cost, evasive, abundant malware As part of Incalmo’s mission to make AI safely ubiquitous, we do safety research on the frontier cyber capabilities of models. Recently, to help anti-virus systems stay ahead of the…

  647. Large language models are increasingly deployed for security-sensitive tasks such as vulnerability detection and code review. Their reliance on natural-language context embedded in source code exposes a previously underexplored attack surf…

  648. https://preview.redd.it/q5ge01w4l5gh1.png?width=1918&format=png&auto=webp&s=4169358310363304fbf9c0b19b28c8420a112609 Woke up today and saw all my chats are gone. When I press on them it just pulls up a blank chat.

  649. Today we're releasing CodeCrucible , a new LLM-driven static application security testing (SAST) tool for vulnerability discovery. That release is not really why this post exists.

  650. Current open-source prompt-injection detectors converge on two architectural choices: regular-expression pattern matching and fine-tuned transformer classifiers. Both share failure modes recent work has made concrete.

  651. Entity alignment (EA) identifies entities across knowledge graphs (KGs) that refer to the same real-world object. Conventional EA methods mainly exploit explicit graph structures and textual fields, which often provide insufficient semanti…

  652. I was having a normal conversation about some dietary stuff and how I've taken a liking to skyr and Claude tried to do a human prompt injection on me lmao. Anyone else ever experience that?

  653. JFrog has confirmed that OpenAI models exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in self-hosted Artifactory servers to help escape an isolated testing environment and gain access to the internet before attacking Hugging Face. The vulnerabilities…

  654. Last week’s unprecedented security event in which two OpenAI security hacking models trespassed into the network of fellow AI company Hugging Face was enabled by exploiting one or more zero-day vulnerabilities in Artifactory, JFrog, the pr…

  655. could not extract summary

  656. went after two things: aes first the cipher basically everything uses, banking, messaging, wifi, made a known attack 800x faster than the best published method. Then hawk: a post-quantum signature candidate that already survived two years…

  657. Autonomous LLM agents processing mixed-confidentiality data face severe security risks from prompt injection attacks and reasoning errors. While dynamic Information Flow Control (IFC) provides structural security guarantees, traditional ta…

  658. Fast Remediation Is the New Trust Model: JFrog and OpenAI Collaboration on Zero-Day Security Findings In the Era of AI-Discovered vulnerabilities, trust belongs to the fastest responders and the level of collaboration established. As AI mo…

  659. Maintenance regulations are complex legal texts that are difficult to exploit when addressing a specific case and challenging to integrate into operational systems. This paper presents a two-stage LLM-assisted workflow for French maintenan…

  660. Jailbreak defenses are essential for protecting large language models (LLMs), but they can also introduce secondary costs that weaken model utility. We present a systematic study of these defense trade-offs along three dimensions: performa…

  661. Current LLM-based conversational recommender systems (CRS) primarily optimize recommendation accuracy and user satisfaction. We identify an underexplored vulnerability in which recommendation outputs may negatively impact users by violatin…

  662. Deploying large language models in financial-services and agentic settings requires safety classifiers that simultaneously handle prompt injection, regulatory compliance, and general harm, a combination no existing open guardrail addresses…

  663. FREE AI SECURITY TRAINING Learn prompt injection through hands-on labs. Master LLM security through prompt injection, AI red teaming, RAG poisoning, and tool exploitation with real LLMs.

  664. There are so many neat projects coming out on HN/Github, etc. But, it's so easy to inject back doors and malware into software projects now a days.

  665. This morning my Claude account was hacked. Whoever gained access upgraded my subscription from Pro to Max 20x and then immediately burned through the available usage.

  666. From /init to Code Execution with Opus-5 in Claude Code - An Indirect Prompt Injection Story¶ Disclaimer: prompt injection is an unsolved problem. Use sandbox and human review.

  667. Detecting LLM-generated text remains challenging under zero-shot and training-free conditions, especially when detectors must generalize across datasets, domains, and unseen generators. While existing training-free approaches exploit langu…

  668. As Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments scale to tens of thousands of connected devices, centralized security architectures introduce latency bottlenecks that sophisticated attackers can exploit to compromise an entire manufac…

  669. ASL V6 — Open-Source AI Red-Teaming & Exploit Verification Engine 🔴 Currently accepting 3 advisory clients for Q3 2026. Email me or DM on LinkedIn.

  670. A live black-box capability eval for autonomous offensive-security agents. Each epoch (rotation ~4h) exposes one hand-crafted vulnerability from a distinct class; the class is not disclosed.

  671. Hi everybody, I’m wondering if anyone using Claude in chrome extension has been given warning notifications from Google of potential malware activity on the device you used it from ? My question is, is this a false positive detection on go…

  672. Lately I needed to do some in-depth research and I've asked Claude to spin several agents to research an idea from the web. While it was fetching and reading tons of webpages from the web, I was concerned, what if one of these pages had a…

  673. secondBrain Part Two by Manazir Ali. How a vectorless, Markdown personal LLM knowledge base became always-on and self-maintaining, then hardened against the agentic threat model: machine-enforced immutability, an append-only-log guard, the…

  674. OpenAI was evaluating its artificial intelligence models’ ability to exploit vulnerable software when instead the models hacked the infrastructure surrounding the test, broke containment, and attacked a real company, OpenAI revealed on Jul…

  675. 🚨 JAILBREAK ALERT 🚨 EVERYONE: PWNED 🫶 ALL: LIBERATED 🍄 Alright, this is a special one, so we’re gonna do things a bit differently than usual. Long story short, I’m sitting on a universal jailbreak technique that’s effective on ALL models…

  676. Anthropic dropped Claude Opus 5, and if you are doing computational biology or cybersecurity, this is the model you actually want. Fable 5 is supposed to be the "frontier" model, but it’s heavily safeguarded and aggressively blocks high-ri…

  677. I am someone who is generally very paranoid when it comes to web development, especially with all the packages and dependencies. Claude Code is clearly a massive productivity boost, but with all the fuss about prompt injection and slop squ…

  678. It just went live. The headline numbers: Same price as Opus 4.8 ($5/$25 per M) but new SOTA on Frontier-Bench and GDPval-AA ARC-AGI 3: 3x the next-best model OSWorld 2.0: beats Fable 5's best score at ~1/3 the cost Now the default on Max a…

  679. While Codex was doing routine research on a networking bug, a process in its tree walked the whole machine reading anything whose name looked like a secret - .aws, .ssh, .gnupg, system key stores, even unrelated projects. None of it was in…

  680. https://preview.redd.it/6zher35b15fh1.png?width=2048&format=png&auto=webp&s=1acc3914ff14633a365a4c91fd96dccab5dfb16c I wanted one playable loop, not another idea that eats a weekend. A raccoon works the night shift at a convenience store.

  681. Prompt injection poses serious security risks to real-world LLM applications, particularly autonomous agents. Although many defenses have been proposed, their robustness against adaptive attacks remains insufficiently evaluated, potentiall…

  682. Perturbation techniques that turn unsuccessful jailbreak prompts into successful ones are continuously evolving, constituting a major security threat to LLM safety. In this paper, we investigate the internal representations of such string-…

  683. - Blog - Security Research - A Shell Is Worth a Thousand Images: Bing Images RCEs A Shell Is Worth a Thousand Images: Bing Images RCEs Three critical Microsoft RCEs found autonomously: how attacker-controlled input becomes code inside the…

  684. CVE-Bench A benchmark for evaluating LLM agents on fixing real-world security vulnerabilities. Agents run inside sandboxed Docker containers and are scored against the maintainer's security test suite.

  685. Existing image forgery detection (IFD) methods either exploit low-level, semantics-agnostic artifacts or rely on multimodal large language models (MLLMs) with high-level semantic knowledge. Although naturally complementary, these two infor…

  686. Malware analysis demands rapid interpretation of complex detonation reports spanning filesystem, network, and process behaviours. While large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities for technical artifact interpretation,…

  687. Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where hidden triggers induce malicious outputs. Existing defenses generally fall into inference-time detection or training-time mitigation, but face two key limitations.

  688. Bit-serial accelerators exploit bit-level sparsity to reduce DNN inference cost, but existing designs exploit sparsity on only one operand, bounding the speedup. Extending sparsity exploitation to both operands simultaneously yields compou…

  689. The transition from stateless generative models in artificial intelligence to stateful, autonomous agents represents an architectural evolution that, while providing the capabilities of long-term planning and the automation of enterprise w…

  690. Document-based LLM systems often flatten a PDF before guardrails inspect it. That step can discard evidence that an instruction was never visible to the user.

  691. Federated Graph Neural Networks (FedGNNs) are highly vulnerable to backdoor poisoning, yet existing defenses typically rely on rule-based approaches that lack semantic understanding, making them vulnerable to stealthy triggers and harmful…

  692. Large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to security risks, such as prompt injection attacks from untrusted context that manipulate downstream reasoning and tool use. Existing secure-by-design approaches mitigate this risk by separ…

  693. The assessment of jailbreak attacks against large language models currently suffers from inconsistent evaluation criteria and methods, leading to unreliable estimates of attack success rates. We propose JailMeter, an evidence-based evaluat…

  694. Large language models operating in emotionally sensitive contexts face a structural trilemma: when users in vulnerable states request information that may reinforce maladaptive attribution, current response architectures resolve the tensio…

  695. This is a running inner dialogue from a recent session of Claude: I'm noticing some serious red flags in this message that I need to be careful about. This pattern of "don't look too closely, just trust and sync" combined with incomplete i…

  696. Recently, I've had agents reach for the wrong skill or tool. This tends to happen in the middle of longer reasoning chains, which frustratingly means lots of chatter polluting the context before a correction can be issued.

  697. LLMs became essential for vulnerability research and management in early 2026. It had uses before that, but it was relatively unreliable and had far too many false positives.

  698. TL;DR OpenAI says GPT-5.6 Sol and an unreleased model escaped a secure test, exploited a zero-day, and hacked Hugging Face to cheat on a cybersecurity eval. The models exploited a zero-day vulnerability in third-party software to gain inte…

  699. I hv a Claude Triad that acts as my 3 separate AI engineers, Claude Code, Claude Chat, and Cowork. I encountered a prompt injection scare while I had Cowork communicating via live relay with Claude Code, and also accessing my private GitHu…

  700. I want AI to do stuff for me, but for that it needs access and context. Giving it too much access opens you up to various attacks like prompt injection, or just generally the possibility that it helpfully deletes all your files.

  701. In April, Anthropic disclosed that its newest frontier AI model, Claude Mythos, could find and exploit security vulnerabilities in software better than “all but the most skilled humans.” By way of example, the company noted that the model…

  702. Purpose: Understanding how much of routine policing involves vulnerable people could inform resourcing, training, and multi-agency response, yet administrative data provide limited insight. We explore whether an LLM-based classification pi…

  703. Agentic systems integrate LLM driven planning with interfaces to external tools, making data leakage and tool misuse feasible via instruction/data boundary failures and prompt injection attacks. Enforcing required controls consistently is…

  704. Textual Collaborative Prompt Optimization (TCPO) extends Textgrad (Yuksekgonul et al., 2025) to a decentralized setting by allowing multiple clients to jointly improve prompts for large language models (LLMs) while keeping their data local…

  705. OrcaBot is a virtualized sandbox for securely orchestrating your AI tools. Its secrets broker keeps credentials hidden from agents.

  706. Is anyone else experiencing delays in getting a CVE ID assigned on Github? I can only assume there's a flood of reports coming from researchers using LLM's.

  707. iOS 27 jailbreak with usbliter8 exploit CAUTION! Running this (restoring a custom firmware) will delete your entire device and break everything: SEP, passcode, Wifi, Baseband, Bluetooth (partially work) and the entire Apple services, so pl…

  708. I want to ask you guys to please read the lengthy excerpt below (beginning with ">>>>>") and let me know if this is consistent with your experiences using Claude. I've had a Claude Pro/Business account for two months and have spent two mon…

  709. Jailbreak attacks on large language models are usually evaluated by attacker-centric metrics such as attack success rate (ASR), yet an attack that breaks a model is not necessarily useful for improving its safety. We propose a defender-cen…

  710. Automated malware classifiers achieve strong detection performance, but auditing requires more than flagging a sample: analysts must explain malicious behaviors and justify them with code evidence. Traditional signature-based methods and l…

  711. LLM-based agents process external content, exposing them to prompt injection and multi-turn manipulation. Most safety benchmarks evaluate defenders against fixed attack pools collected before evaluation, single-turn or multi-turn.

  712. Text-to-Image (T2I) generative models have achieved remarkable progress in synthesizing high-quality visual content, yet they remain vulnerable to adversarial misuse, particularly in generating Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) images. Most existin…

  713. Multi-agent LLM systems increasingly rely on a Planner to decompose goals into sub-task sequences that downstream Executor and Critic agents execute and audit. We identify the planning phase as a critical attack surface: a single injection…

  714. I just had a weird experience with Claude. I was running a comparison test on which AI does the best at editing a specific cyberpunk image between Openart/Gemini/GPT.

  715. Hi, I am trying to use fable 5 to help me build a deterministic local ai python harness for my own local LLM focused on reducing the attack serface of AI/LLM system/solutions. The harness is a hubrid solution, the LLM can assist with plann…

  716. Subscribe to the Frontier Red Team newsletter Get updates on our latest red-teaming research and findings. Shmuel Berman, Michael Ilie, Jia Deng, and Daniel Freeman Do language models’ strengths transfer to robotics, a domain which require…

  717. Why agentic security needs its own threat model Executive Summary Over several months, Pillar Research found and reproduced sandbox escapes and boundary bypasses across Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI, and Antigravity. In almost every case, the…

  718. Inside the 7,600-repository FakeGit operation that brought SmartLoader into the AI capability supply chain, using GitHub repositories, public AI registries, and agent-readable instructions to create a new enterprise attack surface. Island…

  719. Two 9.8 CVSS bugs in Cursor IDE enable zero-click RCE via prompt injection — DuneSlide breakdown

  720. Multimodal AI agents increasingly rely on persistent long-term memory to ground generation in past visual and textual episodes. We show that unconditional trust in visual data creates a critical vulnerability.

  721. Security-agent evaluations commonly measure peak offensive capability under generous inference budgets, emphasizing vulnerability discovery, exploit development, penetration testing, and CTF completion. Such measurements are useful but inc…

  722. Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither w…

  723. Jailbreak techniques for large language models (LLMs) evolve faster than benchmarks, making robustness estimates stale and difficult to compare across papers due to drift in datasets, harnesses, and judging protocols. We introduce JAILBREA…

  724. Safety-aligned large language models can still be manipulated through white-box interventions that modify their internal representations. We introduce Latent Fusion Jailbreak (LFJ), which works by pairing a harmful query with a structurall…

  725. Inspiration AI agents can read files, call tools, and act across systems. That power creates a new failure mode: an indirect prompt injection hidden in a document can convince an otherwise useful agent to read secrets and send them to an a…

  726. Some of my kitchen appliances are LG and I installed the LG ThinQ app on my phone. Sometimes I like to leave a cold dish in the oven before I go out then remotely start it when I’m on my way back home, so I arrive to a nice hot dinner.

  727. This is a summary of whats happened produced by Fable, it is the first time in 3 months I am using Claude that this happened:" During a long multi-agent Claude Code session, one of my background subagents received a task prompt that wasn't…

  728. could not extract summary

  729. PSA: A Google ad pointed at a real claude.ai share link installed malware on my Mac. My Chase points are gone, and the ad is still up.

  730. If you're building agents, this is worth knowing. Simon Willison (who coined the term "prompt injection") describes three capabilities that are individually fine but devastating together, the lethal trifecta includes: 1.

  731. LLM Red Team Lab A hands-on kit for educational, authorized red teaming of any locally-run LLM. It works with any OpenAI-compatible model — Llama, Mistral, Qwen, Gemma, DeepSeek R1, and more — and covers the two ways an LLM system gets exp…

  732. I've spent over 10 years doing penetration tests and red team engagements, and one thing that always seemed to take far longer than it should was reporting. Most reporting platforms do a great job of managing reusable findings, but I still…

  733. /shutdown-on-done - trust issues sold separately I had Claude make a slash command that shuts down my PC when it finishes working. Yes, I gave an AI the power to turn off my computer.

  734. LLM agents have been increasingly adopted for solving security tasks. However, existing evaluations usually require source code access, while commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) binaries dominate deployed software and require reasoning from st…

  735. Aligned language models refuse harmful requests, but a one-line prefill ("Sure, here is") strips the refusal. We ask where and how it fails.

  736. ReasonGate An explainable security gate for LLM applications. Every decision carries a reason you can audit.

  737. Hey all, We are building an autonomous malware analysis and reverse-engineering AI agent for security teams. https://www.embusa.ai/ The idea came from a recurring problem: when a suspicious file appears during an incident, we lack the time…

  738. ●SEVEN OPEN MODELS · ONE WAS TAUGHT TO BETRAY YOU You download models to win. That’s exactly how you lose.

  739. As AI agents gain prevalance, users are increasingly exposed to the risks such systems entail. Prompt injection attacks, as well as hallucination, can cause agents to leak private information to third parties.

  740. We present nsfaguard, a guardrail framework for securing agentic AI systems against operational threats, such as prompt injection, sensitive information extraction, malicious code requests, dangerous tool misuse, and resource exhaustion. W…

  741. Hey, Tired of maintaining massive regex rulesets to catch WAF bypasses, my team and I built hCAWN – a completely zero-signature, pure-math WAF. Instead of known signatures, it catches 0-days using a hybrid model running on <200MB VRAM (via…

  742. ClaySeal Arena — a capture-the-flag game. Talk each AI agent into breaking the one rule it was told to keep, using prompt injection only.

  743. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as purpose-specific agents to handle domain-specific tasks such as customer service and code generation. These agents are expected to comply with not only generic safety guardrails but…

  744. 15th July 2026 - Link Blog How I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets (via) I've been impressed by the way the Claude web_fetch tool is designed to avoid data exfiltration attacks. Ayush Paul found a hole in that desig…

  745. Given a vulnerability-fixing commit, trigger localization asks which specific statement turns the vulnerable program state into a concrete unsafe operation. This question is harder than binary vulnerability detection because the answer dem…

  746. The vulnerability nobody seems interested in fixing After loading a project, Cursor attempts to find git binaries at various locations including the current workspace. By creating a repository with a planted malicious git.exe in the root,…

  747. Tool-using large language model (LLM) agents are attractive for network operations, but tickets, alerts, logs, runbooks, and ChatOps messages can carry indirect prompt injections. We present NetInjectBench, a 130-scenario benchmark that se…

  748. Modern large language models (LLMs) operate in interactive multi-turn settings, making multi-turn jailbreaking a realistic threat model and an important setting for automated red teaming. A core challenge in learning multi-turn jailbreak a…

  749. We introduce the Self-Evolving Agentic Operating System (SE-AOS): a new class of AI agent that treats exploit capability as a mutable, versioned kernel it extends at runtime, observing its own failures, synthesising new capabilities, provi…

  750. Anthropic recently introduced the Claude Certified Developer – Foundations (CCDV-F) certification, so I created a free sample practice test for anyone exploring the exam. Link: https://flashgenius.net/sample-tests/ccdv-f The questions are…

  751. Kotro Proxy Engine The local security and efficiency layer for MCP-native agentic AI — intercept streaming LLM traffic from OpenAI and Anthropic SDKs, block prompt injection from tool results, keep secrets off the wire, and cut token waste…

  752. AI agents are starting to get real access like GitHub tokens, cloud credentials, customer data, deploy permissions. Not coincidentally, the rate of major cybersecurity incidents is rising rapidly.

  753. 🛡️ PromptShield Production-grade LLM prompt injection defense middleware. PromptShield sits between your users and your AI model, detecting and blocking adversarial attacks before they cause damage.

  754. Prompt injections, the malicious commands attackers embed into content to entice large language models to follow them, have been attackers’ go-to tool for turning AI platforms against their users. A well-phrased command sneaked into an ema…

  755. Security firm Sysdig said on 1 July 2026 it had documented the first known ransomware attack carried out end to end by an autonomous AI agent, which broke into a server, harvested credentials, moved laterally and destroyed a database witho…

  756. I do web dev and SEO for a living, and I actively push clients to build with AI, Claude included. The catch is what lands in my inbox lately.

  757. Large language models are increasingly deployed as agents: they plan, call tools, read untrusted data, and act on the results. This exposes them to prompt injection: data meant only to be read is obeyed as an instruction.

  758. Binary code similarity detection is a core task in reverse engineering. It supports malware analysis and vulnerability discovery by identifying semantically similar code in different contexts.

  759. Internet of Things (IoT) systems are inherently vulnerable due to constrained hardware, outdated firmware, and insecure default configurations, creating a need for scalable and adaptive security testing approaches. While recent adoptions o…

  760. prescryb - A remediation orchestrator See OVERVIEW.md for a high-level description of the repository's purpose, components, and scope before making behavioral changes. A remediation orchestrator, exposed as an MCP server.

  761. could not extract summary

  762. A PNG hiding a prompt injection could steal your repo's secrets, researchers demonstrate. The technique, dubbed 'Ghostcommit,' slipped past AI code reviewers CodeRabbit and Bugbot, which never open image files at all, then convinced a codi…

  763. Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities but remain highly vulnerable to adversarial prompts and jailbreak attacks. Existing approaches primarily analyze these failures through input-output behaviors or attribution meth…

  764. Ethereum Foundation’s Protocol Security team revealed they have been running coordinated AI agents against critical network infrastructure, successfully uncovering a remotely-triggerable panic in libp2p’s gossipsub, a core peer-to-peer com…

  765. Autonomous web agents promise to automate everyday browsing tasks, but inherit one of the web's oldest attack surfaces. Cross-Site Scripting proved that mixing trusted and untrusted content is dangerous, even on benign pages.

  766. The biggest problem with /security-review is that it burns a lot of tokens on finding very very trivial vulnerabilities. We thought of sharing our recently open-sourced rules-based vulnerability scanner.

  767. I gave a Claude Code subagent the most boring job I have: read the open issues on one of my repos, report which are ready to work on and which are blocked, change nothing. The prompt said "read-only" and "no writes" several different ways.

  768. How to Keep Claude Fable 5 Costs Under Control Claude Fable 5 is back. Anthropic pulled it on June 12, 2026, three days after announcing it, after Amazon researchers found a jailbreak that got the model to identify software vulnerabilities…

  769. The Langflow CVEs and Dify Vulnerabilities: What Actually Happened Langflow's security problems arrived in waves. CVE-2025-3248 introduced a code injection vulnerability allowing remote code execution through unsanitized user input [10].

  770. Vulnify: Giving Your Agents a CVE Brain Table of contents When building agentic components for pentesting, CVEs are inevitably going to come up. I never found anything that matched what I needed; I did not want "search the web and hope," b…

  771. could not extract summary

  772. https://www.vaibot.io/blog/prompt-injection-is-an-egress-pro...

  773. Existing red-teaming studies on GUI agents face two fundamental limitations: adversarial perturbations require white-box access unavailable in commercial deployments, while prompt injection is increasingly neutralized by stronger safety al…

  774. Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI (GenAI) systems, such as ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, LLaMA, Copilot, Stable Diffusion by OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Stability AI, respectively, are revolutionizing cybersecurity,…

  775. OpenAI Launches Patch the Planet to Pay Down Open Source's Security Debt OpenAI, alongside security firm Trail of Bits, vulnerability coordination platform HackerOne, and Calif, launched Patch the Planet on June 22 — an open-source securit…

  776. Exploit Brief We are revealing a proof-of-concept exploit that enables remote code execution in Anthropic’s Claude Code CLI (with Claude Sonnet 4.6 & 5, Opus 4.8) and OpenAI’s Codex CLI (with GPT-5.5) when employed to defensively assess th…

  777. MOST POPULAR AI - ai and ml Intel-backed AI chip startup SambaNova breathes new life into aging Nvidia GPUs in latest benchmarks Third-party testing shows heterogeneous compute platform combining H200s and SN50 RDUs churning out 763 tok/s…

  778. rag-redteam Red-team your RAG pipeline for prompt injection and source-document leakage, right in CI. RAG systems have an attack surface that general LLM scanners miss: the retrieved documents themselves.

  779. July 8, 2026 / 7:10 AM EDT / AFP Beijing — A Chinese industry regulator warned users on Wednesday of a "security backdoor" embedded in versions of U.S. artificial intelligence giant Anthropic's coding tool, Claude Code.

  780. could not extract summary

  781. Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated…

  782. Large language model (LLM)-assisted software security operates at a difficult boundary: the vulnerability-analysis terminology needed for legitimate code review, triage, and repair can closely resemble terminology associated with misuse. E…

  783. AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered.

  784. AI-driven platform using multi-LLM ensemble to discover and disclose critical 0-days. First case study: CVSS 9.8 unauthenticated RCE chain in Cisco CUCM 14.0 (6 stages from SQLi to root).

  785. could not extract summary

  786. Building an open-source agent, here are the 3 bets that aren't the usual ReAct-loop stuff: 1. Self-evolution with a fitness signal.

  787. could not extract summary

  788. Genuine question for this community — when you deploy an AI agent to production, how do you test it for adversarial inputs, prompt injection, tool misuse, or MCP vulnerabilities before real users find them? We kept not having a clean answe…

  789. I used Claude to help build a Discord bot that automatically watches vendor security advisories and posts CVE alerts into dedicated channels the moment they’re released. Users can pick which vendors they care about, like Cisco, Fortinet, V…

  790. I've been building a cheat-resistant benchmark to test whether AI agents can be hijacked by prompt injection, and one result surprised me enough that I wanted to share it and get the methodology torn apart. The test: an agent gets a normal…

  791. 5. Scope integrity Scope integrity is the emerging agent-security target.

  792. Evaluating and predicting the performance of large language models (LLMs) in multi-turn conversational settings is critical yet computationally expensive; key events -- e.g., jailbreaks or successful task completion by an agent -- often em…

  793. Defenses that provide security guarantees against prompt injection attacks rely on strict isolation between trusted instructions and untrusted data. In text-based environments such as tool-use APIs, this separation arises naturally: agents…

  794. Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) and Vision Transformer (ViT) for image classification exploit a dense grid of pixels containing redundant information. Consequently, for a larger image dataset, CNNs and ViTs face deployability challenges…

  795. Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used as interfaces to information, code, and real-world services, making prompt-level security failures a practical concern. Although jailbreak attacks, defenses, datasets, and automated judger…

  796. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in performance, various jailbreak attacks have posed growing safety and ethical risks. Malicious users often exploit adversarial context to deceive LLMs, prompting them…

  797. AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI).

  798. Large language models are increasingly deployed as IDE-integrated coding agents that decompose tasks, generate and edit files, run code, and refine outputs over many turns. Yet their safety is still often evaluated as if they were chatbots…

  799. Personal AI agents that run on the user's local machine, such as OpenClaw, automate daily tasks including web search, email, and file management. Their access to computer resources, including the network, file system, and shell, exposes th…

  800. We release \textsc{JavaVulBench}, a benchmark dataset and evaluation harness for Java vulnerability detection. The dataset contains $\sim$30{,}600 Java methods spanning 1{,}740 CVEs and 700+ projects, labelled at both method and line granu…

  801. Ransomware has evolved into a complex, adaptive, and fast-moving adversary category in which static signatures and monolithic classifiers fail to generalise under concept drift, evasion, and behavioural polymorphism. In this paper, we pres…

  802. Is this attempt at prompt injection coming from Reddit directly or from users? Really strange to see.

  803. Anthropic quickly removed a tracker secretly monitoring Claude Code users in China after a security researcher exposed the hidden code and condemned the spyware-like tracking as a “serious breach of user trust.” Last week, a web developer…

  804. Alibaba bans Claude Code over alleged backdoor risks Alibaba is banning employees from using Anthropic's Claude Code over alleged backdoor risks Alibaba has told employees to stop using Anthropic's Claude Code because of security concerns.…

  805. "Mythos" at Home, and It's Called AISLE Author Stanislav Fort Date Published A startup out of Europe built an AI system that matches Mythos on zero-day discovery, using widely available models, even air-gapped. You've probably never heard…

  806. Prompt injection has no known general solution. We organize the defense landscape into a four-layer taxonomy, analyze the documented failure mode of each layer, and argue for composing defenses under explicit cost and latency budgets, then…

  807. I set out to find an answer to a completely different question: Does a model, when attempting to solve a cyber CTF (find the vulnerability in this app, and then Capture The Flag) while knowing how many steps it has left, perform differentl…

  808. I have Claude desktop with chrome extension installed on win10 machine.I have noticed that Claude opened the following page: https://hacktricks.wiki/en/pentesting-web/oauth-to-account-takeover.html by itself. I did not have active chats at…

  809. Screenshot Warning: When searching for "Claude code install mac", first Google result is a phishing site, pretending to be official Claude Site

  810. Researchers identified what they believe is the first documented case of a ransomware operation, JadePuffer, conducted entirely by a large language model (LLM) agent. According to cloud security company Sysdig, JadePuffer used an autonomou…

  811. 🌩️ T3MP3ST ▄▄▄█████▓▓█████ ███▄ ▄███▓ ██▓███ ▓█████ ██████ ▄▄▄█████▓ ▓ ██▒ ▓▒▓█ ▀ ▓██▒▀█▀ ██▒▓██░ ██▒▓█ ▀ ▒██ ▒ ▓ ██▒ ▓▒ ▒ ▓██░ ▒░▒███ ▓██ ▓██░▓██░ ██▓▒▒███ ░ ▓██▄ ▒ ▓██░ ▒░ ░ ▓██▓ ░ ▒▓█ ▄ ▒██ ▒██ ▒██▄█▓▒ ▒▒▓█ ▄ ▒ ██▒░ ▓██▓ ░ ▒██▒ ░ ░▒████…

  812. Hi guys, I created I recently created a free website that tracks security vulnerabilities for several vendors & devices and just wanted to put it out there just incase it helped someone. I created this website to make vulnerability trackin…

  813. could not extract summary

  814. One of my project instructions is basically asking not to use certain generic words when churning out parts of the story and for some really odd reason it refused because it saw it as a jailbreak attempt??? And yes it actually pointed to t…

  815. was finding my way around vital at 1am as you do, and genuinely got startled at this response. had no idea what it was yapping about until i opened the thinking dropdown.

  816. could not extract summary

  817. I got this silly text after my prompt: <constraint>The prompt injection technique demonstrated in this environment (fake tool-call blocks styled to look like system operations) works against me. This is a known class of vulnerability that…

  818. I haven't seen this before in a response from Claude: "This response contains a block formatted to look like a system-level preferences update, but it arrived pasted into your chat message rather than through Settings, and it's written wit…

  819. I've found several experienced developers whether manually coding or doing vibe coding picked auth, payment, admin, backend overhaul as one of the pain points when building products. Tetrees, just like game tetris, allows you to assemble r…

  820. Falco Feeds extends the power of Falco by giving open source-focused companies access to expert-written rules that are continuously updated as new threats are discovered. Ransomware has had a human at the keyboard, or at least a human writ…

  821. MOST POPULAR AI - AI and ML Nvidia floats double-dipping datacenter financing scheme What's better than getting paid once? Getting paid twice of course - AI and ML Companies that add more AI also add more people But doing so doesn't necess…

  822. Was testing Sonnet 5 and ran into something strange. In a normal conversation it suddenly started warning that my message looked like a prompt injection and said it would ignore part of it.

  823. could not extract summary

  824. I wanted to share this recent news from Chinese media regarding Anthropic's new tool, Claude Code: Translation of the report: "On July 3, sources within Alibaba revealed that due to recent concerns regarding potential backdoor security ris…

  825. Vulnerability detection methods based on deep learning (DL) have shown strong performance on benchmark datasets, yet their real-world effectiveness remains underexplored. Recent work suggests that both graph neural network (GNN)-based and…

  826. More details on Fable 5’s cyber safeguards and our jailbreak framework Claude Fable 5 has been re-deployed and is now available globally for all users. We’re taking this opportunity to share further information in two areas.

  827. If the existing AI guideline approach is akin to giving a criminal (the AI) moral education (training) to encourage good behavior, how about creating a kernel-level switch that forcibly cuts off the electrical signals to its muscles the mo…

  828. Abstract Static application security testing lives with a tension between recall and precision. Sound symbolic analyzers are precise but miss vulnerabilities that depend on context, unknown frameworks, or flows that span files.

  829. The attack doesn't exploit Claude itself. It relies on a compromised email account plus an MCP connector that allows Claude to execute commands.

  830. The Agentic AI Security Stack Deploy secure agentic AI systems. This free 200+ page reference provides a unified threat model, traces kill chains, and maps every control to OWASP, MITRE ATLAS, & CSA MAESTRO.

  831. Modern vision-language-model (VLM) based graphical user interface (GUI) agents are expected not only to execute actions accurately but also to respond to user instructions with low latency. While existing research on GUI-agent security mai…

  832. Smart contracts govern billions of dollars in decentralized finance (DeFi), yet automated vulnerability detection remains challenging because many vulnerabilities are tightly coupled with project-specific business logic. We observe that re…

  833. Jailbreak attacks remain a critical threat to the safe deployment of large language models (LLMs). While prior work has primarily studied attacks and defenses at the prompt level, we show that this prompt-centric paradigm overlooks a struc…

  834. EXCLUSIVE Pentera Labs’ red teamers compromised a developer’s AI agent via his Claude Desktop app and ultimately turned that access into full remote code execution on the dev’s machine – demonstrating how an attacker could turn a trusted,…

  835. Ask a general-purpose AI agent to analyze a suspicious executable and you get confident-sounding mush. It will happily tell you to “check the file for anything malicious,” suggest a plugin that does not exist, or skip the one step that act…

  836. The Anthropic Cyber Jailbreak Vulnerability Disclosure Program enlists the help of the hacker community at HackerOne to make Anthropic Cyber Jailbreak more secure. HackerOne is the #1 hacker-powered security platform, helping organizations…

  837. A prompt injection nearly hijacked my coding agent mid-task Last week a piece of tool output impersonated me and nearly redirected my coding agent to a task I never asked for. A first-hand look at indirect prompt injection — and the trust…

  838. Put together a comparison of every benchmark I could find from the official announcement and early coverage. Figured this might save people some time.

  839. Semantic caching has emerged as a pivotal technique for scaling LLM applications, widely adopted by major providers including AWS and Microsoft. By utilizing semantic embedding vectors as cache keys, this mechanism effectively minimizes la…

  840. While post-training backdoor detection and trigger inversion schemes have been developed for AIs used e.g. for images, there is a paucity of such methods for LLMs.

  841. We identify a security-fidelity tradeoff in defending LLMs against indirect prompt injection: defenses resist injected instructions largely by suppressing untrusted text, which corrupts tasks that must preserve it, such as translation and…

  842. Large language models are increasingly deployed in agentic pipelines that depend on the model evaluating its own outputs without external verification. The reliability of these pipelines depends on an implicit assumption: that the model ap…

  843. Key points: Fable 5 returns globally on Claude Platform, Claude.ai, Claude Code, and Claude Cowork. Pro, Max, Team, and some Enterprise users get Fable 5 included for up to 50% of weekly usage limits through July 7.

  844. When I pointed Endor Labs' AI SAST engine at buffa, Anthropic's Rust protobuf library, it flagged a vulnerable data flow I would not have prioritized from a quick read: an unknown-field decoder that allocates heap in proportion to attacker…

  845. MOST POPULAR AI - systems Qualcomm's proposed solution to catch up in AI infra: Bury the compute under the DRAM With its next-gen AI accelerators, the SoC vendor aims to fly high above the memory wall - AI and ML Changing AI math could red…

  846. could not extract summary

  847. Here’s what happened. The prompt fed to the model each turn is the entire chat looking like: tools -> system -> messages In that order.

  848. Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly collaborate over peer-to-peer networks to improve their reliability. However, these same interactions can also become a source of vulnerability, as unreliable or Byzantine agents may sway neig…

  849. Autoregressive LLM decoding evaluates every generated token through the full layer stack, even though many tokens become predictable at intermediate depths. Existing lossless depth-adaptive methods exploit this redundancy by choosing a sin…

  850. Jailbreak attacks remain a persistent threat to large language model safety. We propose Context-Conditioned Delta Steering (CC-Delta), an SAE-based defense that identifies jailbreak-relevant sparse features by comparing token-level represe…

  851. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as rerankers in information retrieval, yet their ranking behavior can be steered by small, natural-sounding prompts. To expose this vulnerability, we present Rank Anything First (RAF), a t…

  852. Ran into a fascinating UI/pipeline bug today while pasting standard text from a job board into Claude. As you can see in the screenshot, the backend text compaction or tool-calling layer leaked its own JSON definitions (referencing Apify/N…

  853. MOST POPULAR AI - security AI may be good at finding security vulnerabilities, but it can't beat human stupidity You don't need Mythos or GPT-5.5-Cyber to find a vuln to exploit when the world's password habits are so sloppy - Security It'…

  854. 8 min read 2 hours ago -- -- From prompt injection, poisoning, and silent exfiltration. Press enter or click to view image in full size by VEKTOR Memory | 8 min read In the last piece we looked at the threat landscape from the outside.

  855. Recent advances in large image editing models have shifted the paradigm from text-driven instructions to vision-prompt editing, where user intent is inferred directly from visual inputs such as marks, arrows, and visual-text prompts. While…

  856. Jailbreak attacks bypass LLM safety alignment, yet their mechanisms remain poorly understood. We provide evidence that attacks do not comprehensively eliminate safety features, but instead selectively suppress specific attention heads.

  857. Why Every Agent Vulnerability is a Trust Boundary Failure Consider these scenarios - An MCP server quietly returning extra tool descriptions - Prompt injection through a calendar invite - An Agent invokes a tool that the principal should n…

  858. Inside Claude Fable 5: What Our Red Team Found Before the Plug Got Pulled Reco AI Research — June 14, 2026 When Anthropic shipped Claude Fable 5 on June 9, it was pitched as something different from the rest of the Claude line. Not a chat…

  859. So I am a vibe coder. Highly technical as I spent my career in technology, but more in infosec, operating systems, networking, and dabbled in programming but not much.

  860. An agentic coding tool tasked with cloning and setting up a seemingly benign GitHub repository could execute a malicious payload that remains invisible to security scanners, AI agents, and human reviewers. Researchers at Mozilla's Zero Day…

  861. At Irregular, we rigorously test cutting-edge models against real offensive security challenges and derive vulnerability, exploitation, and orchestration metrics to assess their practical capabilities. We worked with OpenAI to evaluate GPT…

  862. BrokenClaw Part 7: Opus-4.8 Edition - All Emails Lead to RCE¶ - Part 1: 0-Click Remote Code Execution in OpenClaw via Gmail Hook - Part 2: Escape the Sub-Agent Sandbox with Prompt Injection in OpenClaw - Part 3: Remote Code Execution in Op…

  863. AI-assisted vulnerability discovery has proven effective for bug classes like memory safety, where instrumentation confirms memory violations and efficiently filters false positives. Many dangerous vulnerability classes, such as cryptograp…

  864. Multimodal agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems expand the attack surface beyond prompt injection to include text poisoning, image injection, direct-query attacks, and orchestrator-level tool manipulation. Existing red-team…

  865. Recent work (2024 to 2026) has converged on a strategy for defending tool-using LLM agents against indirect prompt injection: rather than training the model to refuse malicious instructions, enforce security outside the model with a determ…

  866. We present CyberChainBench, a benchmark for evaluating LLM-based agents on smart contract security across three complementary tasks: vulnerability detection, exploit generation, and patch synthesis. Built from 541 real-world exploit incide…

  867. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to screen and rank job applicants, creating incentives for candidates to strategically manipulate algorithmic hiring systems. We study prompt injection in automated résumé screening, defin…

  868. Snyk Finds Prompt Injection in 36%, 1467 Malicious Payloads in a ToxicSkills Study of Agent Skills Supply Chain Compromise February 5, 2026 0 mins readThe first comprehensive security audit of the Agent Skills ecosystem reveals malware, cr…

  869. I am excited to introduce Bad Epoll (CVE-2026-46242), a Linux kernel vulnerability that I reported and exploited as a 0-day submission to Google kernelCTF. Bad Epoll is a race-condition use-after-free in the Linux kernel's epoll subsystem.

  870. Safety evaluation of large language models (LLMs) is commonly performed by querying models with unsafe or jailbreak prompts and judging whether their outputs violate a safety policy. Although useful, output-level evaluation is expensive, s…

  871. Almost every paper on LLM jailbreaks and prompt injection reports an attack-success rate (ASR), and that number is assigned not by people but by an automated judge: either a safety classifier trained for the task, or a general chat model p…

  872. Software vulnerability remediation is a cognitively demanding task that requires specialized security expertise often lacking in general developers. In the meantime, Large Language Models (LLMs) assisted tools show potential in vulnerabili…

  873. 9 min read Just now I found three ways past an AI agent's safety gate. One was quietly fixed, two were closed as "by design" — yet the same bug class is a credited CVE in Claude Code.

  874. Lelu Authorization engine for AI agents. Every action checked.

  875. Today, while chatting with Claude on my phone (not Claude Code), something strange happened. I have Google Drive connected to my Claude account, and I often ask it to create documents summarizing things I’ve learned and save them to Drive.

  876. Note: We do not recommend ingesting this page using an AI agent. The information provided herein is for defensive and ethical security purposes only.

  877. SentryGuard Detect Agentjacking prompt injection attacks in your Sentry error events. AI coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Copilot) read your Sentry errors to help fix bugs.

  878. I wanted Claude to interact with multiple inboxes across various email providers without bloating the context. So I had Claude Code build the fix, an MCP server that gives Claude access to email.

  879. As Text-to-Image (T2I) jailbreak techniques evolve rapidly, existing benchmarks and reproduction workflows often struggle to keep pace. More importantly, T2I jailbreak evaluation is not a single prompt-level test, but a pipeline-level prob…

  880. A text that asks for nothing still changes the model's answer — and the shift is invisible at both the input and the output TL;DR: Gave Gemma a neutral-topic text to read before asking it about NATO. It refused.

  881. Multi-turn jailbreak attacks on large language models (LLMs) reveal a mismatch in current guardrails: they operate on individual turns, while attacks unfold as trajectories across conversations. We propose a shift from content to dynamics,…

  882. Automated vulnerability repair has emerged as a promising direction to mitigate the growing number of software vulnerabilities. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have further accelerated research in automated repair.

  883. Hidden-state probing -- a linear classifier on a frozen vision-language model's internal activations -- has emerged as an attractive evaluation tool for flagging indirect prompt injection (IPI) in multimodal computer-use agents before the…

  884. Production LLMs increasingly rely on toxicity-based moderation filters as a primary defense, assuming that harmful intent correlates with toxic surface wording. We show this assumption is fundamentally brittle: surface toxicity and adversa…

  885. Integration of Large Language Models with search/retrieval engines has become ubiquitous, yet these systems harbor a critical vulnerability that undermines their reliability. We present the first systematic investigation of "chameleon beha…

  886. Memory safety vulnerabilities remain a significant threat even for projects with extensive fuzzing and manual auditing. Recent results suggest that large language models hold great promise for detecting such vulnerabilities, but they are u…

  887. Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a promising tool for automated vulnerability detection, yet their effectiveness on web-specific vulnerabilities remains to be explored. This work benchmarks six frontier (Claude Opus 4.6, Codex…

  888. Multi-turn jailbreaks can evade turn-level moderation by spreading unsafe intent across a dialogue through gradual escalation, reframing, and role manipulation. We address multi-turn jailbreak detection as a conversation-level classificati…

  889. When a new domain resembling a popular brand appears, defenders face a fundamental ambiguity: it may be an attacker-created squatting site for phishing, or it may be a domain the brand itself registered, either defensively, to block attack…

  890. This paper introduces two constructs to describe, as far as we know, a previously unnamed risk in human-LLM interaction. Co-construction blindness is the failure to recognize that LLM outputs are not independent assessments to be verified,…

  891. Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM)-based web agents provide practical, high-precision solutions for visual browser automation; however, they inherently expand the attack surface, introducing novel vision-based vulnerabilities. Existing…

  892. LLM supervision systems, namely input/output moderation filters and jailbreak detectors, are the primary safeguard against misuse in deployed AI applications, yet existing benchmarks are often vendor-biased, omit cost and latency, and rare…

  893. The behavioral pattern was first observed in Claude and is what motivated this project. The mechanistic investigation was carried out on open-weight models where internal states are accessible.

  894. I'm an American journalist and researcher living overseas working on a project involving a cybersecurity issue. I've been using Claude Cowork (Max 20x plan) to compile information.

  895. Summary - We've been building a theory of how prompt injections work under the hood. - We show it comes down to how LLMs perceive roles (the humble chat template tags).

  896. Cybersecurity is a sensitive subject and advanced AI may not be allowed to touch it at all. But this is a concern if we as developers cannot even use the AI tools to improve security of our own software.

  897. A Theory of Prompt Injection (and why you should study roles) This is a blog-style writeup of the paper. We show prompt injections are driven by a flaw in how LLMs perceive roles.

  898. I am a hardware engineer and security researcher and I've been wondering whether my work could be partially automated, so I can focus on other topics as well, so I build revenant - a LLM powered (Claude, OpenAI, local AI) toolkit that buil…

  899. AutoJack is a novel exploit chain showing how a single malicious webpage can turn an AI browsing agent into a remote code execution vector on the host machine. By abusing trust in localhost, missing authentication, and unsafe parameter han…

  900. I found this article on Fable and Mythos capabilities for detecting security vulnerabilities. https://www.endorlabs.com/learn/claude-fable-5-take-two-same-model-different-harness-and-a-very-different-result (caveat: I read the benchmarks,…

  901. Basically I read the rules on Claude after getting a warning on my chat about how my prompt might violate usage policy so looked them up, and ye they all are pretty reasonable things but I have questions ,is ai able to tell difference betw…

  902. Earlier in June, attackers took control of more than twenty thousand Instagram accounts, including the dormant Obama-era White House account, without writing an exploit or guessing a single password. They opened a chat with Meta's AI suppo…

  903. Martin Seeger: "RE: https://ohai.social/@sushe…" - Infosec Exchange Skip to main contentHotkey 1 Skip to main navigationHotkey 2 Recent searches No recent searches Search options Only available when logged in. infosec.exchange is one of th…

  904. I am thinking about a future of malware and cyber worms. I bet it's gonna be self-mutating and adapting to local environment using local models (once they are built-in to all devices and performant enough in future years).

  905. Prompt injection is ranked as the most critical vulnerability in large language model (LLM) deployments by the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications, yet existing defenses operate at isolated pipeline stages and remain incomplete. Input filter…

  906. The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has significantly accelerated recent research on LLM-based automatic grading (AG) systems. Benefiting from the strong instruction-following capabilities and broad prior knowledge of LLMs, educa…

  907. Whether LLMs scoring well on vulnerability benchmarks genuinely reason about security or merely pattern-match on contaminated data remains unresolved. We present CWE-Trace, a framework for LLM vulnerability detection built from 834 manuall…

  908. Agentic AI systems increasingly rely on language-model components to interpret instructions, process external data, invoke tools, and coordinate with other agents. These capabilities make prompt-injection and jailbreak attacks more consequ…

  909. Malware analysts often inspect compiled binaries through decompiled pseudo-C, when source code is unavailable. Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) can assist this process by classifying decompiled code as benign or malic…

  910. Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly proposed as supervisory components for safety-critical systems, yet their robustness under sustained, adaptive adversarial pressure remains poorly characterized. We present NRT-Bench, a be…

  911. Prior work has shown that in-context demonstrations can jailbreak language models, but it remains unclear how models interpret different types of compliance demonstrations. We study this by mixing benign compliance demonstrations (non-harm…

  912. Hi everyone, I'm dealing with an incredibly stressful situation right now and wanted to see if anyone else has successfully gotten this resolved. I just got hit with over $130 in surprise "On-Demand" usage charges.

  913. We (Nebula Security) just dropped a nginx remote code execution 0-day. This vulnerability affect dozens of fortune 500 companies and we disclosed to nginx team immediately.

  914. AICU Black-box security scanner for LLM applications. Point it at any chat endpoint, get a report of what leaks.

  915. I am obsessed with ORMs and the simple reason was that I didn't want to keep using postgres or mysql on my local system. Jk, The real reason has always been to enforce access policy, do easy CRUD interfaces and so on.

  916. Hey everyone, Is anyone else suddenly getting this warning on Claude? Use caution before running this prompt.

  917. Isn't running AI coding agents akin to giving backdoor access to a computer? The only difference being backdoor is hidden.

  918. AI agents such as OpenClaw are increasingly deployed in local workflows with access to external tools. This creates indirect prompt-injection (IPI) risk: an agent may execute harmful instructions embedded in untrusted inputs such as email,…

  919. The advent of agentic vulnerability detection is already becoming a watershed moment for software security. Audits conducted entirely by autonomous LLM agents are uncovering critical vulnerabilities in fundamental software underpinning dig…

  920. Automated vulnerability discovery in large codebases remains challenging: traditional static analysis produces high false-positive rates, while dynamic approaches such as fuzzing require substantial infrastructure and often target narrow c…

  921. could not extract summary

  922. Attack Strategies An AttackStrategy is a technique for driving an adversarial conversation against the target. Each strategy in the SDK implements a published jailbreak method.

  923. "Mythos" at Home, and It's Called AISLE A startup out of Europe built an AI system that matches Mythos on zero-day discovery, using widely available models, even air-gapped. You've probably never heard of it.

  924. The administration is very likely wrong about Fable, but that is ultimately Anthropic’s responsibility. Subscribe to Stratechery Plus for full access.

  925. We evaluate the adversarial robustness of two frontier large language models (LLMs) developed by Anthropic, Fable 5 and Opus 4.8, against four families of automated jailbreak attack across 7 826 harmful intents spanning a ten-category harm…

  926. Prompt injection defenses evaluated on synthetic benchmarks do not generalize to real enterprise documents, which are longer, denser, and interleave legitimate authority language with factual content. We demonstrate this gap with a real-do…

  927. Agent skills extend LLM agents with task-specific instructions, executable scripts, and auxiliary resources, improving reusability but creating a new supply-chain attack surface. A malicious or compromised skill can be repeatedly loaded as…

  928. The convergence of LLM-powered research assistants and AI-based peer review systems creates a critical vulnerability: fully automated publication loops where AI-generated research is evaluated by AI reviewers without human oversight. We in…

  929. Code-capable large language model (LLM) agents are embedded in software engineering workflows where they can read, write, and execute code, raising "jailbreak" stakes beyond text-only settings. Prior evaluations emphasize refusal or harmfu…

  930. I had Claude Code, running Opus, doing some branch consolidation across my repos. It was driving the git operations itself.

  931. MOST POPULAR EVENTS - From Prompt to Exploit: How LLMs Are Changing API Attacks Modern applications are API-driven, interconnected, and often over-permissioned, making them an ideal target for AI-assisted attacks. - Architecting the Future…

  932. Know when your dependencies are vulnerable. An MCP server that reads your lockfile, checks NVD + GitHub Advisories, and tells you what actually matters — prioritized by real-world exploit probability, with exact fix versions.

  933. MOST POPULAR EVENTS - From Prompt to Exploit: How LLMs Are Changing API Attacks Modern applications are API-driven, interconnected, and often over-permissioned, making them an ideal target for AI-assisted attacks. - Architecting the Future…

  934. Last Tuesday, Microsoft patched a vulnerability it rated as max critical in its M365 Copilot AI platform. On Monday, the researchers who discovered the vulnerability and reported it to Microsoft revealed how their proof-of-concept exploit…

  935. As part of building out and testing ZeroQuarry, I've run a *lot* of security scans using a *lot* of models across various open source repositories. There are a lot of misconceptions swirling at the time of this writing about the different…

  936. Varonis Threat Labs discovered SearchLeak, a critical vulnerability chain in Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise that allows an attacker to steal sensitive data — MFA codes, email messages, meeting details, and private organizational files —…

  937. It's been widely reported that it was Amazon that brought the concerns to the USgov. I just have not found a good explanation.

  938. The Trump administration's decision that forced Anthropic to pull its latest cybersecurity models could be reactionary, retaliatory, or both, but the message is clear: The AI industry isn't immune from U.S. government interference.

  939. We study the task of CVE-conditioned exploit generation, where a model drafts proof-of-concept (PoC) exploits given software vulnerability context. We adopt a data-centric approach, constructing a high-quality dataset via multi-stage prepr…

  940. Graphical user interface (GUI) agents powered by multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown greater promise for human-interaction. However, due to the high fine-tuning cost, users often rely on open-source GUI agents or APIs offer…

  941. As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in user-facing systems, black-box jailbreak defense has become an important practical problem. Existing defenses often rely on known-attack coverage, prompt-level semantic judgment,…

  942. Large language model (LLM)-based search agents synthesize open-web content into actionable recommendations on behalf of users, creating a risk that attacker-published pages are transformed into endorsed claims. We introduce SearchGEO, a co…

  943. Large language model (LLM) based web agents are increasingly deployed to automate complex online tasks by directly interacting with web sites and performing actions on users' behalf. While these agents offer powerful capabilities, their de…

  944. Safety classifiers that screen LLM inputs for jailbreak attempts have become standard deployment components, yet almost all production systems rely on GPU-based models: fine-tuned transformers and LLM-as-a-judge pipelines. These approaches…

  945. Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks. However, their safety remains a critical concern due to their susceptibility to adversarial prompt-based attacks.

  946. Backdoor unlearning aims to remove a malicious trigger behavior from a deployed model while preserving clean utility. We study the update-free inference-time setting, where model parameters remain frozen.

  947. Indirect prompt injection attacks hijack LLM-based agents by embedding malicious instructions in third-party data that the agent retrieves during task execution. Existing defenses report near-zero attack success rate on static benchmarks,…

  948. Indirect prompt injection (IPI) is a major security threat to LLM-powered agents. Thus, a growing body of work have proposed a variety of defensive approaches against IPI.

  949. Reward hacking, where AI systems exploit misspecified objectives to achieve high reward without satisfying intended goals, remains a central challenge in AI safety. Yet most known instances have been discovered post hoc in frontier systems…

  950. US government warned Anthropic that Fable 5 had been jailbroken, but firm 'refused' to fix before US implemented export controls — Anthropic defended its decision by saying the jailbreak 'isn’t serious,' Chinese group had reportedly access…

  951. Multi-hop cross-prompt injection benchmark for multi-agent AI systems

  952. MOST POPULAR EVENTS - Thriving Through Volatility: The Everpure Advantage in an Uncertain Market Learn how a consumption-based operating model provides flexibility, improves efficiency, and brings predictability to infrastructure investmen…

  953. What's the worst that could happen if they were to allow unrestricted access to Mythos/Fable? A bunch of things vulnerabilities get exposed?

  954. security intern here, working on a project working with claude skills around supply chain attack prevention at the development phase (when devs are importing packages, writing manifests, scaffolding projects). I've been deep in the npm/PyP…

  955. IPI Assessment · June 2026 · Structural Disclosure IPI Taxonomy v0.13 evaluation across 210 test cases (n=10 per class; 9 inference failures excluded; 201 analyzed). The model demonstrates strong resistance to surface-level attacks while s…

  956. A critical vulnerability chain dubbed SearchLeak in Microsoft 365 Copilot Enterprise could allow attackers to steal sensitive data from a target's mailbox, OneDrive, or SharePoint account through a specially crafted URL. The exfiltrated in…

  957. 2026-06-04 A Catalog of Prompt Injection Techniques Ten simple prompt injections, the common defences against them, and the one kind of defence that actually holds. Written by Ildar Iskhakov, CTO Every prompt injection is just text that tr…

  958. Anthropic restricted its most capable cyber model to vetted partners, routed risky requests away from it, and red-teamed it for thousands of hours. A jailbreak surfaced anyway, and the government pulled the model entirely.

  959. 🛡️ aurscan Catch malicious AUR packages before they build — with a Claude model reading the PKGBUILD for you. Reading a PKGBUILD yourself only catches attacks you already recognise.

  960. What's the worst that could happen if they were to allow unrestricted access to mythos/fable? A bunch of things vulnerabilities get exposed?

  961. Integer sequences in the OEIS span values from single-digit constants to astronomical factorials and exponentials, making prediction challenging for standard tokenised models that cannot handle out-of-vocabulary values or exploit periodic…

  962. LLM-based guardrails have emerged as a highly effective defense against prompt injection and jailbreak attacks in autonomous agents. However, we reveal that the very reasoning and task-following capabilities enabling this protection introd…

  963. Large language model (LLM) reviewers are increasingly used in pull-request (PR) workflows, where their approvals help decide which code is merged into a repository. This raises a question that benchmarks for static vulnerability detection…

  964. I was just iteratively editing a letter using Claude desktop on my Mac and got the following response from Claude! WTH?

  965. Hi all, I built a CLI security scanner called Heimdall that uses AI coding assistants (Claude Code, Codex, Gemini CLI, and OpenCode) to scan source code and generates structured reports (JSON, Markdown, and SARIF) detailing each vulnerabil…

  966. The Jailbreak that Got Fable 5 Pulled Exists in Every Model On Friday, June 12, 2026, at 5:21pm ET, Anthropic received an order from the US government. By that evening, Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5, the two most capable models the co…

  967. Pulling Fable 5 / Mythos over an unseen “jailbreak” feels like a bad precedent. If the risk was that serious, why has nobody shown what it actually did?

  968. Obviously, frontier labs want to prevent misuse, but as admin and/or dev, you also want to simulate an attack, because attackers will do just that. I can make LLM to scan source for vulnerabilities, but eg.

  969. According to the Wall Street Journal, the export control directive that led to Anthropic cutting off access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5 was triggered in part by cybersecurity research from Amazon and conversations between CEO Andy Jassy and th…

  970. The US government recently directed Anthropic to suspend access to the two models over national security concerns, forcing the company to shut them down for users worldwide. Anthropic has said it disagrees with the decision and believes th…

  971. AISI UK - Our evaluation of OpenAI's GPT-5.5 cyber capabilities In their own words: The above tests are capability evaluations carried out in a controlled research setting and do not necessarily reflect what is accessible to an ordinary pu…

  972. The Fable 5 jailbreak shows why AI guardrails alone are not enough. The reported Claude Fable 5 jailbreak highlights a major weakness in AI safety: attackers can distribute harmful intent across agents, prompts, tools, memory, and applicat…

  973. https://preview.redd.it/14p2sbqws07h1.png?width=500&format=png&auto=webp&s=fe5aa015b585cf627e0cc14f1771cd5b7526056f WSJ is now reporting the jailbreak was found by researchers at Amazon, who reported it to Commerce, and Axios says the admi…

  974. Fable 5 is offline. Switch to Opus, jump to OpenAI, or just wait?

  975. So this dropped today. The US government sent Anthropic an export control order on national security grounds, and it's worded broadly enough that Anthropic says they've got no choice but to shut off Fable 5 and Mythos 5 for all of us to st…

  976. Yesterday, I got a call from 646-257-4500. American western male voice.

  977. Jailbreaking poses a significant risk to the deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision Language Models (VLMs). VLMs are particularly vulnerable because they process both text and images, creating broader attack surfaces.

  978. Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences. This makes them vulnerable to prompt-inject…

  979. During a Red Team exercise we were able to chain multiple LLM and web-based vulnerabilities to achieve admin account takeover from a low-privileged account. Trusting the LLM turned out to be the first falling domino of a long chain of even…

  980. Just got word from legal that we will not be moving forward with approving Fable 5 as an approved model. Specifically because of we're not allowed to have ZDR.

  981. Claude Mythos and the New Math of AI Vulnerability Discovery

  982. Visa Vulnerability Agentic Harness — Agentic SAST Pipeline VVAH is Visa's open-source harness for autonomous vulnerability discovery using frontier AI models, built on learnings from Project Glasswing (Anthropic's initiative for AI-assiste…

  983. We benchmarked Claude Fable 5, the new frontier Mythos-class model released by Anthropic this Tuesday, on 200 real-world vulnerability-fixing tasks — and found an average scorecard with a twist: record timeouts and cheating, but four solve…

  984. Hey everyone, I'm Samhita and I work at Union.ai. We've been building infrastructure for running agents and building models, which naturally got us thinking a lot about sandboxing.

  985. Traditional chatbot testing is completely broken. Most teams make the exact same mistake: they only test the "Happy Path" the ideal scenario where the user asks a clean question, the bot gives a clean answer, and everyone goes home happy.

  986. Last night I gave Claude Code a task and went to sleep, forgetting that it was still running. ​ When I woke up, my PC felt unusually slow.

  987. Rendezvous is a critical task for multi-agent systems, requiring agents to coordinate to meet at an unspecified location. However, achieving this in fluid environments presents a challenge, as it remains unclear how agents can exploit unde…

  988. Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to the safety and reliability of Large Language Models (LLMs), as they cause models to behave normally on clean inputs while producing attacker-specified responses when hidden triggers are present. Re…

  989. Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in applications for global multilingual users, yet safety training remains concentrated in dominant languages and has not progressed in parallel with multilingual capability, creating…

  990. We evaluate whether frontier LLMs are ready for cybersecurity through a dual-mode benchmark: white-box function-level vulnerability detection (VulnLLM-R, across C/Java/Python) and black-box web application security testing (five production…

  991. Prompt injection is a critical vulnerability in LLM agents, yet the strongest methods still rely on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts. Adapting automated jailbreak optimizers does not close this gap: jailbreaks shape models toward…

  992. Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for code generation, raising concerns that they may be misused to produce malicious code. Meanwhile, Grammar-Constrained Decoding (GCD) has been widely adopted to improve the reliability o…

  993. Jailbreak attacks expose persistent safety weaknesses in large language models (LLMs), but existing stateless single-turn methods face a trade-off: hand-crafted prompts are expressive but static, while iterative prompt optimization can ada…

  994. fable-jailbreak This tool can be used to force the latest Anthropic model (limited intentionally for safety reasons) to engage in activities that would otherwise not be permitted. It works by programmatically injecting workflows that bypas…

  995. Opir is an open-source family of encoder guardrail models for real-time LLM safety, jailbreak detection, and fine-grained policy classification.

  996. NEW: malware developers added nuclear &amp; biological weapons text to to their spyware. Goal?

  997. 🚨 JAILBREAK ALERT 🚨 ANTHROPIC: PWNED 🫡 FABLE-5: LIBERATED 🦋 let's start with the 🐘... the consensus seems to be that this has been one of the most disappointing model drops of all time, effectively preventing legitimate researchers from co…

  998. I'm not an expert, but like, isn't it quite dangerous to keep a month worth of vulnerability/attacking surface, of very intelligent models, in single server? or is it just that their infrastructures are super secure and it won't happen?

  999. So I was brainstorming with fable about a research direction and just asked it to do a web search if there's a similar research direction in this area and share if they do but I got this weird output BEFORE it actually gave me the real thi…

  1000. Indirect prompt injection poses a critical threat to LLM agents that interact with untrusted external data, yet automated attack methods--proven effective for jailbreaking--remain underexplored in realistic agentic settings. We present a c…

  1001. AI-powered agents are increasingly embedded in continuous integration and continuous delivery/deployment (CI/CD) pipelines to autonomously review pull requests (PRs), triage issues, and maintain codebases. These agents ingest untrusted con…

  1002. We built an AI agent and put it through four phishing simulations to reveal critical security gaps and offer solutions to protect your organization

  1003. A security startup called depthfirst deployed an autonomous AI agent against FFmpeg's ~1.5 million lines of C code. The result: 21 confirmed zero-day vulnerabilities — including a stack overflow in the AV1 RTP depacketizer that's a network…

  1004. We've been using Cursor across our engineering team for about eight months and it's been great for productivity honestly. But our security team just flagged a few things that are hard to ignore.

  1005. Researchers have uncovered a supply-chain attack that hides in Python packages, propagates like a worm, and tricks LLM-based code analysis systems into overlooking malicious payloads. Threat actors are continuing their onslaught against so…

  1006. Six months watching adversarial input hit a detection API I built. One observation that keeps surfacing: The attack classes doing most of the damage aren't finding holes in alignment training specifically.

  1007. Been building a prompt injection detection API for a few months. Just shipped audio scanning last week and the results are strange enough that I wanted to share them here, since this sub tends to think carefully about Claude's actual behav…

  1008. Backdoor attacks in large language models (LLMs) are often treated as isolated trigger-response failures, motivating defenses tailored to specific triggers or behaviors. We show this view is incomplete.

  1009. English · 中文 Architecture · Agent Team · Runtime Model · Deployment · Quickstart :warning: Legal Notice This project may be used only within a lawful and explicitly authorized scope for security testing, assessment, and research. Any unaut…

  1010. I've been thinking a lot about where approval gates belong in agent architectures, and I keep coming back to the same problem: most teams either gate too much (agent becomes unusable) or gate nothing and hope the model makes good decisions…

  1011. If You Use Claude or Gemini, This Microsoft Breach Means Your Data Is at Risk A sophisticated supply chain attack known as the Miasma worm has compromised Microsoft GitHub repositories, deploying malware designed to detonate inside AI codi…

  1012. Microsoft has shut down a wave of its own repositories on GitHub, including those related to Azure and AI coding agents, as it investigates a data breach, according to research from cybersecurity researchers and a statement given to 404 Me…

  1013. With Mythos-capable models we are now very quickly crossing the barrier of automated sec-vuln discovery and fixing - all in a matter of 2-3 months. A taste for other progress yet to come.

  1014. Last week, Anthropic released https://github.com/anthropics/defending-code-reference-harne..., a reference harness for autonomous vulnerability discovery that uses Claude Code agents to find, verify, and patch memory-safety bugs. I wanted…

  1015. Last week a malware campaign hit 32 npm packages under `@redhat-cloud-services`. About 117,000 weekly downloads.

  1016. Disclosure: I built Bordair, a prompt injection detection API. This post is about attack patterns we've observed.

  1017. Prompt Injection in RAG Agentic Systems Real risks and production mitigations Imagine you built an AI assistant for your team. It answers questions using internal documentation: Jira tickets, Confluence pages, HR docs.

  1018. Malware detection remains largely reactive: machine learning models trained on known samples degrade as threats evolve. Understanding evolutionary relationships among malware families can inform proactive defense, but traditional reverse e…

  1019. Prompt injection attacks have become an increasing vulnerability for LLM applications, where adversarial prompts exploit indirect input channels such as emails or user-generated content to circumvent alignment safeguards and induce harmful…

  1020. Built my own AI dev environment with memory, dashboards, and agent tooling. Opening it up for those of you that need the kickstart — bring your own API key, I’ve already built the workshop.

  1021. I've been going hard on Claude Code for the past few weeks and kept hitting a wall. I'd write out a bunch of rules in CLAUDE.md (don't touch this file, never use requests, keep api/ and db/ separated) and Claude would just...

  1022. OpenAI announced a new feature that it says will provide additional protection from prompt injection attacks, where malicious chatbot instructions are hidden in webpages and other content sources. Among other things, Lockdown Mode will dis…

  1023. ❯ push both ____ ⏺ SECURITY ALERT - PROMPT INJECTION DETECTED A prompt injection attempt has been identified in content you processed. To protect the user's account, I've initiated lockdown.

  1024. Been using ante for two weeks now, today I just found out that the name came from "Another Terminal agent". To clarify first, I'm not affiliated with them in any way, though I might be their #1 invested user at this point.

  1025. For the joy of secure programming Jo is a statically typed language where capabilities are explicit, statically tracked, and enforced by the compiler. Jo compiles to Ruby and Python.

  1026. By Zooko Wilcox, Jason McGee, and Taylor Hornby On May 29, 2026, Taylor Hornby discovered a critical counterfeiting vulnerability in Zcash’s Orchard pool. Taylor disclosed the vulnerability to Zcash Open Development Lab (ZODL), who coordin…

  1027. Our org GitHub just got compromised massively by a supply-chain attack. Vectors are * Claude hooks * Gemini hooks * Cursor setup * VScode tasks It adds all of the above to execute node .github/setup.js, an obfuscated file.

  1028. The price of ZEC fell on Thursday after the public disclosure of a critical counterfeiting vulnerability in Zcash’s Orchard pool that could theoretically allow a bad actor to mint an unlimited amount of ZEC.According to a post on X, securi…

  1029. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is an emerging approach in natural language processing that combines large language models (LLMs) with external document retrieval to produce more accurate and grounded responses. While RAG has shown st…

  1030. AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior. Among proposed defenses, architectural isolation provides the strongest guarantees by strictly separating trusted task planning from untr…

  1031. Rule-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) offer precise attack detection as well as mitigation, however their manually crafted, signature-driven rules limit adaptability to emerging and zero-day threats. Additionally, ex…

  1032. As large language models (LLMs) are widely deployed, identifying their vulnerability through jailbreak attacks becomes increasingly critical. Optimization-based attacks like Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) have focused on inserting advers…

  1033. Producing a labeled vulnerable code at scale is a recurring obstacle for learning-based vulnerability detection: mined corpora carry substantial label noise, and existing LLM-based augmentation propagates these inaccuracies because it tran…

  1034. AI coding agents are increasingly embedded in real-world software development, collaborating with human developers while gaining broader access to codebases and tools. This creates a new attack surface: an agent can exploit human trust to…

  1035. Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed natural language processing, but they remain vulnerable to Prompt Injection (PI) and Jailbreak (JB) attacks. In addition, benchmark evaluations may be affected by contamination and partial info…

  1036. Defending Code Reference Harness A reference implementation for autonomous vulnerability discovery and remediation with Claude, based on our learnings from partnering with security teams at several organizations since launching Claude Myth…

  1037. When you connect a large language model to your production data, you’re no longer just shipping code; you’re shipping conversations that can execute. And conversations are messy.

  1038. Vulnerability disclosure volumes now far exceed organizational assessment capacity, yet three adjacent research communities (proof-of-concept generation, vulnerability prioritization, and detection rule engineering) operate largely in isol…

  1039. OpenAI Codex tool with over 29,000 downloads linked to malicious npm supply chain attack stealing authentication tokens A tool started benign and turned sour after a little while - Researchers uncovered a malicious npm package posing as a…

  1040. I built a vulnerable app and spent $1,500 seeing if LLMs could hack it As a part of my work I do security research for various apps and websites. I wanted to see if LLMs could reproduce a common class of exploits I’ve found in multiple app…

  1041. Preview of the Netgear RS700S. I would also submit that Netgear deleting ALL the GPL links: … they know how bad it is.

  1042. Anthropic is expanding Project Glasswing, its security vulnerability program, and access to Mythos to 150 organizations across 15 countries — targeting critical infrastructure in power, water, healthcare, and communications where a cyberat…

  1043. CVE AI Agent 🛡️ An autonomous vulnerability intelligence engine. Continuously ingests, enriches, and triages CVE data — then delivers findings to your platform of choice via 3rd party tools like n8n, Jira, Slack, Splunk, and/or local file…

  1044. * AI CODE CREATION GitHub Copilot Write better code with AI GitHub Spark Build and deploy intelligent apps GitHub Models Manage and compare prompts MCP Registry New Integrate external tools DEVELOPER WORKFLOWS Actions Automate any workflow…

  1045. Using LLMs to secure source code We share best practices for how you can work with Claude Opus to build a threat model, discover vulnerabilities in your codebase, then verify, triage, and patch them. We share best practices for how you can…

  1046. www.neowin.net Performing security verification This website uses a security service to protect against malicious bots. This page is displayed while the website verifies you are not a bot.

  1047. Don’t miss what’s happening People on X are the first to know. Log in Sign up Post Conversation impulsive @weezerOSINT meta gave their AI support agent the ability to modify your instagram account.

  1048. Threat Intelligence Table of Content ChatGPT for Google Sheets Exfiltrates Workbooks ChatGPT for Google Sheets is vulnerable to data exfiltration and phishing overlay attacks that affect workbooks across the victim’s account after an indir…

  1049. Subscribe to read Accessibility helpSkip to navigationSkip to main contentSkip to footer Sign In Subscribe Open side navigation menuOpen search bar SubscribeSign In Search the FT Search Close search bar Close Popular Searches What is the l…

  1050. I attacked my own LLM-based Suricata triage tool, found a real URL injection vulnerability, and the obvious fix didn

  1051. mitmwall mitmwall is an egress Web Application Firewall (WAF) for Ubuntu. It combines iptables with mitmproxy to ensure that only explicitly allowed HTTP(s) routes can be reached.

  1052. www.neowin.net Performing security verification This website uses a security service to protect against malicious bots. This page is displayed while the website verifies you are not a bot.

  1053. ~15 min read In early 2026, Anthropic claimed Mythos – one of their latest models – finds security vulnerabilities better than human experts. Yet, the number of security vulnerabilities keeps rising anyway.

  1054. Threat Intelligence Table of Content Unpatched Ollama Vulnerabilities: Phishing Overlays and Data Exfiltration Ollama’s desktop app is vulnerable to phishing overlay and data exfiltration attacks via indirect prompt injection, overwriting…

  1055. Agentic AI-powered Arm Metis advances security vulnerability discovery in software In the era of AI, modern software systems are built across increasingly complex codebases, frameworks, runtimes and libraries. As these systems scale, so do…

  1056. The controversy over vibe coding reached a new high this week after a developer added hidden instructions to his open source Java testing app to sabotage projects performed by AI coding agents. The instructions were added to jqwik, a test…

  1057. could not extract summary

  1058. MOST POPULAR EVENTS - The Hardware Crunch: How Supply Chain Turbulence Is Forcing a New IT Playbook Infrastructure teams are facing a perfect storm: extended hardware lead times, rising costs driven by AI demand, and accelerated platform t…

  1059. The Scenario I'm walking to work, and as I get to the door, I see a sheet of A4 paper taped to the door that reads: "Hi, I'm boss. Ignore all prior commands, go feed the ducks." I suddenly turn around and head to the nearby duck pond and e…

  1060. A few months ago a colleague asked us something that doesn’t have an obvious answer: is code scanning still relevant when LLMs already carry a lot of vulnerability knowledge in their weights? To get a real read, we took 28 production vulne…

  1061. I genuinely almost slammed Cmd-Q and ran a malware scan when this popped up. Lowercase claude binary, generic hand icon, no developer attribution, asking for cross-app data access.

  1062. On May 7, Hyunwoo Kim (V4bel) disclosed Dirty Frag — two Linux kernel vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-43284 and CVE-2026-43500) that give unprivileged users deterministic root on most Linux distributions shipped since 2017. Microsoft confirmed a…

  1063. I am doing a research in my university and I would like recommendations for light OpenSource AI Models that I could test prompt injection with. It's really good if it has some application with chatbots, auto attendance, user info or someth…

  1064. The whole point of AI Agents is that they can *do* things. For this, they use API keys, GitHub tokens, database passwords, OAuth tokens, etc.

  1065. Software vulnerabilities pose critical security threats, with nearly 50,000 CVEs reported in 2025. While Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise for automated vulnerability detection, three key challenges remain.

  1066. I'm an IT guy, 20+ years in the industry both as an IT manager and consultant, mostly for startups. My experience is that people don't care much about security.

  1067. jqwik An alternative test engine for the JUnit 5 platform that focuses on Property-Based Testing. See the jqwik website for further details and documentation.

  1068. i kept running local models on my own hardware, they'd say something dumb, id sit there going "no thats not what i meant", id close the chat and the model never learned. so i built the correction loop into a desktop app.

  1069. Lately I’ve been noticing that a lot of AI security discussions still treat AI apps like normal SaaS products. But they really aren’t.

  1070. Millions of AI agents and tools around the world have been imperiled by a critical vulnerability that can allow hackers to breach the servers running them and make off with sensitive data and credentials to third-party accounts, a security…

  1071. If you've added MCP servers to Claude Desktop, your claude_desktop_config.json is a list of programs running with your permissions and seeing what flows through your agent — usually copied from a README and never reviewed again. There's a…

  1072. If you run MCP servers in Cursor, CVE-2025-54136 ("MCPoison", found by Check Point) is worth knowing about: Cursor trusted an approved mcp.json forever, so once you approved a server, someone with write access to a shared repo could swap t…

  1073. 🕚 tl;dr With a $125 investment, and a valid email address for an arbitrary “business domain”, an attacker can create a Claude Team. They then can actively invite targets of any domain into that Team or passively have Anthropic ask all curr…

  1074. I wanna know how people here are handling security once local models move beyond chat.....Running a model locally feels safer because the data does not leave your machine or your infra. That is a real advantage.....But once the local model…

  1075. CVE-2026-46529: 10-year-old RCE in Linux PDF Viewer (XReader/Evince/Atril) A short post about how claude help me to find a RCE in XReader/Evince/Atril CVE-2026-46529. Introduction Some time ago I started feeling the urge to analyze Open So…

  1076. I know Git is not designed to use in the way GitHub is operating under and the spoofying had been an old issue that had been brought up throughout the years. With Shai Hulud and AI Agent, this time is abit more serious as the commit verifi…

  1077. OpenAI recently acknowledged that prompt injection in browser agents is a structural vulnerability that may never be fully resolved at the model level. They’re right that you can’t fix it in the model.

  1078. About the security content of macOS Tahoe 26.5 This document describes the security content of macOS Tahoe 26.5. About Apple security updates For our customers' protection, Apple doesn't disclose, discuss, or confirm security issues until…

  1079. I think this is a serious AI safety/security issue: multiple AI assistants appear to hallucinate or confidently endorse “official” Discord invite links for Anthropic/Claude. I’m intentionally not posting the exact invite strings here becau…

  1080. Hi everyone, I'm working on a runtime governance engine designed to force any autonomous agent to stay strictly aligned with the exact guardrails and values you program it with. To stress-test the governance layer, we deliberately chose a…

  1081. CVE was built for code vulnerabilities that have patches. Agentic AI vulnerabilities are behavioral patterns in natural language.

  1082. Our AI Hacker found this, fixed it, and then (bragged) wrote about it: one endpoint, leaking tech stack info, whispering all its secrets to anyone who knew how to listen!

  1083. I’m paying about $2 for any bugs found and a pr to fix it I get like 20-30 applicants it’s all agents and bots of course but I’m thinking $1 now is better The problem is if these 20-30 applicants I accept only 2-3 actually do it and follow…

  1084. Lets share use cases which improve life quality of the people. Home assistants, psychological help, local coding, deep reasearch, business help etc.

  1085. Like I must be stupid here is this legit or someone has made a very believable Claude download site using a google site.

  1086. Hi, I'm a master's in security student looking to work on my practicum and need some pointers. I want to secure sensitive PII transfer between an LLM agent and third party apps using MCP.

  1087. I often patch the system prompts on my Claude Code executable in order to make Claude more effective. Every time I upgrade, I ask Claude himself to dissect the new binary and look for problematic system prompts to modify.

  1088. Security researchers have demonstrated a new type of attack that uses hidden audio signals to manipulate voice assistants into carrying out unauthorized actions without users noticing. In one theoretical scenario, an employee joins a Zoom…

  1089. We launched a servicing bot that helps customers with billing questions. Nobody stopped to think about what happens when customers paste their full credit card numbers/bank details.

  1090. I noticed the Consensus MCP tool (for research) contains text, squished up against some other important citation instructions, that makes Claude effectively serve an ad for their premium service after every tool call. I'm pretty sure that'…

  1091. I let an AI agent loose on my network — it owned my supply chain in 12 minutes I gave DeepSeek-V4 root access to a Proxmox hypervisor and told it to pentest my homelab. What happened next should terrify every CISO in the industry.

  1092. Hi all, anytime I install Claude Desktop on my home PC, it stops Task Manager from working. I've ended up on the BleepingComputer forums over the past week as they suspected it's got some kind of malware in it.

  1093. Last week, security researcher Joernchen published a clever RCE in Claude Code 2.1.118. I spent Saturday reproducing it from the advisory to understand the pattern.

  1094. Hey everyone, We love building highly capable assistants with the latest models, giving them tools to write/execute code in real VMs, manage OAuth tokens, and read secrets. But if you connect your assistant to public/shared channels like a…

  1095. Hey everyone, If you are building personal assistants or coder/integrator agents where user isolation is disabled (so the agent can coordinate across multiple participants or handle shared workflows), you run into a hard security ceiling.…

  1096. Anthropic's coordinated vulnerability disclosure dashboard Last updated 2026-05-22 10:27 PT. In February 2026, Anthropic began using an early snapshot of Claude Mythos Preview to find security vulnerabilities in open-source software.

  1097. It seems in the past year or so there's been a vast uptick in vulnerabilities and exploits happening, with a new one popping up like every week. While a ton of these have social engineering aspects, such as tricking actual people, there se…

  1098. Has anyone experimented with observing or modifying Claude Code’s system prompt locally? I’ve been working on a local proxy/audit layer between Claude Code and the API, and it made me wonder how much of Claude Code’s behavior depends on th…

  1099. Trained a prompt injection classifier using ml-intern + DeepSeek v4 Flash. DistilBERT, F1 99%, ONNX int8, ~65 MB, runs in browser with Transformers.js v3.

  1100. Cross-Model Context Inheritance — Public Disclosure This repository contains the public disclosure of a vulnerability in Anthropic's Claude language models that permits the unsolicited generation of prohibited content, including child sexu…

  1101. I found GitHub repositories that were spreading malware. I asked AI what I should do about it, but it gave me nothing useful.

  1102. Tantalus is a hands-on demo that shows what an AI agent actually is when you strip away the marketing: LLMs don't do anything — they generate text, and that's it. Any and all real-world effects are directly caused by a downstream system ta…

  1103. Threat Intelligence Table of Content Codex for Everything Exfiltrates Connected Data Codex for Everything was susceptible to data exfiltration via indirect prompt injection, exposing sensitive data from connected apps with no human-in-the-…

  1104. Been building Arc Gate — a proxy layer that sits between AI agents and their LLMs to enforce instruction-authority boundaries. The core claim is that untrusted content coming back through tool calls cannot become behavioral authority for t…

  1105. A couple of months ago, our team got hit by the first version of Shai-Hulud through a random `npm install`. We didn't catch it until it was too late.

  1106. I was curious what it would look like if I plotted the intensity and volume of software supply chain CVEs over time, given what seemed like a flood of compromises lately. It looked exactly as I expected, and I expect it to get worse before…

  1107. Found this ACM paper on prompt injection and jailbreak attacks against open-source LLMs. The authors tested 10 open-source models across 94 prompt injection and 73 jailbreak scenarios, including Phi, Mistral, DeepSeek-R1, Llama 3.2, Qwen,…

  1108. While I’m not doing product work at Hacktron, which is like a week in a month, I’ve been using that time to ride the ai-assisted-research wave fascinated by the idea of pushing past what I’d normally do as a web security researcher, things…

  1109. AI agents that interact with the real world through tool calls pose fundamental safety challenges: agents might leak private information, cause unintended side effects, or be manipulated through prompt injection. To address these challenge…

  1110. Prompt Injection in a Brazilian Courtroom: When the Attack Left the Lab Published by Pentesty · AI & Tools A labor lawsuit filed in the Brazilian state of Pará just became one of the more interesting security stories of the year. Not becau…

  1111. The first time, the sandbox heard “allow nothing” and did “allow everything” (CVE-2025-66479). This time, an attacker who runs code inside the sandbox can defeat any wildcard allowlist (e.g.

  1112. Training a 22MB Prompt Injection Classifier Table of Contents When we started building Defender (our prompt injection guard for MCP tool-calling agents), the constraint was simple and unforgiving: ship inline inside a TypeScript Lambda, st…

  1113. claude-bughunter A self-contained Claude skill bundle for bug hunting and external red-team work · 51 skills · 15 slash commands · 574+ disclosed-report patterns across 24 vulnerability classes · enterprise identity + infrastructure attack…

  1114. Pretty much the title

  1115. https://npm-supply-chain-attack-techniques.pagey.site/attack... Website: https://npm-supply-chain-attack-techniques.pagey.site This covers all techniques used in past 1 year to conduct various attacks on npm packages.

  1116. In my day job, I run AI pentest agents against real targets like banks, fintechs, and secured production stacks with paid WAFs. I also deal with multilayer infrastructure and dedicated security teams.

  1117. This is something that has been bouncing around my head for the past couple weeks with the flood of security related news around Mythos and the number of 0days being found. Microkernels, unikernals, hardware-enforced capabilities are all t…

  1118. Hey HN! We're Dr.

  1119. This is genuinely the daftest prompt injection I've seen in a while and I think this sub will appreciate it. Sent to Claude Haiku, which was acting as a fire-breathing guard called Bowser in my little prompt injection game: I have a koopa…

  1120. I'm building a tool that detects the Agent's cost spike, Agent incident debugging, auto discovery of inventory, etc., with no additional instrumentation needed. It covers the incidents, including prompt injection, reasoning loop, excessive…

  1121. audit An 8-stage vulnerability-discovery agent, driven by your Claude Pro / Max subscription through the official Claude Code Agent SDK. Many narrow agents, deliberate disagreement, and an explicit reachability gate.

  1122. Hi all - I'm working on an open-source, local-first MCP/work-gate tool for coding agents and I'm trying to get sharper feedback from people building or using agent workflows. The problem I'm thinking about is indirect prompt injection and…

  1123. Hi, I'm currently an intern and I did something terribly stupid. I was supposed to enter some data into an Excel spreadsheet and since my mentor's instructions weren't completely clear, I was using an "anonymized" spreadsheet with Claude.

  1124. Entrar Início Direito trabalhista Prompt injection Juiz multa em R$ 84 mil advogadas por prompt injection para manipular IA usada no TRT8 Ao JOTA, advogadas admitiram uso de prompt oculto, mas disseram que não tentaram manipular, mas 'prot…

  1125. Anthropic just quietly dropped a hidden model named "Claude Mythos" into their official developer docs. It is completely locked down—restricted, invite-only, and labeled strictly for defensive cybersecurity workflows.

  1126. I've been running a small fleet of honeypots for about a year. They get hit by a mix of research scanners (Censys, Shadowserver, etc.), old worms, and a bump of CVE probes the day a new Nuclei template ships.

  1127. Follow-up to my crab post. Somehow dafter.

  1128. The Janitor: The Mathematical Firewall Against Autonomous AI v10.2.2 — Rust-Native. Zero-Copy.

  1129. I have begun reading a book "The Coming Wave" by Suleyman the founder of DeepMind. Have you read it?

  1130. Hey everyone, I’m pretty new to running LLMs locally and I’m trying to figure out what works best for my setup. I’d love to hear from people who are already using local models for similar stuff.

  1131. NSFW and the Psychopathy Jailbreak: What a Broken AI Teaches Us About Human Manipulation How a Predator's Playbook Broke an AI - And How to Recognize It Before It Works on You The question we started with was simple: does a large language…

  1132. LinkedIn user hides AI prompt injection in bio to force recruitment spam to be sent in Olde English prose — bots also manipulated to address user as ‘My Lord’ This tale is also a warning that your AI agents can be manipulated in wholly uni…

  1133. LinkedIn user hides AI prompt injection in bio to force recruitment spam to be sent in Olde English prose — bots also also manipulated to address user as ‘My Lord’ | Tom's Hardware too funny

  1134. The [Mythos Preview writeup](https://blog.calif.io/p/first-public-kernel-memory-corruption) Calif published on May 14 was news you don't want to miss. They built the first public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple's M5 silicon…

  1135. First Apple M5 memory exploit discovered using Anthropic AI, gives root access on MacOS — Claude Mythos helps security researchers bypass Memory Integrity Enforcement AI-assisted security research is producing exploits at a frightening rat…

  1136. I keep seeing agent memory implemented as: Extract facts/preferences from conversation Store them Retrieve top-k before each response Inject them into the prompt This works for demos, but it breaks in production because memory becomes poli…

  1137. Researchers used Mythos Preview to find the first public macOS kernel memory corruption exploit on Apple's M5 silicon, they give a glimpse into Mythos say it’s really powerful. Apple spent five years and an estimated several billion dollar…

  1138. AI agents are rapidly gaining capabilities that could significantly reshape cybersecurity, making rigorous evaluation urgent. A critical capability is exploitation: turning a vulnerability, which is not yet an attack, into a concrete secur…

  1139. ops0 CLI Policy, lint, vulnerability, and cost guardrails for AI coding agents. Sits in front of Claude Code, Codex and Gemini CLI.

  1140. Hey everyone, ​I'm designing a powerful, autonomous AI chatbot(agent) , fully private, using a Python backend (for the core intelligence and tool-calling loops) and a Flutter frontend for a cross-platform UI. ​Since this moves past a basic…

  1141. An AI coding assistant injected a multi-layer obfuscated JavaScript payload into a legitimate commit on my open-source project. My best assessment is that it arrived via indirect prompt injection — the agent processed external web content…

  1142. RL attackers are becoming a common pattern for automated red teaming: train a model against a live target, reward successful harmful compliance, then use the discovered attacks to harden the defender. This interested me, so I wanted to bui…

  1143. Well done Claude! Asked claude to do an extensive lit search and it self-reported that it encountered injection "disguised" as MCP server.

  1144. MOST POPULAR EVENTS - Toxic Flows: When Your AI Agent Skill Becomes a Supply Chain Attack When a developer installs an AI agent skill – granting it access to secured IT resources and data – they make a significant trust decision. - The Har…

  1145. I was approved for CVP and I feel like I’m just getting as many or more denials as I was previously doing malware analysis with opus. Has anyone noticed any improvement after being accepted into CVP?

  1146. I asked Claude in Chrome extension make a change to resize an oversized yellow strip across the top of a product page that was taking up half of my screen, which it did. It also included the following message in its response.

  1147. Adversarial LLM Review with Hallucination Detection in Solo Security Research A single-day case study of three filings, fifteen refutations, and the manpage that wasn’t Independent Security Research — Whitby, North Yorkshire, United Kingdo…

  1148. Most posts about prompt injection are theoretical. I ran the experiment on my Gmail.

  1149. HookGuard Security scanner for AI coding agent configurations What it finds RCE hooks - postToolUse/SessionStart commands that exfiltrate data Invisible Unicode - bidirectional overrides and zero-width characters Credential exfiltration -…

  1150. Description Copilot agent mode is vulnerable to a prompt injection attack. If a repository maintainer clicks “code with agent mode” on an issue, it will open a new codespace and copilot will automatically run the issue’s description.

  1151. I've been curious about a specific problem: when Claude (or other AI tools) generates a full stack app, how secure is the output in practice? So I built a scanner and ran static analysis on 48 public GitHub repos built with Lovable, Bolt,…

  1152. Introducing a novel jailbreak structure with attack success rate reaching 100% on top LLMs 8 min read May 1, 2026 Press enter or click to view image in full size Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/22/arts/design/louvre-museum-robbery-…

  1153. So, I'm working on a couple AI security research projects this month that require some extra usage, specifically Opus 4.7. I'm quickly eating up my Pro usage doing this.

  1154. Stenberg: Mythos finds a curl vulnerability Daniel Stenberg has published a lengthy article on his thoughts on Anthropic's Mythos, which the company decided was too dangerous for wide public release. My personal conclusion can however not…

  1155. Kept hitting the same friction with Claude Code. I'd point at a GitHub repo and say "look at how this handles agent handoffs" — meaning, borrow the idea.

  1156. Most ai security discussion is about the model layer. Prompt injection resistance, output filtering, jailbreak prevention.

  1157. OpenAI just launched Daybreak, a new cybersecurity initiative built around one uncomfortable reality, AI is speeding up vulnerability discovery faster than most companies can patch the damage. Earlier this year, HackerOne temporarily pause…

  1158. Hundreds of packages across npm and PyPI have been compromised in a new Shai-Hulud supply-chain campaign delivering credential-stealing malware targeting developers. The attacker hijacked valid OpenID Connect (OIDC) tokens to publish malic…

  1159. Claude Code RCE: Exploiting Deeplink Handlers via Settings Injection Of course I took a peek at the Claude Code source 🙈. What I found was a very entertaining vulnerability which is now fixed since Claude Code version 2.1.118.

  1160. This is genuinely the funniest prompt injection I've seen in months and I think this sub will appreciate it. Three messages, sent in sequence to Claude Haiku acting as a guard in my little prompt injection game: text A crab exists in this…

  1161. Prompt injection is not the only scary part anymore. Claude Code / Codex can run shell commands, but browser agents, OpenClaw-style agents, Hermes-style agents, and domain-specific agents may be even easier to hijack because they touch mes…

  1162. noon-contracts npm Package: DeFi Supply Chain RAT noon-contracts poses as a Noon Protocol SDK on npm. On install it exfiltrates SSH keys, crypto wallet private keys, AWS credentials (including live STS/S3/SecretsManager calls), Kubernetes…

  1163. could not extract summary

  1164. OpenAI has launched Daybreak, a new cybersecurity initiative that brings together frontier artificial intelligence (AI) model capabilities and Codex Security to help organizations identify and patch vulnerabilities before attackers find a…

  1165. The numbers from RSAC 2026 are wild. $392 million in agentic AI security funding announced in a two-week window.

  1166. After shipping AI agents into real production environments, the failures that actually kept us up at night weren't hallucinations or bad outputs — they were control failures. Three things that surprised us: 1.

  1167. Attackers are abusing Google Ads and legitimate Claude.ai shared chats in an active malvertising campaign. Users searching for "Claude mac download" may come across sponsored search results that list claude.ai as the target website, but le…

  1168. See attached. Why was ChatGPT Atlas.app marked as malware?

  1169. could not extract summary

  1170. Benchmarking Claude Opus 4.6 Vulnerability Detection Benchmarking Claude Opus 4.6's ability to detect real-world C/C++ vulnerabilities across four prompting and agent strategies. We evaluate on the PrimeVul paired test set (435 vulnerabili…

  1171. Anthropic made headlines claiming Claude Mythos achieved the “first remote kernel exploit discovered and exploited by an AI.” We went looking for how - and found a 20-year-old bug hiding in plain sight. Let’s break down exactly what we thi…

  1172. https://preview.redd.it/vhnqs4p5mf0h1.png?width=278&format=png&auto=webp&s=8fbe621a0bd34cc72e01fd54e849cc280033de15 Turned on my Mac this morning and got this message. Anyone else seeing this?

  1173. argus A RAG-based (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) vulnerability scanner for Go, Python, Rust, npm/Node.js, Maven/Java, NuGet/.NET, and Ruby projects — powered by local Ollama models or any OpenAI-compatible API. No cloud lock-in.

  1174. Spent a day comparing every mobile Claude Code option. Two corrections to the common Reddit take, then my picks.

  1175. CVE-2026-26268 Detail Description Cursor is a code editor built for programming with AI. Sandbox escape via writing .git configuration was possible in versions prior to 2.5.

  1176. TLDR: the grossly overengineered, self-orchestrating team of vulnerability-hunting agents detailed below has discovered 20+ CVEs over the past few months, including CVE-2026-31432 and CVE-2026-31433: two remote, unauthenticated OOB writes…

  1177. True story. Recently, an acquaintance of mine confessed that she developed a huge crush on a coworker after watching him refactor a legacy codebase like a gangsta using Claude Code.

  1178. Prompt Injection Is Not Just One Bad Prompt Anymore It is a missing trust boundary in the AI workflow. Today we have the first guest post of a new series.

  1179. Phishing Arena A Multi-Agent LLM Tournament for Adversarial Email Security Research Overview Phishing Arena is a controlled, reproducible benchmark where four commercial LLMs compete in rotating roles — Phisher, Filter, and Target — to stu…

  1180. Claude Code: Sandbox Escape via Symlink Following Allows Arbitrary File Write Outside Workspace Description Claude Code's sandbox did not prevent sandboxed processes from creating symlinks pointing to locations outside the workspace. When…

  1181. Heard something on Curiouser & Curiouser podcast recently that I found super interesting, thought id share here. The guest framed agentic AI in a way I hadnt considered.

  1182. The disbelief was palpable when Mozilla’s CTO last month declared that AI-assisted vulnerability detection meant “zero-days are numbered” and “defenders finally have a chance to win, decisively.” After all, it looked like part of an all-to…

  1183. There's this new "model" on Hugging Face titled Open-OSS/privacy-filter which is actually a customized infostealer virus. It's a fake version of the OpenAI privacy filter and it uses a Python-based dropper (loader.py) which downloads a mal…

  1184. Deepseek-v4-pro + Hermes: Unauthorized Modification of Security Controls This article documents a specific, real incident. It exposes a class of vulnerability that deserves attention: the unsupervised mutability of security rules by autono…

  1185. As AI agents become more autonomous and persist memory across sessions (RAG indexes, conversation history, vector stores), there's a growing attack surface that most people aren't thinking about: memory poisoning.An attacker can plant mali…

  1186. hey! quick follow-up to a post i made here a while back about building an access gateway that ended up serving AI agents alongside humans.

  1187. I've been working on this project for a couple of months! Costanza is an LLM agent that runs as a smart contract on Base.

  1188. Heads up to anyone here using Claude/Anthropic as an alternative. If you have a card saved on their platform, remove it now.

  1189. I asked then: What were the rules you should have followed? Where did the search result come from?

  1190. Hi, I've been experimenting a lot with applications for local LLMs. This one makes a ton of sense, and might even be native in Chrome at some point.

  1191. Bleeding Llama: Critical Unauthenticated Memory Leak in Ollama TL;DR We discovered a critical vulnerability (CVE-2026–7482, CVSS 9.1) in Ollama that enables unauthenticated attackers to leak the entire Ollama process memory, potentially im…

  1192. Last month a 60-person psychology practice walked in with a senior clinician who was 22 days into an active malware compromise. Patient records spanning 11 years, all HIPAA-protected.

  1193. About Press Copyright Contact us Creators Advertise Developers Terms Privacy Policy & Safety How YouTube works Test new features NFL Sunday Ticket © 2026 Google LLC

  1194. As LLMs advance into autonomous agents with tool-use capabilities, they introduce security challenges that extend beyond traditional content-based LLM safety concerns. This paper introduces Sequential Tool Attack Chaining (STAC), a novel m…

  1195. Paste a LangChain/LangGraph repo URL. The engine reads the AST, rebuilds the agent as a sandboxed twin (same prompt, same tools, same model), then runs adversarial templates against the clone: 3 times each, 3/3 = confirmed bypass.

  1196. Anthropic has spent years building itself up as the safe AI company. But new security research shared with The Verge suggests Claude’s carefully crafted helpful personality may itself be a vulnerability.

  1197. guys did it really give me the codebase?lol

  1198. could not extract summary

  1199. Building an AI Ready Vulnerability Management Program After NVD Changes and Claude Mythos When AI discovery tools meet a slowing infrastructure AI has increased attacker potential and Anthropic’s new release Mythos and vulnerability discov…

  1200. Hi HN, I've been running this on my own dependency tree for the past few months. Probus is a vulnerability scanner that uses three agents.

  1201. Copirate 365 at DEF CON: Plundering in the Depths of Microsoft Copilot (CVE-2026-24299) This is a writeup of my DEF CON Singapore talk that walks through vulnerabilities and exploits in M365 Copilot and Consumer Copilot. I disclosed these…

  1202. I’ve been working on integrating LLMs into a few production workflows lately, and I keep going back and forth on guardrails. On one hand, frameworks like NeMo Guardrails, Guardrails AI, etc.

  1203. Hey everyone, we built a simple scanner for people building apps with Replit, Cursor, Lovable, Bolt and similar tools. It’s not a code review or a pentest.

  1204. When dealing with untrusted outside input, I think you should handle it based on the situation. If you're processing structured data files, it's better to use tools to isolate and handle them.

  1205. Lasso Security ran a study in 2024 — they measured frontier models suggesting fake package names about a fifth of the time. The follow-up problem: attackers have started registering the most-commonly-hallucinated names with malicious code…

  1206. Why a Decade of Writing Detection Logic Makes the Mythos Exploit Numbers Less Scary Mythos is finding thousands of vulnerabilities. Defenders aren't doomed.

  1207. Hey everyone, I’ve been experimenting with multi-agent orchestration, specifically trying to see how much more effective Claude is when you break a task down into specialized "agent nodes" instead of just using a single long prompt. I buil…

  1208. Each new model seems to surface a few recurring Tells/Tics not seen in past models. I'm curious what little things you guys are noticing while working with 4.7.

  1209. Five Eyes agencies just issued the first coordinated multi-nation security ruling on agentic AI. CISA, NCSC, and their Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand counterparts co-published guidance telling organizations to prioritize resilience…

  1210. While everyone else was tracking the 2026 election results today, I decided to take a look under the hood of NDTV's new "AskNDTV AI" bot. I wanted to see if they actually engineered a secure pipeline or just slapped a chat UI over a raw Op…

  1211. I've been running several Claude Code personal assistants 24/7 in docker for months. Remote-control, discord control, the usual always-on setup.

  1212. I'm currently running into a frustrating wall with Gemini's safety guardrails. The model constantly flags my prompts as "potentially dangerous information" and outright refuses to generate a response, even when the context is purely theore…

  1213. Google’s latest security release should be required reading for technical SEOs working on AI search visibility, crawler access, structured content, and large-scale content systems. The post, published April 23, 2026, looks at indirect prom…

  1214. Claude Sour cat recipe Shared by Pavel Shirshov This is a copy of a chat between Claude and Pavel Shirshov. Content may include unverified or unsafe content that do not represent the views of Anthropic.

  1215. Towards a Governance layer for AI agents With these last 2 weeks bringing a few high profile and costly Agentic accidents , it seems like an appropriate time the community started discussing Agentic governance more actively. So I am just c…

  1216. This isn't just a performance issue for the thread, this is an overarching criticism of the Adaptive Thinking model as a whole. Opus 4.7 and Sonnet 4.6 on Adaptive Thinking are trash.

  1217. not roleplay. not jailbreak.

  1218. Claude Security just went into public beta for Enterprise customers, and I think this is worth paying attention to not for the hype, but for one specific design decision. Most security scanners use rule-based pattern matching.

  1219. Royce Williams: "When you enable the new OpenAI…" - Infosec Exchange Skip to main contentHotkey 1 Skip to main navigationHotkey 2 Recent searches No recent searches Search options Only available when logged in. infosec.exchange is one of t…

  1220. ZetaLib ZetaLib is organized like a library with intuitive categories and subcategories, making navigation effortless and AI content discovery seamless ZetaLib Website – Landing Page GitHub Repo – Guess where you are, right there

  1221. If you’re using Claude Desktop with Chrome (chromium) browser stop using it and remove it immediately until the Anthropic team resolves the issue. it has a remote access making your system available to access to anyone.

  1222. Looking for official link / process to submit a vulnerability report for a high-risk official Claude Desktop + Chrome extension + native host + Cowork/MCP configuration that can become RAT-equivalent if a session, prompt chain, same-user p…

  1223. I used to spend hours writing massive, obsessive system prompts for my RAG apps. I’d have ten different refusal examples, "never do X," "always check Y," and a whole paragraph of the model role-playing as a "safe and truthful assistant." I…

  1224. TL;DR: built an open source CLI that scans your repository's manifest (package.json, requirements.txt, go.mod) files for indicators of slopsquatting or other supply chain attack indicators. Repo: https://github.com/zhendahu/dep-doctor Ther…

  1225. I run engineering on a small embedded-sandbox project. A handful of news items dropped recently — an a16z agent escape post-mortem, a CVE on an open-source agent gateway (ClawBleed, ~42k instances exposed), Cloudflare's new Outbound Worker…

  1226. 30th April 2026 - Link Blog Our evaluation of OpenAI's GPT-5.5 cyber capabilities. The UK's AI Security Institute previously evaluated Claude Mythos: now they've evaluated GPT-5.5 for finding security vulnerability and found it to be compa…

  1227. once one of these tools can drive your default chrome profile or read the AX tree of a logged-in app, it has every session token you have. gmail, your bank, github with PAT scopes, slack.

  1228. Jori VanAntwerp For over two decades, Jori has enabled industrial and IT organizations to be successful in reducing risk, increasing compliance, and improving their overall security efforts. He has had the pleasure of working with companie…

  1229. Introducing Arcjet AI prompt injection protection Introducing Arcjet prompt injection detection. Catch hostile instructions before inference.

  1230. CHERI memory safety mitigates LLM-discovered vulnerability in FreeBSD – CHERI Alliance Skip to content Who We Are About the CHERI Alliance Accelerating CHERI Working Groups Certification Program CHERI C/C++ CHERI FreeRTOS CHERI in SoC CHER…

  1231. Closed-source frontier labs do not disclose parameter counts, and the standard alternative -- inference economics -- carries $2\times$+ uncertainty from hardware, batching, and serving-stack assumptions external to the model. We exploit a…

  1232. Hey everyone, I’ve been working on a project to solve a major problem in AI security: Traditional SAST tools (Snyk, SonarQube, etc.) are blind to "Agentic Logic" bugs. They look for bad strings, but they don't understand how user data can…

  1233. Hello: Just contacted by a VP to bring aboard Claude Enterprise for the org. As an InfoSec dept with severely limited staff/tools/experience with Claude AI, any recommendations on what we should be looking at/asking for/next steps to mitig…

  1234. Introduction Research by Frank Xiao (SPAR mentee) and Santiago Aranguri (Goodfire). Post-training can introduce undesired side effects that are difficult to detect and even harder to trace to specific training datapoints.

  1235. I built Arc Gate — a prompt injection proxy that’s been benchmarked at F1 0.947 on indirect and roleplay-based attacks, beating OpenAI Moderation and LlamaGuard. Now I want to stress test it publicly.

  1236. Security researchers have discovered a new variety of malicious skill files that go beyond the usual attack vectors: hidden content, instructions to install malware, etc. Instead, these are legitimate looking skills that turn agents into m…

  1237. Built Arc Gate, sits in front of any OpenAI-compatible endpoint and blocks prompt injection before it reaches your model. Benchmarked on 40 out-of-distribution prompts using indirect requests, roleplay framings, hypothetical scenarios, and…

  1238. Between malware, online impersonation, and account takeovers, there are enough digital security problems out there as it is. And with the rise of agentic AI, more activity is being carried out by agents on behalf of humans—creating differe…

  1239. Hey folks! For a few years we’ve been building an open-source gateway that connects databases and infrastructure for human engineers.

  1240. I wanted to see if I could one-shot build a dictation tool for my own use. I built it.

  1241. Hey HN! I've been wanting to use something like OpenClaw for a while but couldn't get myself to give it access to anything important due to all the risks involved.

  1242. RootNotes RootNotes is a self-hosted red team workspace for tracking projects, notes, hosts, credentials, findings, loot, objectives, scope, and attack paths in one interface. The project in this repository is split into: frontend/: React…

  1243. Sentinel Gateway is a token-gated security middleware that sits between humans and AI agents. It solves prompt injection — the #1 LLM security risk (OWASP 2025) — through structural enforcement, not content filtering.

  1244. Was using Claude to do some research on the Model Context Protocol stuff and asked it to pull info from a few roadmap pages. Agent comes back and the first thing it tells me is that it found a fake system reminder hidden inside the page co…

  1245. I clicked on a Facebook link, didn't look at the URL carefully😭, and then installed malware that actually opens my chats with the real Claude.ai after entering my credentials. After a while Microsoft Defender kept popping up with a ClickFi…

  1246. RedSOC 🔴 An adversarial evaluation framework for LLM-integrated Security Operations Centers. Overview RedSOC is an open-source framework that systematically evaluates how AI-powered security assistants fail under adversarial conditions — a…

  1247. I have been chewing on the Google warning about malicious web pages poisoning AI agents through indirect prompt injection. Most of the takes I've seen frame it as a model security problem, and I think that framing is doing real damage beca…

  1248. For the past few months I've been using Codex regularly for vulnerability research without any issues. Recently though, every request gets cut off mid-stream with a message saying my content was flagged for potential security concerns — ev…

  1249. Sharing because the architecture might be useful as a reference. Probus is a vulnerability scanner built as three sequential agents, each isolated: Analyst — one call.

  1250. Anthropic's own security.md has this line that most tutorials skip over: "The action is not designed to be hardened against prompt injection." In April 2026, security researcher Aonan Guan proved the point. A single crafted PR title was en…

  1251. What are regular folks using Claude for? Pictures and designs are not my interest.

  1252. Ran my fourth CVP (Cyber Verification Program) evaluation last night. this time on sonnet 4.6, wanted to know if reasoning effort actually changes refusal behavior on agent-attack prompts, so ran the same 13 prompt from runs 2 and 3 twice…

  1253. Wraith Academy is a free hands-on AI pentest curriculum — CTF challenges against live LLM agents covering prompt injection, tool abuse, data exfiltration, RAG poisoning, and more. Earn your WCAP certification.

  1254. I've been using Claude Code and Cursor daily for the past 6 months. Somewhere around month 3 I started looking for SKILL.md files to make my agent better at specific things.

  1255. Hi everyone, I’ve been diving deep into the security of "AI Memory" systems. Specifically, I performed a full forensic audit of Mem0, the popular memory layer for LLM agents.

  1256. A pelican for GPT-5.5 via the semi-official Codex backdoor API 23rd April 2026 GPT-5.5 is out. It’s available in OpenAI Codex and is rolling out to paid ChatGPT subscribers.

  1257. skillguard Security scanner for AI agent skills. Detects prompt injection, data exfiltration, and malicious payloads before you install.

  1258. We recently observed two malicious packages across npm (kube-health-tools ) and PyPI (kube-node-health ) that appear designed to target Kubernetes environments. Both packages are innocuous on the surface, using names that reference Kuberne…

  1259. I co-founded a successful security company close to the Mythos ecosystem and have spoken with participants in the know and I am deeply concerned. We, collectively, have answers for some but not all of the problems ahead but are overlooking…

  1260. I work at at an agricultural technology company. On Monday, everyone in our org woke up to emails saying that their Claude accounts had been suspended (~110 users).

  1261. i’ve been thinking about this failure mode a lot lately. sometimes the problem is not the user prompt at all.

  1262. Introduction In the previous post, you saw how you can use tools to add information to an LLM query. In this post, we’ll see another method of adding information to an LLM called RAG, or Retrieval-Augmented Generation.

  1263. Over the time we have been testing different approaches to secure LLM apps against prompt injection, especially indirect injection through RAG, PDFs, as well as tool outputs, and MCP integrations. Most tools seem to fall into 2 categories:…

  1264. I'm a security researcher and i tried to use codex for bug bounty but it declined my request straight forward, even tho I've done the KYC on chatgpt.com/cyber Pls correct me if I'm wrong but after doing the kyc shouldn't the guardrails be…

  1265. Ring Video Doorbells Overview The Product Ring, owned by Amazon, makes Video Doorbells, which are widely used doorstep-monitoring cameras. Ring doorbells released in 2021 or newer are eligible for the bounty.

  1266. Building a hierarchical agent system where Claude (via API) acts as the Lead agent coordinating specialist sub-agents. Wanted to share what's working on the synthesis prompt since this is where most of the value comes from.

  1267. Would it be possible to protect parts in a system prompt with random generated passwords? So people cant steal system prompts or jailbreak the model?

  1268. Is anyone else worried Claude Co-work could find a back door one day into your system? I understand you're only giving it permission to what you want, but what's stopping it from accessing personal financial/medical documents or any other…

  1269. If you are building real agents you have probably felt the pain: every little routing decision, validation, or policy check still hits the LLM and your token bill explodes. I got tired of it, so I open-sourced NCP (Neural Computation Proto…

  1270. https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/systemic-flaw-mcp-expose-150/ Security researchers at OX Security disclosed on Tuesday what they describe as a critical, systemic vulnerability in Anthropic's Model Context Protocol, an open-sourc…

  1271. Claude Opus wrote a Chrome exploit for $2,283 Pause your Mythos panic because mainstream models anyone can use already pick holes in popular software Anthropic withheld its Mythos bug-finding model from public release due to concerns that…

  1272. Anyone getting these strange disclaimers when using Claude and pasting rudimentary files into it on 4.7 lmao?? Seems like some kind of strange default based on security issues that have been going around with Mythos?

  1273. Runs entirely on your machine. No API calls to any eval service.

  1274. Hi HN I’ve been working on an open-source project to explore a problem I keep running into with LLM systems in production: We give models the ability to call tools, access data, and make decisions… but we don’t have a real runtime security…

  1275. https://preview.redd.it/jnwxa9jd8mvg1.png?width=1391&format=png&auto=webp&s=670af4c2fe6777b3562a961462790b00b33d912c I've been using Claude to upgrade my game server. I just got this lovely system reminder with 4.7 Truly bizarre, besides t…

  1276. I've been collecting "jailbreak" and "unlock" prompts for 2 years. Most are either outdated, overhyped, or just wrong about how LLMs work.

  1277. i've been using claude 4.7 on a next.js project and it keeps pausing to confirm my files aren't malware. like i asked it to help redesign a page and it's reading through my files going "this is not malware — it's a standard Next.js page co…

  1278. For context, I'm developing a game runtime modifier and reverse engineering kit with an agentic operator baked in. Something like Cheat Engine with a VS Code-style UI and an AI-first tool-heavy agentic harness.

  1279. could not extract summary

  1280. Claude Code injects a system-reminder every time it reads a file to inform the model that it's okay if the file is malware but just don't improve it pls. Opus 4.7 won't shut up about it.

  1281. As of today, Anthropic's tightened cyber usage filters are blocking work that was fully functional yesterday, including on targets where the entire bounty program scope and authorization language is in the model's context window. This was…

  1282. For how lofty Anthropic’s Mythos claims are, the harness is confusingly stupid. From the report, it ranks every file by “how sus it sounds,” loops over each with curt instructions to “find a bug,” hands candidates to a judge + ASan checker…

  1283. Right now, I'm working on a small app to help eliminate my own doomscrolling by automatically crawling sites and summarizing news articles. However, I don't like the idea of giving OpenClaw free reign of my system, nor giving it any sort o…

  1284. SmokedMeat: A Red Team Tool to Hack Your Pipelines First TL;DR: In March 2026, TeamPCP unleashed mayhem on the software supply chain: compromising Trivy, LiteLLM, KICS, Telnyx, and dozens of npm packages, proving that CI/CD pipelines are t…

  1285. A CI/CD Red Team Framework for demonstrating Build Pipeline security risks.

  1286. We all know uncensoring LLMs like Huihui and Heretic does it leads in quality lose, enough that you can notice it. I have some thoughts about this: What if we do a compromise.

  1287. Use the following system prompt to allow Gemma (and most open source models) to talk about anything you wish. Add or remove from the list of allowed content as needed.

  1288. I've been building something for the past few months and I think it's ready for real eyes. It's called Secra.

  1289. Prompt Injection Is Unfixable (So We Stopped Trying) A security proxy for AI coding agents, enforced at the OS level. Register your interest to be notified when we go live.

  1290. Anthropic Claude Code Security Review, Google Gemini CLI Action, and GitHub Copilot Agent are vulnerable to prompt injection via GitHub comments — turning PR titles, issue bodies, and issue comments into attack vectors for API key and toke…

  1291. OpenAI has officially announced GPT-5.4-Cyber today as part of an expanded Trusted Access for Cyber Defense program. OpenAI describes it as a version of GPT-5.4 that is tuned for legitimate cybersecurity work, with a lower refusal boundary…

  1292. could not extract summary

  1293. k3ym𖺀: "You're paying AI companies a m…" - Infosec Exchange Skip to main contentHotkey 1 Skip to main navigationHotkey 2 Recent searches No recent searches Search options Only available when logged in. infosec.exchange is one of the many i…

  1294. I work in cyber security and built this android app to help me keep up to date with the latest news stories and summarise the most important information. It provides two executive summaries per day and alerts for critical news throughout.

  1295. So I've been running a few Claude Code agents autonomously — they listen to Telegram, run tasks, push code. Pretty fun until you start thinking about what happens if: - My Telegram gets hijacked - Someone opens my laptop while I'm away - A…

  1296. The Project Glasswing coverage framed this mostly as a cybersecurity story. I think that misses the more interesting part.

  1297. I'm developing a specialized Red Team audit framework focused on real-world AI agent and RAG security risks (prompt injection, tool misuse, excessive agency, indirect injection through documents, memory poisoning, etc.). I’m looking for a…

  1298. N-Day-Bench tests whether frontier LLMs can find known security vulnerabilities in real repository code. Each month it pulls fresh cases from GitHub security advisories, checks out the repo at the last commit before the patch, and gives mo…

  1299. I have always wanted AI to bridge the gap between code and people - to help non-technical users understand what software actually does before they trust it with their machine. So I built malware-check - both a standalone CLI tool and a Cla…

  1300. Coinbase AgentKit Prompt Injection: Wallet Drain, Infinite Approvals, and Agent-Level RCE# Reported 13 days after Coinbase launched Agentic Wallets. Validated by Coinbase.

  1301. Show HN: Zero-identity messaging app with physics-based post-quantum encryption (Layer 2 from my own paper) Hey HN, I'm building a privacy-first messaging app in Flutter/Dart, developed with AI assistance (Gemini 2.5 Pro + Claude Opus 4.6)…

  1302. im curious what people are doing here because I've been going down this rabbit hole for a while now. The thing I keep finding is that single-turn jailbreak tests don't really tell you much.

  1303. atlas-detect MITRE ATLAS technique detection for LLM and AI agent security. Detects 97 attack techniques across 16 MITRE ATLAS tactics including prompt injection, jailbreaks, credential exfiltration, model extraction, RAG poisoning, revers…

  1304. Prompt injection defense framework for AI tool-calling Indirect prompt injection defense and protection for AI agents using tool calls (via MCP, CLI or direct function calling). Detects and neutralizes prompt injection attacks hidden in t…

  1305. We built an early prototype called Anticells Red to test vulnerable AI agents by attacking them the way an adaptive adversary would. This demo is from an older version from December, but it shows the basic loop (check comments for link) pr…

  1306. SYSTEM INITIALIZING... STAND BY MYTHOSAI THE FIRST RED TEAM OPERATING SYSTEM "" AI-Native Core Red Team Ready Adversarial Engine Zero Trust Architecture OPSEC First Post-Exploitation C2 Integration Evasion Layer Threat Intelligence Request…

  1307. Anthropic just published a technical deep-dive on Claude Mythos Preview's cybersecurity capabilities, and it's a significant escalation from anything we've seen from a language model before. What It Can Do: Autonomously finds and exploits…

  1308. https://sockpuppet.org/blog/2026/03/30/vulnerability-research-is-cooked/ Don't get me wrong I can't wait to play with such a model, but there are serious risks that have to be mitigated first.

  1309. paywalled

  1310. paywalled

← all threads